Sofie Goethals

Sofie Goethals, Kenneth Sörensen, David Martens

Black-box machine learning models are being used in more and more high-stakes domains, which creates a growing need for Explainable AI (XAI). Unfortunately, the use of XAI in machine learning introduces new privacy risks, which currently remain largely unnoticed. We introduce the explanation linkage attack, which can occur when deploying instance-based strategies to find counterfactual explanations. To counter such an attack, we propose k-anonymous counterfactual explanations and introduce pureness as a new metric to evaluate the validity of these k-anonymous counterfactual explanations. Our results show that making the explanations, rather than the whole dataset, k- anonymous, is beneficial for the quality of the explanations.

Sofie Goethals, David Martens, Theodoros Evgeniou

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly used in high-stakes domains of our life, increasing the need to explain these decisions and to make sure that they are aligned with how we want the decision to be made. The field of Explainable AI (XAI) has emerged in response. However, it faces a significant challenge known as the disagreement problem, where multiple explanations are possible for the same AI decision or prediction. While the existence of the disagreement problem is acknowledged, the potential implications associated with this problem have not yet been widely studied. First, we provide an overview of the different strategies explanation providers could deploy to adapt the returned explanation to their benefit. We make a distinction between strategies that attack the machine learning model or underlying data to influence the explanations, and strategies that leverage the explanation phase directly. Next, we analyse several objectives and concrete scenarios the providers could have to engage in this behavior, and the potential dangerous consequences this manipulative behavior could have on society. We emphasize that it is crucial to investigate this issue now, before these methods are widely implemented, and propose some mitigation strategies.

James Hinns, Sofie Goethals, Stephan Van der Veeken et al.

Counterfactual explanations are widely used to communicate how inputs must change for a model to alter its prediction. For a single instance, many valid counterfactuals can exist, which leaves open the possibility for an explanation provider to cherry-pick explanations that better suit a narrative of their choice, highlighting favourable behaviour and withholding examples that reveal problematic behaviour. We formally define cherry-picking for counterfactual explanations in terms of an admissible explanation space, specified by the generation procedure, and a utility function. We then study to what extent an external auditor can detect such manipulation. Considering three levels of access to the explanation process: full procedural access, partial procedural access, and explanation-only access, we show that detection is extremely limited in practice. Even with full procedural access, cherry-picked explanations can remain difficult to distinguish from non cherry-picked explanations, because the multiplicity of valid counterfactuals and flexibility in the explanation specification provide sufficient degrees of freedom to mask deliberate selection. Empirically, we demonstrate that this variability often exceeds the effect of cherry-picking on standard counterfactual quality metrics such as proximity, plausibility, and sparsity, making cherry-picked explanations statistically indistinguishable from baseline explanations. We argue that safeguards should therefore prioritise reproducibility, standardisation, and procedural constraints over post-hoc detection, and we provide recommendations for algorithm developers, explanation providers, and auditors.

David Martens, Galit Shmueli, Theodoros Evgeniou et al.

Understanding the decisions made and actions taken by increasingly complex AI system remains a key challenge. This has led to an expanding field of research in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), highlighting the potential of explanations to enhance trust, support adoption, and meet regulatory standards. However, the question of what constitutes a "good" explanation is dependent on the goals, stakeholders, and context. At a high level, psychological insights such as the concept of mental model alignment can offer guidance, but success in practice is challenging due to social and technical factors. As a result of this ill-defined nature of the problem, explanations can be of poor quality (e.g. unfaithful, irrelevant, or incoherent), potentially leading to substantial risks. Instead of fostering trust and safety, poorly designed explanations can actually cause harm, including wrong decisions, privacy violations, manipulation, and even reduced AI adoption. Therefore, we caution stakeholders to beware of explanations of AI: while they can be vital, they are not automatically a remedy for transparency or responsible AI adoption, and their misuse or limitations can exacerbate harm. Attention to these caveats can help guide future research to improve the quality and impact of AI explanations.

Sandra C. Matz, C. Blaine Horton, Sofie Goethals

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act on people's behalf: they write emails, buy groceries, and book restaurants. While the outsourcing of human decision-making to AI can be both efficient and effective, it raises a fundamental question: how does delegating identity-defining choices to AI reshape who people become? We study the impact of agentic LLMs on two identity-relevant outcomes: interpersonal distinctiveness - how unique a person's choices are relative to others - and intrapersonal diversity - the breadth of a single person's choices over time. Using real choices drawn from social-media behavior of 1,000 U.S. users (110,000 choices in total), we compare a generic and personalized agent to a human baseline. Both agents shift people's choices toward more popular options, reducing the distinctiveness of their behaviors and preferences. While the use of personalized agents tempers this homogenization (compared to the generic AI), it also more strongly compresses the diversity of people's preference portfolios by narrowing what they explore across topics and psychological affinities. Understanding how AI agents might flatten human experience, and how using generic versus personalized agents involves distinctiveness-diversity trade-offs, is critical for designing systems that augment rather than constrain human agency, and for safeguarding diversity in thought, taste, and expression.

Lauren Rhue, Sofie Goethals, Arun Sundararajan

This study examines the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) for retrieving factual information, addressing concerns over their propensity to produce factually incorrect "hallucinated" responses or to altogether decline to even answer prompt at all. Specifically, it investigates the presence of gender-based biases in LLMs' responses to factual inquiries. This paper takes a multi-pronged approach to evaluating GPT models by evaluating fairness across multiple dimensions of recall, hallucinations and declinations. Our findings reveal discernible gender disparities in the responses generated by GPT-3.5. While advancements in GPT-4 have led to improvements in performance, they have not fully eradicated these gender disparities, notably in instances where responses are declined. The study further explores the origins of these disparities by examining the influence of gender associations in prompts and the homogeneity in the responses.

Sofie Goethals, Marco Favier, Toon Calders

Artificial Intelligence (AI) finds widespread application across various domains, but it sparks concerns about fairness in its deployment. The prevailing discourse in classification often emphasizes outcome-based metrics comparing sensitive subgroups without a nuanced consideration of the differential impacts within subgroups. Bias mitigation techniques not only affect the ranking of pairs of instances across sensitive groups, but often also significantly affect the ranking of instances within these groups. Such changes are hard to explain and raise concerns regarding the validity of the intervention. Unfortunately, these effects remain under the radar in the accuracy-fairness evaluation framework that is usually applied. Additionally, we illustrate the effect of several popular bias mitigation methods, and how their output often does not reflect real-world scenarios.

Raphael Mazzine Barbosa de Oliveira, Sofie Goethals, Dieter Brughmans et al.

In eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), counterfactual explanations are known to give simple, short, and comprehensible justifications for complex model decisions. However, we are yet to see more applied studies in which they are applied in real-world cases. To fill this gap, this study focuses on showing how counterfactuals are applied to employability-related problems which involve complex machine learning algorithms. For these use cases, we use real data obtained from a public Belgian employment institution (VDAB). The use cases presented go beyond the mere application of counterfactuals as explanations, showing how they can enhance decision support, comply with legal requirements, guide controlled changes, and analyze novel insights.