Emanuele Ratti

Alberto Termine, Emanuele Ratti, Alessandro Facchini

We provide an analysis of theory ladenness in machine learning in science, where "theory", that we call "domain theory", refers to the domain knowledge of the scientific discipline where ML is used. By constructing an account of ML models based on a comparison with phenomenological models, we show, against recent trends in philosophy of science, that ML model-building is mostly indifferent to domain theory, even if the model remains theory laden in a weak sense, which we call theory infection. These claims, we argue, have far-reaching consequences for the transferability of ML across scientific disciplines, and shift the priorities of the debate on theory ladenness in ML from descriptive to normative.

Emanuele Ratti, Mark Graves

We propose a conceptualization and implementation of AI ethics via the capability approach. We aim to show that conceptualizing AI ethics through the capability approach has two main advantages for AI ethics as a discipline. First, it helps clarify the ethical dimension of AI tools. Second, it provides guidance to implementing ethical considerations within the design of AI tools. We illustrate these advantages in the context of AI tools in medicine, by showing how ethics-based auditing of AI tools in medicine can greatly benefit from our capability-based approach.

Emanuele Ratti

The past few years have witnessed an increasing use of machine learning (ML) systems in science. Paul Humphreys has argued that, because of specific characteristics of ML systems, human scientists are pushed out of the loop of science. In this chapter, I investigate to what extent this is true. First, I express these concerns in terms of what I call epistemic control. I identify two conditions for epistemic control, called tracking and tracing, drawing on works in philosophy of technology. With this new understanding of the problem, I then argue against Humphreys pessimistic view. Finally, I construct a more nuanced view of epistemic control in ML-based science.

Emanuele Ratti

There is an overwhelming abundance of works in AI Ethics. This growth is chaotic because of how sudden it is, its volume, and its multidisciplinary nature. This makes difficult to keep track of debates, and to systematically characterize goals, research questions, methods, and expertise required by AI ethicists. In this article, I show that the relation between AI and ethics can be characterized in at least three ways, which correspond to three well-represented kinds of AI ethics: ethics and AI; ethics in AI; ethics of AI. I elucidate the features of these three kinds of AI Ethics, characterize their research questions, and identify the kind of expertise that each kind needs. I also show how certain criticisms to AI ethics are misplaced, as being done from the point of view of one kind of AI ethics, to another kind with different goals. All in all, this work sheds light on the nature of AI ethics, and sets the groundwork for more informed discussions about the scope, methods, and training of AI ethicists.