Hang Li

Peiyuan Feng, Yichen He, Guanhua Huang et al.

We introduce a novel reinforcement learning framework of LLM agents named AGILE (AGent that Interacts and Learns from Environments) designed to perform complex conversational tasks with users, leveraging LLMs, memory, tools, and interactions with experts. The agent possesses capabilities beyond conversation, including reflection, tool usage, and expert consultation. We formulate the construction of such an LLM agent as a reinforcement learning (RL) problem, in which the LLM serves as the policy model. We fine-tune the LLM using labeled data of actions and the PPO algorithm. We focus on question answering and release a dataset for agents called ProductQA, comprising challenging questions in online shopping. Our extensive experiments on ProductQA, MedMCQA and HotPotQA show that AGILE agents based on 7B and 13B LLMs trained with PPO can outperform GPT-4 agents. Our ablation study highlights the indispensability of memory, tools, consultation, reflection, and reinforcement learning in achieving the agent's strong performance. Datasets and code are available at https://github.com/bytarnish/AGILE.

Rui Zheng, Hongyi Guo, Zhihan Liu et al.

The standard Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) framework primarily focuses on optimizing the performance of large language models using pre-collected prompts. However, collecting prompts that provide comprehensive coverage is both tedious and challenging, and often fails to include scenarios that LLMs need to improve on the most. In this paper, we investigate alignment through the lens of two-agent games, involving iterative interactions between an adversarial and a defensive agent. The adversarial agent's task at each step is to generate prompts that expose the weakness of the defensive agent. In return, the defensive agent seeks to improve its responses to these newly identified prompts it struggled with, based on feedback from the reward model. We theoretically demonstrate that this iterative reinforcement learning optimization converges to a Nash Equilibrium for the game induced by the agents. Experimental results in safety scenarios demonstrate that learning in such a competitive environment not only fully trains agents but also leads to policies with enhanced generalization capabilities for both adversarial and defensive agents.