Salvador Mascarenhas

Michael Goodale, Salvador Mascarenhas

The recent successes of neural networks producing human-like language have caused significant stir in cognitive science, with many researchers arguing that classical puzzles about human cognition and challenges to artificial intelligence are being solved by neural networks. A notable case is the argument from systematicity due to Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, argues that humans display systematic biconditional dependencies. For example, someone can understand the sentence "John saw Mary" just in case that they understand the sentence "Mary saw John." Symbolic systems explain this systematicity of language and thought, while neural networks offer no immediate explanation. Several recent articles argue that this challenge has now been met by neural networks. In particular, Brenden Lake and Marco Baroni argue that their meta-learning for compositionality protocol matches and perhaps explains human systematicity. We demonstrate that these conclusions are premature. Among other results, we found that their model struggles to learn rules that are even slightly out of distribution compared to their training data. Furthermore, the model behaves unsystematically even on many within-distribution problems. We conclude that Fodor and Pylyshyn's challenge to neural networks remains unmet.

Michael Goodale, Salvador Mascarenhas, Yair Lakretz

Children acquire language despite being exposed to several orders of magnitude less data than large language models require. Meta-learning has been proposed as a way to integrate human-like learning biases into neural-network architectures, combining both the structured generalizations of symbolic models with the scalability of neural-network models. But what does meta-learning exactly imbue the model with? We investigate the meta-learning of formal languages and find that, contrary to previous claims, meta-trained models are not learning simplicity-based priors when meta-trained on datasets organised around simplicity. Rather, we find evidence that meta-training imprints neural mechanisms (such as counters) into the model, which function like cognitive primitives for the network on downstream tasks. Most surprisingly, we find that meta-training on a single formal language can provide as much improvement to a model as meta-training on 5000 different formal languages, provided that the formal language incentivizes the learning of useful neural mechanisms. Taken together, our findings provide practical implications for efficient meta-learning paradigms and new theoretical insights into linking symbolic theories and neural mechanisms.