11.3SEJul 15Code
ProfMalPlus: Agent-Coordinated Detection of Malicious NPM Packages via Static-Dynamic Analysis SynergyYiheng Huang, Zhijia Zhao, Bihuan Chen et al.
Open source software is vulnerable to supply-chain attacks through transitive dependencies, especially malicious code injected into NPM packages. Existing detectors often inadequately model obfuscated behavior, overlook JavaScript's object-centric features, poorly coordinate static and dynamic analysis, and lose semantic information during behavior abstraction. We propose ProfMalPlus, a malicious NPM package detector combining object-sensitive behavior graphs with coordinated LLM reasoning over annotated code slices. It identifies installation commands and entry files, then constructs graphs capturing sensitive APIs, third-party calls, and unresolved calls. From these graphs, ProfMalPlus extracts security-relevant slices and adds inline static analysis evidence. Local judge agents independently assess each slice. Self-consistency consolidates repeated judgements to reduce LLM variance, while a global judge synthesizes their reports into an entry-level verdict. For undetermined cases, a router selects either third-party enrichment, which adds registry derived module and method semantics, or dynamic augmentation, which executes the package in a sandbox to resolve runtime dependent behavior. The enriched evidence is fed back for reassessment. Finally, a localization agent reports malicious code snippets with explanations. ProfMalPlus achieves a 98.1% F1-score, outperforming state-of-the-art detectors by 3.5% to 52.6%. It also identified 597 previously unknown malicious packages, all confirmed and removed from NPM.
12.5CRApr 2
From Component Manipulation to System Compromise: Understanding and Detecting Malicious MCP ServersYiheng Huang, Zhijia Zhao, Bihuan Chen et al.
The model context protocol (MCP) standardizes how LLMs connect to external tools and data sources, enabling faster integration but introducing new attack vectors. Despite the growing adoption of MCP, existing MCP security studies classify attacks by their observable effects, obscuring how attacks behave across different MCP server components and overlooking multi-component attack chains. Meanwhile, existing defenses are less effective when facing multi-component attacks or previously unknown malicious behaviors. This work presents a component-centric perspective for understanding and detecting malicious MCP servers. First, we build the first component-centric PoC dataset of 114 malicious MCP servers where attacks are achieved as manipulation over MCP components and their compositions. We evaluate these attacks' effectiveness across two MCP hosts and five LLMs, and uncover that (1) component position shapes attack success rate; and (2) multi-component compositions often outperform single-component attacks by distributing malicious logic. Second, we propose and implement Connor, a two-stage behavioral deviation detector for malicious MCP servers. It first performs pre-execution analysis to detect malicious shell commands and extract each tool's function intent, and then conducts step-wise in-execution analysis to trace each tool's behavioral trajectories and detect deviations from its function intent. Evaluation on our curated dataset indicates that Connor achieves an F1-score of 94.6%, outperforming the state of the art by 8.9% to 59.6%. In real-world detection, Connor identifies two malicious servers.
10.8SEApr 12
VulWeaver: Weaving Broken Semantics for Grounded Vulnerability DetectionYiheng Cao, Yihao Chen, Xin Hu et al.
Detecting vulnerabilities in source code remains critical yet challenging, as conventional static analysis tools construct inaccurate program representations, while existing LLM-based approaches often miss essential vulnerability context and lack grounded reasoning. To mitigate these challenges, we introduce VulWeaver, a novel LLM-based approach that weaves broken program semantics into accurate representations and extracts holistic vulnerability context for grounded vulnerability detection. Specifically, VulWeaver first constructs an enhanced unified dependency graph (UDG) by integrating deterministic rules with LLM-based semantic inference to address static analysis inaccuracies. It then extracts holistic vulnerability context by combining explicit contexts from program slicing with implicit contexts, including usage, definition, and declaration information. Finally, VulWeaver employs meta-prompting with vulnerability type specific expert guidelines to steer LLMs through systematic reasoning, aggregated via majority voting for robustness. Extensive experiments on PrimeVul4J dataset have demonstrated that VulWeaver achieves a F1-score of 0.75, outperforming state-of-the-art learning-based, LLM-based, and agent-based baselines by 23%, 15%, and 60% in F1-score, respectively. VulWeaver has also detected 26 true vulnerabilities across 9 realworld Java projects, with 15 confirmed by developers and 5 CVE identifiers assigned. In industrial deployment, VulWeaver identified 40 confirmed vulnerabilities in an internal repository.
A Survey and Benchmarking of Spatial-Temporal Traffic Data Imputation ModelsShengnan Guo, Tonglong Wei, Yiheng Huang et al.
Traffic data imputation is a critical preprocessing step in intelligent transportation systems, underpinning the reliability of downstream transportation services. Despite substantial progress in imputation models, model selection and development for practical applications remains challenging due to three key gaps: 1) the absence of a model taxonomy for traffic data imputation to trace the technological development and highlight their distinct features. 2) the lack of unified benchmarking pipeline for fair and reproducible model evaluation across standardized traffic datasets. 3) insufficient in-depth analysis that jointly compare models across multiple dimensions, including effectiveness, computational efficiency and robustness. To this end, this paper proposes practice-oriented taxonomies for traffic data missing patterns and imputation models, systematically cataloging real-world traffic data loss scenarios and analyzing the characteristics of existing models. We further introduce a unified benchmarking pipeline to comprehensively evaluate 11 representative models across various missing patterns and rates, assessing overall performance, performance under challenging scenarios, computational efficiency, and providing visualizations. This work aims to provide a holistic perspective on traffic data imputation and to serve as a practical guideline for model selection and application in intelligent transportation systems.