Faheem Ullah

Xuanyu Duan, Mengmeng Ge, Triet H. M. Le et al.

Internet of Things (IoT) based applications face an increasing number of potential security risks, which need to be systematically assessed and addressed. Expert-based manual assessment of IoT security is a predominant approach, which is usually inefficient. To address this problem, we propose an automated security assessment framework for IoT networks. Our framework first leverages machine learning and natural language processing to analyze vulnerability descriptions for predicting vulnerability metrics. The predicted metrics are then input into a two-layered graphical security model, which consists of an attack graph at the upper layer to present the network connectivity and an attack tree for each node in the network at the bottom layer to depict the vulnerability information. This security model automatically assesses the security of the IoT network by capturing potential attack paths. We evaluate the viability of our approach using a proof-of-concept smart building system model which contains a variety of real-world IoT devices and potential vulnerabilities. Our evaluation of the proposed framework demonstrates its effectiveness in terms of automatically predicting the vulnerability metrics of new vulnerabilities with more than 90% accuracy, on average, and identifying the most vulnerable attack paths within an IoT network. The produced assessment results can serve as a guideline for cybersecurity professionals to take further actions and mitigate risks in a timely manner.

Hussain Ahmad, Isuru Dharmadasa, Faheem Ullah et al.

Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) systems are increasingly used in critical civil and military domains for achieving information superiority, operational efficacy, and greater situational awareness. Unlike traditional systems facing widespread cyber-attacks, the sensitive nature of C3I tactical operations make their cybersecurity a critical concern. For instance, tampering or intercepting confidential information in military battlefields not only damages C3I operations, but also causes irreversible consequences such as loss of human lives and mission failures. Therefore, C3I systems have become a focal point for cyber adversaries. Moreover, technological advancements and modernization of C3I systems have significantly increased the potential risk of cyber-attacks on C3I systems. Consequently, cyber adversaries leverage highly sophisticated attack vectors to exploit security vulnerabilities in C3I systems. Despite the burgeoning significance of cybersecurity for C3I systems, the existing literature lacks a comprehensive review to systematize the body of knowledge on C3I systems' security. Therefore, in this paper, we have gathered, analyzed, and synthesized the state-of-the-art on the cybersecurity of C3I systems. In particular, this paper has identified security vulnerabilities, attack vectors, and countermeasures/defenses for C3I systems. Furthermore, our survey has enabled us to: (i) propose a taxonomy for security vulnerabilities, attack vectors and countermeasures; (ii) interrelate attack vectors with security vulnerabilities and countermeasures; and (iii) propose future research directions for advancing the state-of-the-art on the cybersecurity of C3I systems.

Faheem Ullah, Adam Johannes Raft, Mojtaba Shahin et al.

Continuous Deployment (CD) has emerged as a new practice in the software industry to continuously and automatically deploy software changes into production. Continuous Deployment Pipeline (CDP) supports CD practice by transferring the changes from the repository to production. Since most of the CDP components run in an environment that has several interfaces to the Internet, these components are vulnerable to various kinds of malicious attacks. This paper reports our work aimed at designing secure CDP by utilizing security tactics. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of five security tactics in designing a secure pipeline by conducting an experiment on two CDPs - one incorporates security tactics while the other does not. Both CDPs have been analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. We used assurance cases with goal-structured notations for qualitative analysis. For quantitative analysis, we used penetration tools. Our findings indicate that the applied tactics improve the security of the major components (i.e., repository, continuous integration server, main server) of a CDP by controlling access to the components and establishing secure connections.