Nicolas Anastassacos

Amazon AGI, Aaron Langford, Aayush Shah et al. · amazon-science

We present Amazon Nova, a new generation of state-of-the-art foundation models that deliver frontier intelligence and industry-leading price performance. Amazon Nova Pro is a highly-capable multimodal model with the best combination of accuracy, speed, and cost for a wide range of tasks. Amazon Nova Lite is a low-cost multimodal model that is lightning fast for processing images, video, documents and text. Amazon Nova Micro is a text-only model that delivers our lowest-latency responses at very low cost. Amazon Nova Canvas is an image generation model that creates professional grade images with rich customization controls. Amazon Nova Reel is a video generation model offering high-quality outputs, customization, and motion control. Our models were built responsibly and with a commitment to customer trust, security, and reliability. We report benchmarking results for core capabilities, agentic performance, long context, functional adaptation, runtime performance, and human evaluation.

Tobias Falke, Nicolas Anastassacos, Samson Tan et al.

Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly popular for frontier large language models (LLM) but they introduce training challenges due to routing complexity. Fully leveraging parameters of an MoE model requires all experts to be well-trained and to specialize in non-redundant ways. Assessing this, however, is complicated due to lack of established metrics and, importantly, many routing techniques exhibit similar performance at smaller sizes, which is often not reflective of their behavior at large scale. To address this challenge, we propose the MoE Routing Testbed, a setup that gives clearer visibility into routing dynamics at small scale while using realistic data. The testbed pairs a data mix with clearly distinguishable domains with a reference router that prescribes ideal routing based on these domains, providing a well-defined upper bound for comparison. This enables quantifiable measurement of expert specialization. To demonstrate the value of the testbed, we compare various MoE routing approaches and show that balancing scope is the crucial factor that allows specialization while maintaining high expert utilization. We confirm that this observation generalizes to models 35x larger.

Nicolas Anastassacos, Julian García, Stephen Hailes et al.

Creating incentives for cooperation is a challenge in natural and artificial systems. One potential answer is reputation, whereby agents trade the immediate cost of cooperation for the future benefits of having a good reputation. Game theoretical models have shown that specific social norms can make cooperation stable, but how agents can independently learn to establish effective reputation mechanisms on their own is less understood. We use a simple model of reinforcement learning to show that reputation mechanisms generate two coordination problems: agents need to learn how to coordinate on the meaning of existing reputations and collectively agree on a social norm to assign reputations to others based on their behavior. These coordination problems exhibit multiple equilibria, some of which effectively establish cooperation. When we train agents with a standard Q-learning algorithm in an environment with the presence of reputation mechanisms, convergence to undesirable equilibria is widespread. We propose two mechanisms to alleviate this: (i) seeding a proportion of the system with fixed agents that steer others towards good equilibria; and (ii), intrinsic rewards based on the idea of introspection, i.e., augmenting agents' rewards by an amount proportionate to the performance of their own strategy against themselves. A combination of these simple mechanisms is successful in stabilizing cooperation, even in a fully decentralized version of the problem where agents learn to use and assign reputations simultaneously. We show how our results relate to the literature in Evolutionary Game Theory, and discuss implications for artificial, human and hybrid systems, where reputations can be used as a way to establish trust and cooperation.

Nicolas Anastassacos, Stephen Hailes, Mirco Musolesi

Social dilemmas have been widely studied to explain how humans are able to cooperate in society. Considerable effort has been invested in designing artificial agents for social dilemmas that incorporate explicit agent motivations that are chosen to favor coordinated or cooperative responses. The prevalence of this general approach points towards the importance of achieving an understanding of both an agent's internal design and external environment dynamics that facilitate cooperative behavior. In this paper, we investigate how partner selection can promote cooperative behavior between agents who are trained to maximize a purely selfish objective function. Our experiments reveal that agents trained with this dynamic learn a strategy that retaliates against defectors while promoting cooperation with other agents resulting in a prosocial society.

Nicolas Anastassacos, Mirco Musolesi

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has received significant interest in recent years notably due to the advancements made in deep reinforcement learning which have allowed for the developments of new architectures and learning algorithms. Using social dilemmas as the training ground, we present a novel learning architecture, Learning through Probing (LTP), where agents utilize a probing mechanism to incorporate how their opponent's behavior changes when an agent takes an action. We use distinct training phases and adjust rewards according to the overall outcome of the experiences accounting for changes to the opponents behavior. We introduce a parameter eta to determine the significance of these future changes to opponent behavior. When applied to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), LTP agents demonstrate that they can learn to cooperate with each other, achieving higher average cumulative rewards than other reinforcement learning methods while also maintaining good performance in playing against static agents that are present in Axelrod tournaments. We compare this method with traditional reinforcement learning algorithms and agent-tracking techniques to highlight key differences and potential applications. We also draw attention to the differences between solving games and societal-like interactions and analyze the training of Q-learning agents in makeshift societies. This is to emphasize how cooperation may emerge in societies and demonstrate this using environments where interactions with opponents are determined through a random encounter format of the IPD.

Tim Pearce, Nicolas Anastassacos, Mohamed Zaki et al.

The use of ensembles of neural networks (NNs) for the quantification of predictive uncertainty is widespread. However, the current justification is intuitive rather than analytical. This work proposes one minor modification to the normal ensembling methodology, which we prove allows the ensemble to perform Bayesian inference, hence converging to the corresponding Gaussian Process as both the total number of NNs, and the size of each, tend to infinity. This working paper provides early-stage results in a reinforcement learning setting, analysing the practicality of the technique for an ensemble of small, finite number. Using the uncertainty estimates produced by anchored ensembles to govern the exploration-exploitation process results in steadier, more stable learning.