Ninad Rajgopal

Tom Gur, Mohammad Mahdi Jahanara, Mohammad Mahdi Khodabandeh et al.

We continue the study of doubly-efficient proof systems for verifying agnostic PAC learning, for which we obtain the following results. - We construct an interactive protocol for learning the $t$ largest Fourier characters of a given function $f \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ up to an arbitrarily small error, wherein the verifier uses $\mathsf{poly}(t)$ random examples. This improves upon the Interactive Goldreich-Levin protocol of Goldwasser, Rothblum, Shafer, and Yehudayoff (ITCS 2021) whose sample complexity is $\mathsf{poly}(t,n)$. - For agnostically learning the class $\mathsf{AC}^0[2]$ under the uniform distribution, we build on the work of Carmosino, Impagliazzo, Kabanets, and Kolokolova (APPROX/RANDOM 2017) and design an interactive protocol, where given a function $f \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$, the verifier learns the closest hypothesis up to $\mathsf{polylog}(n)$ multiplicative factor, using quasi-polynomially many random examples. In contrast, this class has been notoriously resistant even for constructing realisable learners (without a prover) using random examples. - For agnostically learning $k$-juntas under the uniform distribution, we obtain an interactive protocol, where the verifier uses $O(2^k)$ random examples to a given function $f \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$. Crucially, the sample complexity of the verifier is independent of $n$. We also show that if we do not insist on doubly-efficient proof systems, then the model becomes trivial. Specifically, we show a protocol for an arbitrary class $\mathcal{C}$ of Boolean functions in the distribution-free setting, where the verifier uses $O(1)$ labeled examples to learn $f$.

Georgios Birmpas, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros Hollender et al.

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm operates by querying the best responses or the payoffs of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by responding as if his payoffs were much different than what they actually are. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm compute a commitment so that best responding to it maximizes the follower's utility, according to his true payoffs. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature only focused on the simplified scenario in which the payoff space is finite, thus leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill in this gap, by showing that it is always possible for the follower to compute (near-)optimal payoffs for various scenarios about the learning interaction between leader and follower.