Luis Vega

h-index10
2papers
264citations

2 Papers

18.3LGJul 11, 2018Code
A Hardware-Software Blueprint for Flexible Deep Learning Specialization

Thierry Moreau, Tianqi Chen, Luis Vega et al.

Specialized Deep Learning (DL) acceleration stacks, designed for a specific set of frameworks, model architectures, operators, and data types, offer the allure of high performance while sacrificing flexibility. Changes in algorithms, models, operators, or numerical systems threaten the viability of specialized hardware accelerators. We propose VTA, a programmable deep learning architecture template designed to be extensible in the face of evolving workloads. VTA achieves this flexibility via a parametrizable architecture, two-level ISA, and a JIT compiler. The two-level ISA is based on (1) a task-ISA that explicitly orchestrates concurrent compute and memory tasks and (2) a microcode-ISA which implements a wide variety of operators with single-cycle tensor-tensor operations. Next, we propose a runtime system equipped with a JIT compiler for flexible code-generation and heterogeneous execution that enables effective use of the VTA architecture. VTA is integrated and open-sourced into Apache TVM, a state-of-the-art deep learning compilation stack that provides flexibility for diverse models and divergent hardware backends. We propose a flow that performs design space exploration to generate a customized hardware architecture and software operator library that can be leveraged by mainstream learning frameworks. We demonstrate our approach by deploying optimized deep learning models used for object classification and style transfer on edge-class FPGAs.

5.5CRMay 2, 2016
Power Side Channels in Security ICs: Hardware Countermeasures

Lu Zhang, Luis Vega, Michael Taylor

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat to many cryptographic-equipped devices including smart cards, encrypted FPGA designs, and mobile phones. Designers and manufacturers of cryptographic devices have in response developed various countermeasures for protection. Attacking methods have also evolved to counteract resistant implementations. This paper reviews foundational power analysis attack techniques and examines a variety of hardware design mitigations. The aim is to highlight exposed vulnerabilities in hardware-based countermeasures for future more secure implementations.