Adam Nguyen

Feiyang Kang, Hanze Li, Adam Nguyen et al.

Curating training data is among the most consequential yet labor-intensive parts of modern AI development: practitioners iteratively propose, implement, evaluate, and revise data policies against noisy benchmark feedback. We ask whether generalist coding agents can automate this data-curation loop. We introduce *Curation-Bench*, an agent-centric benchmark that fixes the model, training recipe, and evaluation suite while giving agents command-line access to inspect data, implement policies, submit them to a fixed training/evaluation pipeline, and revise. In a vision-language instruction-tuning instantiation, out-of-the-box agents reach strong published data-selection baselines within ten iterations. However, trajectory analysis reveals a persistent *execution-research gap*: agents mainly tune local policy variants rather than explore new policy families, even when given strategy guides and paper references. Scaffolds requiring each iteration to cite, instantiate, and adapt a prior method shift agents toward method-guided exploration. The scaffolded agent autonomously composes -- without human design input -- a data-selection policy that outperforms strong published baselines at one-tenth their data budget. Overall, current agents can run the curation loop, but reliable data research requires scaffolded method adaptation, not open-ended prompting alone. Code and benchmark are open-sourced.

Myeongseob Ko, Nikhil Reddy Billa, Adam Nguyen et al.

The memorization of training data in large language models (LLMs) poses significant privacy and copyright concerns. Existing data extraction methods, particularly heuristic-based divergence attacks, often exhibit limited success and offer limited insight into the fundamental drivers of memorization leakage. This paper introduces Confusion-Inducing Attacks (CIA), a principled framework for extracting memorized data by systematically maximizing model uncertainty. We empirically demonstrate that the emission of memorized text during divergence is preceded by a sustained spike in token-level prediction entropy. CIA leverages this insight by optimizing input snippets to deliberately induce this consecutive high-entropy state. For aligned LLMs, we further propose Mismatched Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) to simultaneously weaken their alignment and induce targeted confusion, thereby increasing susceptibility to our attacks. Experiments on various unaligned and aligned LLMs demonstrate that our proposed attacks outperform existing baselines in extracting verbatim and near-verbatim training data without requiring prior knowledge of the training data. Our findings highlight persistent memorization risks across various LLMs and offer a more systematic method for assessing these vulnerabilities.