Jonathan Shaki

Jonathan Shaki, Sarit Kraus, Michael Wooldridge

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have received enormous attention over the past year and are now used by hundreds of millions of people every day. The rapid adoption of this technology naturally raises questions about the possible biases such models might exhibit. In this work, we tested one of these models (GPT-3) on a range of cognitive effects, which are systematic patterns that are usually found in human cognitive tasks. We found that LLMs are indeed prone to several human cognitive effects. Specifically, we show that the priming, distance, SNARC, and size congruity effects were presented with GPT-3, while the anchoring effect is absent. We describe our methodology, and specifically the way we converted real-world experiments to text-based experiments. Finally, we speculate on the possible reasons why GPT-3 exhibits these effects and discuss whether they are imitated or reinvented.

Jonathan Shaki, Eden Hartman, Sarit Kraus et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to provide instructions to many agents who interact with one another. Such shared reliance couples agents who appear to act independently: they may in fact be guided by a common model. This coupling can change the prospects for cooperation among agents with misaligned incentives. We study settings in which multiple LLMs each advise a population of clients who participate in instances of an underlying game, creating strategic interaction at the level of the LLMs themselves. This induces a meta-game among the LLMs, mediated through clients. We first analyze the one-shot setting, where shared instructions can change equilibrium behavior only when an LLM may influence more than one role in the same interaction; in such cases, cooperation may emerge, and the effect of client share can be beneficial, harmful, or non-monotone, depending on the base game. Our main result concerns the repeated setting. We prove a folk theorem for LLMs: despite indirect observation and the clients' inability to identify which LLM advised their opponents, all feasible and individually rational outcomes can be sustained as $\varepsilon$-equilibria. The result does not follow from the standard folk theorem and requires new proof techniques. Together, these results show that shared LLM guidance can sustain cooperation among populations of agents even when the underlying incentives are misaligned.

Ido Aharon, Jonathan Shaki, Sarit Kraus

We present an ensemble-driven self-training framework for unsupervised neural machine translation (UNMT). Starting from a primary language pair, we train multiple UNMT models that share the same translation task but differ in an auxiliary language, inducing structured diversity across models. We then generate pseudo-translations for the primary pair using token-level ensemble decoding, averaging model predictions in both directions. These ensemble outputs are used as synthetic parallel data to further train each model, allowing the models to improve via shared supervision. At deployment time, we select a single model by validation performance, preserving single-model inference cost. Experiments show statistically significant improvements over single-model UNMT baselines, with mean gains of 1.7 chrF when translating from English and 0.67 chrF when translating into English.

Benaya Trabelsi, Jonathan Shaki, Sarit Kraus

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly employed for decision-support across multiple domains. We investigate whether these models display a systematic preferential bias in favor of artificial intelligence (AI) itself. Across three complementary experiments, we find consistent evidence of pro-AI bias. First, we show that LLMs disproportionately recommend AI-related options in response to diverse advice-seeking queries, with proprietary models doing so almost deterministically. Second, we demonstrate that models systematically overestimate salaries for AI-related jobs relative to closely matched non-AI jobs, with proprietary models overestimating AI salaries more by 10 percentage points. Finally, probing internal representations of open-weight models reveals that ``Artificial Intelligence'' exhibits the highest similarity to generic prompts for academic fields under positive, negative, and neutral framings alike, indicating valence-invariant representational centrality. These patterns suggest that LLM-generated advice and valuation can systematically skew choices and perceptions in high-stakes decisions.

Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, Sarit Kraus

We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the principal also acts as a correlation device to correlate the agents' actions. We consider the setting where the agents are categorized into a small number of types. Agents of the same type share identical utility functions and are treated equitably in the utility functions of both other agents and the principal. We study the problem of computing optimal signaling strategies for the principal, under three different types of signaling channels: public, private, and semi-private. Our results include revelation-principle-style characterizations of optimal signaling strategies, linear programming formulations, and analysis of in/tractability of the optimization problems. It is demonstrated that when the maximum number of deviating agents is bounded by a constant, our LP-based formulations compute optimal signaling strategies in polynomial time. Otherwise, the problems are NP-hard.

Jonathan Shaki, Emanuele La Malfa, Michael Wooldridge et al. · oxford

We study how large language models (LLMs) reason about memorized knowledge through simple binary relations such as equality ($=$), inequality ($<$), and inclusion ($\subset$). Unlike in-context reasoning, the axioms (e.g., $a < b, b < c$) are only seen during training and not provided in the task prompt (e.g., evaluating $a < c$). The tasks require one or more reasoning steps, and data aggregation from one or more sources, showing performance change with task complexity. We introduce a lightweight technique, out-of-context representation learning, which trains only new token embeddings on axioms and evaluates them on unseen tasks. Across reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity tests, LLMs mostly perform statistically significant better than chance, making the correct answer extractable when testing multiple phrasing variations, but still fall short of consistent reasoning on every single query. Analysis shows that the learned embeddings are organized in structured ways, suggesting real relational understanding. Surprisingly, it also indicates that the core reasoning happens during the training, not inference.

Jonathan Shaki, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus

Issue salience is a major determinant in voters' decisions. Candidates and political parties campaign to shift salience to their advantage - a process termed priming. We study the dynamics, strategies and equilibria of campaign spending for voter priming in multi-issue multi-party settings. We consider both parliamentary elections, where parties aim to maximize their share of votes, and various settings for presidential elections, where the winner takes all. For parliamentary elections, we show that pure equilibrium spending always exists and can be computed in time linear in the number of voters. For two parties and all settings, a spending equilibrium exists such that each party invests only in a single issue, and an equilibrium can be computed in time that is polynomial in the number of issues and linear in the number of voters. We also show that in most presidential settings no equilibrium exists. Additional properties of optimal campaign strategies are also studied.