Timo Freiesleben

Gunnar König, Timo Freiesleben, Moritz Grosse-Wentrup

Algorithmic recourse recommendations, such as Karimi et al.'s (2021) causal recourse (CR), inform stakeholders of how to act to revert unfavourable decisions. However, some actions lead to acceptance (i.e., revert the model's decision) but do not lead to improvement (i.e., may not revert the underlying real-world state). To recommend such actions is to recommend fooling the predictor. We introduce a novel method, Improvement-Focused Causal Recourse (ICR), which involves a conceptual shift: Firstly, we require ICR recommendations to guide towards improvement. Secondly, we do not tailor the recommendations to be accepted by a specific predictor. Instead, we leverage causal knowledge to design decision systems that predict accurately pre- and post-recourse. As a result, improvement guarantees translate into acceptance guarantees. We demonstrate that given correct causal knowledge, ICR, in contrast to existing approaches, guides towards both acceptance and improvement.

Timo Freiesleben, Gunnar König, Christoph Molnar et al.

To learn about real world phenomena, scientists have traditionally used models with clearly interpretable elements. However, modern machine learning (ML) models, while powerful predictors, lack this direct elementwise interpretability (e.g. neural network weights). Interpretable machine learning (IML) offers a solution by analyzing models holistically to derive interpretations. Yet, current IML research is focused on auditing ML models rather than leveraging them for scientific inference. Our work bridges this gap, presenting a framework for designing IML methods-termed 'property descriptors' -- that illuminate not just the model, but also the phenomenon it represents. We demonstrate that property descriptors, grounded in statistical learning theory, can effectively reveal relevant properties of the joint probability distribution of the observational data. We identify existing IML methods suited for scientific inference and provide a guide for developing new descriptors with quantified epistemic uncertainty. Our framework empowers scientists to harness ML models for inference, and provides directions for future IML research to support scientific understanding.

Timo Freiesleben, Gunnar König

Despite progress in the field, significant parts of current XAI research are still not on solid conceptual, ethical, or methodological grounds. Unfortunately, these unfounded parts are not on the decline but continue to grow. Many explanation techniques are still proposed without clarifying their purpose. Instead, they are advertised with ever more fancy-looking heatmaps or only seemingly relevant benchmarks. Moreover, explanation techniques are motivated with questionable goals, such as building trust, or rely on strong assumptions about the 'concepts' that deep learning algorithms learn. In this paper, we highlight and discuss these and other misconceptions in current XAI research. We also suggest steps to make XAI a more substantive area of research.

Timo Freiesleben, Kristof Meding, Gunnar König

Machine learning systems increasingly make life-changing decisions about individuals, such as loan approvals, hiring, and cheating detection, raising a pressing question: how can individuals respond to negative decisions made by these opaque systems? While explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) has largely focused on algorithmic recourse -- helping individuals change their features to obtain a desired outcome -- the parallel problem of algorithmic contestability -- helping individuals review and correct erroneous algorithmic decisions -- has received far less attention, despite its central ethical and legal importance. We trace this neglect to the absence of clear formal definitions and a systematic operationalization of contestability as an algorithmic problem. To address it, we propose an operational definition of contestability as a natural complement to recourse: contestability starts from the presumption that a decision may be incorrect and focuses on identifying evidence to challenge and potentially overturn it, whereas recourse assumes the decision is valid and instead provides pathways for changing it. We show that standard XAI explanations, such as counterfactuals, LIME, or Anchors, even when combined with human intuitions about decision continuity or monotonicity, reveal only errors in the neighborhood of the individual, but provide insufficient grounds for overturning the decision at hand. Going thus beyond traditional XAI, we identify three types of evidence warranting reversal according to the decision maker's own ethical standards: predictive multiplicity, incorrect feature values, and neglected overruling evidence. We argue that these render decisions normatively indefensible and thus successfully contestable. Finally, we analyze how existing EU legislation connects to our framework and argue that individuals already hold some legal rights to these forms of evidence.

Timo Freiesleben

Recent work in machine learning increasingly attributes human-like capabilities such as reasoning or theory of mind to large language models (LLMs) on the basis of benchmark performance. This paper examines this practice through the lens of construct validity, understood as the problem of linking theoretical capabilities to their empirical measurements. It contrasts three influential frameworks: the nomological account developed by Cronbach and Meehl, the inferential account proposed by Messick and refined by Kane, and Borsboom's causal account. I argue that the nomological account provides the most suitable foundation for current LLM capability research. It avoids the strong ontological commitments of the causal account while offering a more substantive framework for articulating construct meaning than the inferential account. I explore the conceptual implications of adopting the nomological account for LLM research through a concrete case: the assessment of reasoning capabilities in LLMs.

Susanne Dandl, Kristin Blesch, Timo Freiesleben et al.

Counterfactual explanations elucidate algorithmic decisions by pointing to scenarios that would have led to an alternative, desired outcome. Giving insight into the model's behavior, they hint users towards possible actions and give grounds for contesting decisions. As a crucial factor in achieving these goals, counterfactuals must be plausible, i.e., describing realistic alternative scenarios within the data manifold. This paper leverages a recently developed generative modeling technique -- adversarial random forests (ARFs) -- to efficiently generate plausible counterfactuals in a model-agnostic way. ARFs can serve as a plausibility measure or directly generate counterfactual explanations. Our ARF-based approach surpasses the limitations of existing methods that aim to generate plausible counterfactual explanations: It is easy to train and computationally highly efficient, handles continuous and categorical data naturally, and allows integrating additional desiderata such as sparsity in a straightforward manner.

Timo Freiesleben

What do artificial neural networks (ANNs) learn? The machine learning (ML) community shares the narrative that ANNs must develop abstract human concepts to perform complex tasks. Some go even further and believe that these concepts are stored in individual units of the network. Based on current research, I systematically investigate the assumptions underlying this narrative. I conclude that ANNs are indeed capable of performing complex prediction tasks, and that they may learn human and non-human concepts to do so. However, evidence indicates that ANNs do not represent these concepts in individual units.

Gunnar König, Hidde Fokkema, Timo Freiesleben et al.

When applicants get rejected by an algorithmic decision system, recourse explanations provide actionable suggestions for how to change their input features to get a positive evaluation. A crucial yet overlooked phenomenon is that recourse explanations are performative: When many applicants act according to their recommendations, their collective behavior may change statistical regularities in the data and, once the model is refitted, also the decision boundary. Consequently, the recourse algorithm may render its own recommendations invalid, such that applicants who make the effort of implementing their recommendations may be rejected again when they reapply. In this work, we formally characterize the conditions under which recourse explanations remain valid under performativity. A key finding is that recourse actions may become invalid if they are influenced by or if they intervene on non-causal variables. Based on our analysis, we caution against the use of standard counterfactual explanations and causal recourse methods, and instead advocate for recourse methods that recommend actions exclusively on causal variables.

Timo Freiesleben, Sebastian Zezulka

Predictive benchmarking, the evaluation of machine learning models based on predictive performance and competitive ranking, is a central epistemic practice in machine learning research and an increasingly prominent method for scientific inquiry. Yet, benchmark scores alone provide at best measurements of model performance relative to an evaluation dataset and a concrete learning problem. Drawing substantial scientific inferences from the results, say about theoretical tasks like image classification, requires additional assumptions about the theoretical structure of the learning problems, evaluation functions, and data distributions. We make these assumptions explicit by developing conditions of construct validity inspired by psychological measurement theory. We examine these assumptions in practice through three case studies, each exemplifying a typical intended inference: measuring engineering progress in computer vision with ImageNet; evaluating policy-relevant weather predictions with WeatherBench; and examining limitations of the predictability of life events with the Fragile Families Challenge. Our framework clarifies the conditions under which benchmark scores can support diverse scientific claims, bringing predictive benchmarking into perspective as an epistemological practice and a key site of conceptual and theoretical reasoning in machine learning.

Christoph Molnar, Timo Freiesleben, Gunnar König et al.

Scientists and practitioners increasingly rely on machine learning to model data and draw conclusions. Compared to statistical modeling approaches, machine learning makes fewer explicit assumptions about data structures, such as linearity. However, their model parameters usually cannot be easily related to the data generating process. To learn about the modeled relationships, partial dependence (PD) plots and permutation feature importance (PFI) are often used as interpretation methods. However, PD and PFI lack a theory that relates them to the data generating process. We formalize PD and PFI as statistical estimators of ground truth estimands rooted in the data generating process. We show that PD and PFI estimates deviate from this ground truth due to statistical biases, model variance and Monte Carlo approximation errors. To account for model variance in PD and PFI estimation, we propose the learner-PD and the learner-PFI based on model refits, and propose corrected variance and confidence interval estimators.

Gunnar König, Timo Freiesleben, Moritz Grosse-Wentrup

Algorithmic recourse explanations inform stakeholders on how to act to revert unfavorable predictions. However, in general ML models do not predict well in interventional distributions. Thus, an action that changes the prediction in the desired way may not lead to an improvement of the underlying target. Such recourse is neither meaningful nor robust to model refits. Extending the work of Karimi et al. (2021), we propose meaningful algorithmic recourse (MAR) that only recommends actions that improve both prediction and target. We justify this selection constraint by highlighting the differences between model audit and meaningful, actionable recourse explanations. Additionally, we introduce a relaxation of MAR called effective algorithmic recourse (EAR), which, under certain assumptions, yields meaningful recourse by only allowing interventions on causes of the target.

Gunnar König, Timo Freiesleben, Bernd Bischl et al.

Global model-agnostic feature importance measures either quantify whether features are directly used for a model's predictions (direct importance) or whether they contain prediction-relevant information (associative importance). Direct importance provides causal insight into the model's mechanism, yet it fails to expose the leakage of information from associated but not directly used variables. In contrast, associative importance exposes information leakage but does not provide causal insight into the model's mechanism. We introduce DEDACT - a framework to decompose well-established direct and associative importance measures into their respective associative and direct components. DEDACT provides insight into both the sources of prediction-relevant information in the data and the direct and indirect feature pathways by which the information enters the model. We demonstrate the method's usefulness on simulated examples.

Timo Freiesleben

The same method that creates adversarial examples (AEs) to fool image-classifiers can be used to generate counterfactual explanations (CEs) that explain algorithmic decisions. This observation has led researchers to consider CEs as AEs by another name. We argue that the relationship to the true label and the tolerance with respect to proximity are two properties that formally distinguish CEs and AEs. Based on these arguments, we introduce CEs, AEs, and related concepts mathematically in a common framework. Furthermore, we show connections between current methods for generating CEs and AEs, and estimate that the fields will merge more and more as the number of common use-cases grows.

Christoph Molnar, Gunnar König, Julia Herbinger et al.

An increasing number of model-agnostic interpretation techniques for machine learning (ML) models such as partial dependence plots (PDP), permutation feature importance (PFI) and Shapley values provide insightful model interpretations, but can lead to wrong conclusions if applied incorrectly. We highlight many general pitfalls of ML model interpretation, such as using interpretation techniques in the wrong context, interpreting models that do not generalize well, ignoring feature dependencies, interactions, uncertainty estimates and issues in high-dimensional settings, or making unjustified causal interpretations, and illustrate them with examples. We focus on pitfalls for global methods that describe the average model behavior, but many pitfalls also apply to local methods that explain individual predictions. Our paper addresses ML practitioners by raising awareness of pitfalls and identifying solutions for correct model interpretation, but also addresses ML researchers by discussing open issues for further research.