Md Tanvir Arafin

h-index12
2papers
455citations

2 Papers

4.1LGJun 28, 2025
Cybersecurity-Focused Anomaly Detection in Connected Autonomous Vehicles Using Machine Learning

Prathyush Kumar Reddy Lebaku, Lu Gao, Yunpeng Zhang et al.

Anomaly detection in connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) is crucial for maintaining safe and reliable transportation networks, as CAVs can be susceptible to sensor malfunctions, cyber-attacks, and unexpected environmental disruptions. This study explores an anomaly detection approach by simulating vehicle behavior, generating a dataset that represents typical and atypical vehicular interactions. The dataset includes time-series data of position, speed, and acceleration for multiple connected autonomous vehicles. We utilized machine learning models to effectively identify abnormal driving patterns. First, we applied a stacked Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model to capture temporal dependencies and sequence-based anomalies. The stacked LSTM model processed the sequential data to learn standard driving behaviors. Additionally, we deployed a Random Forest model to support anomaly detection by offering ensemble-based predictions, which enhanced model interpretability and performance. The Random Forest model achieved an R2 of 0.9830, MAE of 5.746, and a 95th percentile anomaly threshold of 14.18, while the stacked LSTM model attained an R2 of 0.9998, MAE of 82.425, and a 95th percentile anomaly threshold of 265.63. These results demonstrate the models' effectiveness in accurately predicting vehicle trajectories and detecting anomalies in autonomous driving scenarios.

2.3CROct 16, 2018
Probing Attacks on Physical Layer Key Agreement for Automotive Controller Area Networks (Extended Version)

Shalabh Jain, Qian Wang, Md Tanvir Arafin et al.

Efficient key management for automotive networks (CAN) is a critical element, governing the adoption of security in the next generation of vehicles. A recent promising approach for dynamic key agreement between groups of nodes, Plug-and-Secure for CAN, has been demonstrated to be information theoretically secure based on the physical properties of the CAN bus. In this paper, we illustrate side-channel attacks, leading to nearly-complete leakage of the secret key bits, by an adversary that is capable of probing the CAN bus. We identify the fundamental characteristics that lead to such attacks and propose techniques to minimize the information leakage at the hardware, controller and system levels.