Robert Krzyzanowski

Connor Kissane, Robert Krzyzanowski, Joseph Isaac Bloom et al.

Decomposing model activations into interpretable components is a key open problem in mechanistic interpretability. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular method for decomposing the internal activations of trained transformers into sparse, interpretable features, and have been applied to MLP layers and the residual stream. In this work we train SAEs on attention layer outputs and show that also here SAEs find a sparse, interpretable decomposition. We demonstrate this on transformers from several model families and up to 2B parameters. We perform a qualitative study of the features computed by attention layers, and find multiple families: long-range context, short-range context and induction features. We qualitatively study the role of every head in GPT-2 Small, and estimate that at least 90% of the heads are polysemantic, i.e. have multiple unrelated roles. Further, we show that Sparse Autoencoders are a useful tool that enable researchers to explain model behavior in greater detail than prior work. For example, we explore the mystery of why models have so many seemingly redundant induction heads, use SAEs to motivate the hypothesis that some are long-prefix whereas others are short-prefix, and confirm this with more rigorous analysis. We use our SAEs to analyze the computation performed by the Indirect Object Identification circuit (Wang et al.), validating that the SAEs find causally meaningful intermediate variables, and deepening our understanding of the semantics of the circuit. We open-source the trained SAEs and a tool for exploring arbitrary prompts through the lens of Attention Output SAEs.

Iván Arcuschin, Jett Janiak, Robert Krzyzanowski et al.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.