Yoonjun Cho

h-index17
2papers
1,362citations

2 Papers

2.7LGFeb 2
Preserve-Then-Quantize: Balancing Rank Budgets for Quantization Error Reconstruction in LLMs

Yoonjun Cho, Dongjae Jeon, Soeun Kim et al.

Quantization Error Reconstruction (QER) reduces accuracy loss in Post-Training Quantization (PTQ) by approximating weights as $\mathbf{W} \approx \mathbf{Q} + \mathbf{L}\mathbf{R}$, using a rank-$r$ correction to reconstruct quantization error. Prior methods devote the full rank budget to error reconstruction, which is suboptimal when $\mathbf{W}$ has intrinsic low-rank structure and quantization corrupts dominant directions. We propose Structured Residual Reconstruction (SRR), a rank-allocation framework that preserves the top-$k$ singular subspace of the activation-scaled weight before quantization, quantizes only the residual, and uses the remaining rank $r-k$ for error reconstruction. We derive a theory-guided criterion for selecting $k$ by balancing quantization-exposed energy and unrecoverable error under rank constraints. We further show that resulting $\mathbf{Q} + \mathbf{L}\mathbf{R}$ parameterization naturally supports Quantized Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (QPEFT), and stabilizes fine-tuning via gradient scaling along preserved directions. Experiments demonstrate consistent perplexity reductions across diverse models and quantization settings in PTQ, along with a 5.9 percentage-point average gain on GLUE under 2-bit QPEFT.

12.0CLSep 27, 2025
A2D: Any-Order, Any-Step Safety Alignment for Diffusion Language Models

Wonje Jeung, Sangyeon Yoon, Yoonjun Cho et al.

Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) enable any-order generation, but this flexibility enlarges the attack surface: harmful spans may appear at arbitrary positions, and template-based prefilling attacks such as DIJA bypass response-level refusals. We introduce A2D (Any-Order, Any-Step Defense), a token-level alignment method that aligns dLLMs to emit an [EOS] refusal signal whenever harmful content arises. By aligning safety directly at the token-level under randomized masking, A2D achieves robustness to both any-decoding-order and any-step prefilling attacks under various conditions. It also enables real-time monitoring: dLLMs may begin a response but automatically terminate if unsafe continuation emerges. On safety benchmarks, A2D consistently prevents the generation of harmful outputs, slashing DIJA success rates from over 80% to near-zero (1.3% on LLaDA-8B-Instruct, 0.0% on Dream-v0-Instruct-7B), and thresholded [EOS] probabilities allow early rejection, yielding up to 19.3x faster safe termination.