Rolf Pfister

Simon Ouellette, Rolf Pfister, Hansueli Jud

Algorithmic generalization in machine learning refers to the ability to learn the underlying algorithm that generates data in a way that generalizes out-of-distribution. This is generally considered a difficult task for most machine learning algorithms. Here, we analyze algorithmic generalization when counting is required, either implicitly or explicitly. We show that standard Transformers are based on architectural decisions that hinder out-of-distribution performance for such tasks. In particular, we discuss the consequences of using layer normalization and of normalizing the attention weights via softmax. With ablation of the problematic operations, we demonstrate that a modified transformer can exhibit a good algorithmic generalization performance on counting while using a very lightweight architecture.

Rolf Pfister, Hansueli Jud

OpenAI's o3 achieves a high score of 87.5 % on ARC-AGI, a benchmark proposed to measure intelligence. This raises the question whether systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly o3, demonstrate intelligence and progress towards artificial general intelligence (AGI). Building on the distinction between skills and intelligence made by François Chollet, the creator of ARC-AGI, a new understanding of intelligence is introduced: an agent is the more intelligent, the more efficiently it can achieve the more diverse goals in the more diverse worlds with the less knowledge. An analysis of the ARC-AGI benchmark shows that its tasks represent a very specific type of problem that can be solved by massive trialling of combinations of predefined operations. This method is also applied by o3, achieving its high score through the extensive use of computing power. However, for most problems in the physical world and in the human domain, solutions cannot be tested in advance and predefined operations are not available. Consequently, massive trialling of predefined operations, as o3 does, cannot be a basis for AGI - instead, new approaches are required that can reliably solve a wide variety of problems without existing skills. To support this development, a new benchmark for intelligence is outlined that covers a much higher diversity of unknown tasks to be solved, thus enabling a comprehensive assessment of intelligence and of progress towards AGI.

Rolf Pfister

The article analyses foundational principles relevant to the creation of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Intelligence is understood as the ability to create novel skills that allow to achieve goals under previously unknown conditions. To this end, intelligence utilises reasoning methods such as deduction, induction and abduction as well as other methods such as abstraction and classification to develop a world model. The methods are applied to indirect and incomplete representations of the world, which are obtained through perception, for example, and which do not depict the world but only correspond to it. Due to these limitations and the uncertain and contingent nature of reasoning, the world model is constructivist. Its value is functionally determined by its viability, i.e., its potential to achieve the desired goals. In consequence, meaning is assigned to representations by attributing them a function that makes it possible to achieve a goal. This representational and functional conception of intelligence enables a naturalistic interpretation that does not presuppose mental features, such as intentionality and consciousness, which are regarded as independent of intelligence. Based on a phenomenological analysis, it is shown that AGI can gain a more fundamental access to the world than humans, although it is limited by the No Free Lunch theorems, which require assumptions to be made.