Mu Zhu

Zelin Wan, Jin-Hee Cho, Mu Zhu et al.

This paper introduces a novel approach, Decision Theory-guided Deep Reinforcement Learning (DT-guided DRL), to address the inherent cold start problem in DRL. By integrating decision theory principles, DT-guided DRL enhances agents' initial performance and robustness in complex environments, enabling more efficient and reliable convergence during learning. Our investigation encompasses two primary problem contexts: the cart pole and maze navigation challenges. Experimental results demonstrate that the integration of decision theory not only facilitates effective initial guidance for DRL agents but also promotes a more structured and informed exploration strategy, particularly in environments characterized by large and intricate state spaces. The results of experiment demonstrate that DT-guided DRL can provide significantly higher rewards compared to regular DRL. Specifically, during the initial phase of training, the DT-guided DRL yields up to an 184% increase in accumulated reward. Moreover, even after reaching convergence, it maintains a superior performance, ending with up to 53% more reward than standard DRL in large maze problems. DT-guided DRL represents an advancement in mitigating a fundamental challenge of DRL by leveraging functions informed by human (designer) knowledge, setting a foundation for further research in this promising interdisciplinary domain.

Mu Zhu, Ahmed H. Anwar, Zelin Wan et al.

Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly popular in the research community, there has not been a systematic investigation of its key components, the underlying principles, and its tradeoffs in various problem settings. This survey paper focuses on defensive deception research centered on game theory and machine learning, since these are prominent families of artificial intelligence approaches that are widely employed in defensive deception. This paper brings forth insights, lessons, and limitations from prior work. It closes with an outline of some research directions to tackle major gaps in current defensive deception research.

Iffat Anjum, Mu Zhu, Isaac Polinsky et al.

Historically, enterprise network reconnaissance is an active process, often involving port scanning. However, as routers and switches become more complex, they also become more susceptible to compromise. From this vantage point, an attacker can passively identify high-value hosts such as the workstations of IT administrators, C-suite executives, and finance personnel. The goal of this paper is to develop a technique to deceive and dissuade such adversaries. We propose HoneyRoles, which uses honey connections to build metaphorical haystacks around the network traffic of client hosts belonging to high-value organizational roles. The honey connections also act as network canaries to signal network compromise, thereby dissuading the adversary from acting on information observed in network flows. We design a prototype implementation of HoneyRoles using an OpenFlow SDN controller and evaluate its security using the PRISM probabilistic model checker. Our performance evaluation shows that HoneyRoles has a small effect on network request completion time and our security analysis demonstrates that once an alert is raised, HoneyRoles can quickly identify the compromised switch with high probability. In doing so, we show that a role-based network deception is a promising approach for defending against adversaries that have compromised network devices.

Iffat Anjum, Mohammad Sujan Miah, Mu Zhu et al.

Enterprises are increasingly concerned about adversaries that slowly and deliberately exploit resources over the course of months or even years. A key step in this kill chain is network reconnaissance, which has historically been active (e.g., network scans) and therefore detectable. However, new networking technology increases the possibility of passive network reconnaissance, which will be largely undetectable by defenders. In this paper, we propose Snaz, a technique that uses deceptively crafted honey traffic to confound the knowledge gained through passive network reconnaissance. We present a two-player non-zero-sum Stackelberg game model that characterizes how a defender should deploy honey traffic in the presence of an adversary who is aware of Snaz. In doing so, we demonstrate the existence of optimal defender strategies that will either dissuade an adversary from acting on the existence of real vulnerabilities observed within network traffic, or reveal the adversary's presence when it attempts to unknowingly attack an intrusion detection node.