CRMay 10Code
BadDLM: Backdooring Diffusion Language Models with Diverse TargetsShengfang Zhai, Xiaoyang Ji, Yuling Shi et al.
Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as an alternative modeling paradigm to autoregressive (AR) language models, enabling parallel generation and bidirectional context modeling. Yet their security implications, particularly their vulnerability to backdoor attacks, remain underexplored. We propose BadDLM, a unified framework for studying backdoor attacks against DLMs with diverse targets. We introduce a trigger-aware training objective that emphasizes target-relevant positions in poisoned samples, and theoretically prove that this objective is equivalent to training under an induced forward masking distribution. Unlike backdoors in autoregressive models, which typically manipulate next-token prediction, this characterization indicates that BadDLM can implant backdoors by exploiting the forward masking process. We instantiate BadDLM across different target levels: concept injection (BadDLM_Concept), semantic attribute steering (BadDLM_Attribute), alignment bypass (BadDLM_Align), and code payload injection (BadDLM_Payload). Experiments on mainstream open-source DLMs show that BadDLM achieves strong attack effectiveness across diverse targets while largely preserving benign utility, and remains effective against defenses designed for AR backdoors. Our findings expose a new class of security risks in diffusion-based language generation and call for defenses tailored to DLM denoising dynamics.
LGAug 8, 2024
Self-Supervised Contrastive Graph Clustering Network via Structural Information FusionXiaoyang Ji, Yuchen Zhou, Haofu Yang et al.
Graph clustering, a classical task in graph learning, involves partitioning the nodes of a graph into distinct clusters. This task has applications in various real-world scenarios, such as anomaly detection, social network analysis, and community discovery. Current graph clustering methods commonly rely on module pre-training to obtain a reliable prior distribution for the model, which is then used as the optimization objective. However, these methods often overlook deeper supervised signals, leading to sub-optimal reliability of the prior distribution. To address this issue, we propose a novel deep graph clustering method called CGCN. Our approach introduces contrastive signals and deep structural information into the pre-training process. Specifically, CGCN utilizes a contrastive learning mechanism to foster information interoperability among multiple modules and allows the model to adaptively adjust the degree of information aggregation for different order structures. Our CGCN method has been experimentally validated on multiple real-world graph datasets, showcasing its ability to boost the dependability of prior clustering distributions acquired through pre-training. As a result, we observed notable enhancements in the performance of the model.
CRMar 9, 2025
Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM RouterQiqi Lin, Xiaoyang Ji, Shengfang Zhai et al.
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in natural language processing, yet their performance and computational costs vary significantly. LLM routers play a crucial role in dynamically balancing these trade-offs. While previous studies have primarily focused on routing efficiency, security vulnerabilities throughout the entire LLM router life cycle, from training to inference, remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we present a comprehensive investigation into the life-cycle routing vulnerabilities of LLM routers. We evaluate both white-box and black-box adversarial robustness, as well as backdoor robustness, across several representative routing models under extensive experimental settings. Our experiments uncover several key findings: 1) Mainstream DNN-based routers tend to exhibit the weakest adversarial and backdoor robustness, largely due to their strong feature extraction capabilities that amplify vulnerabilities during both training and inference; 2) Training-free routers demonstrate the strongest robustness across different attack types, benefiting from the absence of learnable parameters that can be manipulated. These findings highlight critical security risks spanning the entire life cycle of LLM routers and provide insights for developing more robust models.