Marco Giunti

Marco Giunti

This paper critically examines the recent publication "ChatGPT-4 in the Turing Test" by Restrepo Echavarría (2025), challenging its central claims regarding the absence of minimally serious test implementations and the conclusion that ChatGPT-4 fails the Turing Test. The analysis reveals that the criticisms based on rigid criteria and limited experimental data are not fully justified. More importantly, the paper makes several constructive contributions that enrich our understanding of Turing Test implementations. It demonstrates that two distinct formats--the three-player and two-player tests--are both valid, each with unique methodological implications. The work distinguishes between absolute criteria (reflecting an optimal 50% identification rate in a three-player format) and relative criteria (which measure how closely a machine's performance approximates that of a human), offering a more nuanced evaluation framework. Furthermore, the paper clarifies the probabilistic underpinnings of both test types by modeling them as Bernoulli experiments--correlated in the three-player version and uncorrelated in the two-player version. This formalization allows for a rigorous separation between the theoretical criteria for passing the test, defined in probabilistic terms, and the experimental data that require robust statistical methods for proper interpretation. In doing so, the paper not only refutes key aspects of the criticized study but also lays a solid foundation for future research on objective measures of how closely an AI's behavior aligns with, or deviates from, that of a human being.

Marco Giunti, Catuscia Palamidessi, Frank D. Valencia

In this paper, we enrich the pi-calculus with an operator for confidentiality (hide), whose main effect is to restrict the access to the object of the communication, thus representing confidentiality in a natural way. The hide operator is meant for local communication, and it differs from new in that it forbids the extrusion of the name and hence has a static scope. Consequently, a communication channel in the scope of a hide can be implemented as a dedicated channel, and it is more secure than one in the scope of a new. To emphasize the difference, we introduce a spy context that represents a side-channel attack and breaks some of the standard security equations for new. To formally reason on the security guarantees provided by the hide construct, we introduce an observational theory and establish stronger equivalences by relying on a proof technique based on bisimulation semantics.