Rachel Freedman

Stephen Casper, Xander Davies, Claudia Shi et al. · berkeley, eth-zurich

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a technique for training AI systems to align with human goals. RLHF has emerged as the central method used to finetune state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs). Despite this popularity, there has been relatively little public work systematizing its flaws. In this paper, we (1) survey open problems and fundamental limitations of RLHF and related methods; (2) overview techniques to understand, improve, and complement RLHF in practice; and (3) propose auditing and disclosure standards to improve societal oversight of RLHF systems. Our work emphasizes the limitations of RLHF and highlights the importance of a multi-faceted approach to the development of safer AI systems.

Rachel Freedman

Prevailing alignment methods target a fixed set of preferences and therefore risk forcing value lock-in as societal norms evolve over time. We introduce Adaptive Pluralistic Alignment (APA), a modular pipeline for updating pluralistically aligned AI systems to track evolving values and avoid value lock-in without repeating costly pretraining or large-scale data collection. APA has three stages: (1) learning compact personalized reward models via low-rank reward basis decomposition, (2) using these models as a jury that collectively selects among candidate outputs through social-choice-theoretic voting, and (3) efficiently adapting the jury over time by fitting new annotator weights over the fixed reward bases as values shift. The resulting system is efficient, explainable, steerable, and modular. We implement a proof-of-concept instantiation using the PRISM multi-user alignment dataset and simulated historical annotators, and provide preliminary analysis showing that jury composition and the choice of voting rule can substantially affect outcomes, particularly when jury preferences are heterogeneous. We provide full code and resulting preference datasets at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/apa.

Rachel Freedman, Rohin Shah, Anca Dragan

Specifying reward functions for robots that operate in environments without a natural reward signal can be challenging, and incorrectly specified rewards can incentivise degenerate or dangerous behavior. A promising alternative to manually specifying reward functions is to enable robots to infer them from human feedback, like demonstrations or corrections. To interpret this feedback, robots treat as approximately optimal a choice the person makes from a choice set, like the set of possible trajectories they could have demonstrated or possible corrections they could have made. In this work, we introduce the idea that the choice set itself might be difficult to specify, and analyze choice set misspecification: what happens as the robot makes incorrect assumptions about the set of choices from which the human selects their feedback. We propose a classification of different kinds of choice set misspecification, and show that these different classes lead to meaningful differences in the inferred reward and resulting performance. While we would normally expect misspecification to hurt, we find that certain kinds of misspecification are neither helpful nor harmful (in expectation). However, in other situations, misspecification can be extremely harmful, leading the robot to believe the opposite of what it should believe. We hope our results will allow for better prediction and response to the effects of misspecification in real-world reward inference.

Rachel Freedman

AI algorithms increasingly make decisions that impact entire groups of humans. Since humans tend to hold varying and even conflicting preferences, AI algorithms responsible for making decisions on behalf of such groups encounter the problem of preference aggregation: combining inconsistent and sometimes contradictory individual preferences into a representative aggregate. In this paper, we address this problem in a real-world public health context: kidney exchange. The algorithms that allocate kidneys from living donors to patients needing transplants in kidney exchange matching markets should prioritize patients in a way that aligns with the values of the community they serve, but allocation preferences vary widely across individuals. In this paper, we propose, implement and evaluate a methodology for prioritizing patients based on such heterogeneous moral preferences. Instead of selecting a single static set of patient weights, we learn a distribution over preference functions based on human subject responses to allocation dilemmas, then sample from this distribution to dynamically determine patient weights during matching. We find that this methodology increases the average rank of matched patients in the sampled preference ordering, indicating better satisfaction of group preferences. We hope that this work will suggest a roadmap for future automated moral decision making on behalf of heterogeneous groups.

Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al.

The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation algorithm that determines who gets what--and who does not. In this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and estimate weights in a principled way from their responses. We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical values of the weights we computed matter little, other than the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant effect, with certain classes of patients being (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value judgments.