James R. Wright

Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Marc Lanctot et al.

Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents with mediated equilibria. To develop hindsight rational learning in sequential decision-making settings, we formalize behavioral deviations as a general class of deviations that respect the structure of extensive-form games. Integrating the idea of time selection into counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), we introduce the extensive-form regret minimization (EFR) algorithm that achieves hindsight rationality for any given set of behavioral deviations with computation that scales closely with the complexity of the set. We identify behavioral deviation subsets, the partial sequence deviation types, that subsume previously studied types and lead to efficient EFR instances in games with moderate lengths. In addition, we present a thorough empirical analysis of EFR instantiated with different deviation types in benchmark games, where we find that stronger types typically induce better performance.

Alireza Masoumian, James R. Wright

In standard RL, a learner attempts to learn an optimal policy for a Markov Decision Process whose structure (e.g. state space) is known. In online model selection, a learner attempts to learn an optimal policy for an MDP knowing only that it belongs to one of $M >1$ model classes of varying complexity. Recent results have shown that this can be feasibly accomplished in episodic online RL. In this work, we propose $\mathsf{MRBEAR}$, an online model selection algorithm for the average reward RL setting. The regret of the algorithm is in $\tilde O(M C_{m^*}^2 \mathsf{B}_{m^*}(T,δ))$ where $C_{m^*}$ represents the complexity of the simplest well-specified model class and $\mathsf{B}_{m^*}(T,δ)$ is its corresponding regret bound. This result shows that in average reward RL, like the episodic online RL, the additional cost of model selection scales only linearly in $M$, the number of model classes. We apply $\mathsf{MRBEAR}$ to the interaction between a learner and an opponent in a two-player simultaneous general-sum repeated game, where the opponent follows a fixed unknown limited memory strategy. The learner's goal is to maximize its utility without knowing the opponent's utility function. The interaction is over $T$ rounds with no episode or discounting which leads us to measure the learner's performance by average reward regret. In this application, our algorithm enjoys an opponent-complexity-dependent regret in $\tilde O(M(\mathsf{sp}(h^*) B^{m^*} A^{m^*+1})^{\frac{3}{2}} \sqrt{T})$, where $m^*\le M$ is the unknown memory limit of the opponent, $\mathsf{sp}(h^*)$ is the unknown span of optimal bias induced by the opponent, and $A$ and $B$ are the number of actions for the learner and opponent respectively. We also show that the exponential dependency on $m^*$ is inevitable by proving a lower bound on the learner's regret.