Hanlin Wu

Hanlin Wu, Xiaohui Rao, Zhenguang G Cai

Listeners adapt language comprehension based on their mental representations of speakers, but how these representations are updated remains unclear. We investigated whether listeners probabilistically adapt comprehension based on the frequency of speakers making stereotype-incongruent statements. In two EEG experiments, participants heard speakers make stereotype-congruent or incongruent statements, with incongruency base rate manipulated. In Experiment 1, stereotype-incongruent statements decreased high-beta (21-30 Hz) and theta (4-6 Hz) oscillatory power in the low base rate condition but increased it in the high base rate condition. The theta effect varied with listeners' openness trait: less open-minded participants tended to show theta increases to stereotype incongruencies, while more open-minded participants tended to show theta decreases. In Experiment 2, we dissociated incongruency base rate from the target speaker by manipulating it using a non-target speaker and found that only the high-beta effect persisted. Our findings reveal two potential mechanisms: a speaker-general mechanism (indicated by high-beta oscillations) that adjusts overall expectations about hearing statements that violate social stereotypes, and a speaker-specific mechanism (indicated by theta oscillations) that updates a more detailed mental model specifically about an individual speaker. These findings provide evidence for how language processing interacts with social cognition.

Xiaohui Rao, Hanlin Wu, Zhenguang G. Cai

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as social agents and trained to produce humor and irony, a question emerges: when encountering witty AI remarks, do people interpret these as intentional communication or mere computational output? This study investigates whether people adopt the intentional stance, attributing mental states to explain behavior,toward AI during irony comprehension. Irony provides an ideal paradigm because it requires distinguishing intentional contradictions from unintended errors through effortful semantic reanalysis. We compared behavioral and neural responses to ironic statements from AI versus human sources using established ERP components: P200 reflecting early incongruity detection and P600 indexing cognitive efforts in reinterpreting incongruity as deliberate irony. Results demonstrate that people do not fully adopt the intentional stance toward AI-generated irony. Behaviorally, participants attributed incongruity to deliberate communication for both sources, though significantly less for AI than human, showing greater tendency to interpret AI incongruities as computational errors. Neural data revealed attenuated P200 and P600 effects for AI-generated irony, suggesting reduced effortful detection and reanalysis consistent with diminished attribution of communicative intent. Notably, people who perceived AI as more sincere showed larger P200 and P600 effects for AI-generated irony, suggesting that intentional stance adoption is calibrated by specific mental models of artificial agents. These findings reveal that source attribution shapes neural processing of social-communicative phenomena. Despite current LLMs' linguistic sophistication, achieving genuine social agency requires more than linguistic competence, it necessitates a shift in how humans perceive and attribute intentionality to artificial agents.