Guy Aridor

Guy Aridor, Duarte Goncalves, Ruoyan Kong et al.

An increasingly important aspect of designing recommender systems involves considering how recommendations will influence consumer choices. This paper addresses this issue by introducing a method for collecting user beliefs about un-experienced items - a critical predictor of choice behavior. We implemented this method on the MovieLens platform, resulting in a rich dataset that combines user ratings, beliefs, and observed recommendations. We document challenges to such data collection, including selection bias in response and limited coverage of the product space. This unique resource empowers researchers to delve deeper into user behavior and analyze user choices absent recommendations, measure the effectiveness of recommendations, and prototype algorithms that leverage user belief data, ultimately leading to more impactful recommender systems. The dataset can be found at https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/ml_belief_2024/.

Guy Aridor, Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins et al.

Most online platforms strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We study the interplay between exploration and competition: how such platforms balance the exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are self-interested agents which choose among the competing platforms. We consider a stylized duopoly model in which two firms face the same multi-armed bandit problem. Users arrive one by one and choose between the two firms, so that each firm makes progress on its bandit problem only if it is chosen. Through a mix of theoretical results and numerical simulations, we study whether and to what extent competition incentivizes the adoption of better bandit algorithms, and whether it leads to welfare increases for users. We find that stark competition induces firms to commit to a "greedy" bandit algorithm that leads to low welfare. However, weakening competition by providing firms with some "free" users incentivizes better exploration strategies and increases welfare. We investigate two channels for weakening the competition: relaxing the rationality of users and giving one firm a first-mover advantage. Our findings are closely related to the "competition vs. innovation" relationship, and elucidate the first-mover advantage in the digital economy.

Guy Aridor, Duarte Goncalves, Shan Sikdar

We study a model of user decision-making in the context of recommender systems via numerical simulation. Our model provides an explanation for the findings of Nguyen, et. al (2014), where, in environments where recommender systems are typically deployed, users consume increasingly similar items over time even without recommendation. We find that recommendation alleviates these natural filter-bubble effects, but that it also leads to an increase in homogeneity across users, resulting in a trade-off between homogenizing across-user consumption and diversifying within-user consumption. Finally, we discuss how our model highlights the importance of collecting data on user beliefs and their evolution over time both to design better recommendations and to further understand their impact.

Guy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins et al.

We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal decisions in order to acquire new information for future decisions. However, when multiple systems are competing for the same market of users, exploration may hurt a system's reputation in the near term, with adverse competitive effects. In particular, a system may enter a "death spiral", when the short-term reputation cost decreases the number of users for the system to learn from, which degrades its performance relative to competition and further decreases its market share. We ask whether better exploration algorithms are incentivized under competition. We run extensive numerical experiments in a stylized duopoly model in which two firms deploy multi-armed bandit algorithms and compete for myopic users. We find that duopoly and monopoly tend to favor a primitive "greedy algorithm" that does not explore and leads to low consumer welfare, whereas a temporary monopoly (a duopoly with an early entrant) may incentivize better bandit algorithms and lead to higher consumer welfare. Our findings shed light on the first-mover advantage in the digital economy by exploring the role that data can play as a barrier to entry in online markets.