Francesco Bacchiocchi

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Gianmarco Genalti, Davide Maran et al.

Autoregressive processes naturally arise in a large variety of real-world scenarios, including stock markets, sales forecasting, weather prediction, advertising, and pricing. When facing a sequential decision-making problem in such a context, the temporal dependence between consecutive observations should be properly accounted for guaranteeing convergence to the optimal policy. In this work, we propose a novel online learning setting, namely, Autoregressive Bandits (ARBs), in which the observed reward is governed by an autoregressive process of order $k$, whose parameters depend on the chosen action. We show that, under mild assumptions on the reward process, the optimal policy can be conveniently computed. Then, we devise a new optimistic regret minimization algorithm, namely, AutoRegressive Upper Confidence Bound (AR-UCB), that suffers sublinear regret of order $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}} \left( \frac{(k+1)^{3/2}\sqrt{nT}}{(1-Γ)^2}\right)$, where $T$ is the optimization horizon, $n$ is the number of actions, and $Γ< 1$ is a stability index of the process. Finally, we empirically validate our algorithm, illustrating its advantages w.r.t. bandit baselines and its robustness to misspecification of key parameters.

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi et al.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{4/5})$ regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi et al.

We study \emph{multi-armed bandits} (MABs) augmented with \emph{best-action queries}, in which the learner may additionally query an oracle that reveals the best arm in the current round. This setting was recently characterized by Russo et al. [2024] in the \emph{full-feedback} model, where the learner observes the rewards of all arms after each round. They show that, in both \emph{stochastic} and \emph{adversarial} environments, $k$ best-action queries reduce the optimal $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret to $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\min\{T/k,\sqrt{T}\})$. Whether this improvement extends to the more realistic \emph{bandit-feedback} model -- where the learner observes only the reward of the played arm -- was left as an open problem. We fully resolve this question. When rewards are stochastic but correlated among arms, we show that the full-feedback result does not carry over: any algorithm must incur regret at least $Ω(\sqrt{T-k})$. This lower bound directly extends to adversarial environments. On the positive side, we show that $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\min\{T/k,\sqrt{T-k}\})$ regret is still achievable when rewards are stochastic and i.i.d., and establish a matching lower bound, up to logarithmic factors. Together, these results provide a complete characterization of the benefits of \emph{best-action queries} in the \emph{bandit-feedback} model.

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Francesco Emanuele Stradi, Matteo Castiglioni et al.

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers interact sequentially. Recently, Markov persuasion processes (MPPs) have been introduced to capture sequential scenarios where a sender faces a stream of myopic receivers in a Markovian environment. The MPPs studied so far in the literature suffer from issues that prevent them from being fully operational in practice, e.g., they assume that the sender knows receivers' rewards. We fix such issues by addressing MPPs where the sender has no knowledge about the environment. We design a learning algorithm for the sender, working with partial feedback. We prove that its regret with respect to an optimal information-disclosure policy grows sublinearly in the number of episodes, as it is the case for the loss in persuasiveness cumulated while learning. Moreover, we provide a lower bound for our setting matching the guarantees of our algorithm.

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi et al.

Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions. When the relevant model parameters are unknown and determined by some (unknown) probability distributions, the problem becomes learning how to optimize an unknown and stochastic piecewise linear reward function. Such a problem is usually framed within an online learning framework, where the decision-maker (learner) seeks to minimize the regret of not knowing an optimal decision in hindsight. This paper introduces a general online learning framework that offers a unified approach to tackle regret minimization for piecewise linear rewards, under a suitable monotonicity assumption commonly satisfied by microeconomic models. We design a learning algorithm that attains a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$, where $n$ is the number of ``pieces'' of the reward function and $T$ is the number of rounds. This result is tight when $n$ is \emph{small} relative to $T$, specifically when $n \leq T^{1/3}$. Our algorithm solves two open problems in the literature on learning in microeconomic settings. First, it shows that the $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound obtained by Zhu et al. [Zhu+23] for learning optimal linear contracts in hidden-action principal-agent problems is not tight when the number of agent's actions is small relative to $T$. Second, our algorithm demonstrates that, in the problem of learning to set prices in posted-price auctions, it is possible to attain suitable (and desirable) instance-independent regret bounds, addressing an open problem posed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CBCP19].