Chris Hicks

Sanyam Vyas, Chris Hicks, Vasilios Mavroudis

This paper investigates the threat of backdoors in Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agent policies and proposes a novel method for their detection at runtime. Our study focuses on elusive in-distribution backdoor triggers. Such triggers are designed to induce a deviation in the behaviour of a backdoored agent while blending into the expected data distribution to evade detection. Through experiments conducted in the Atari Breakout environment, we demonstrate the limitations of current sanitisation methods when faced with such triggers and investigate why they present a challenging defence problem. We then evaluate the hypothesis that backdoor triggers might be easier to detect in the neural activation space of the DRL agent's policy network. Our statistical analysis shows that indeed the activation patterns in the agent's policy network are distinct in the presence of a trigger, regardless of how well the trigger is concealed in the environment. Based on this, we propose a new defence approach that uses a classifier trained on clean environment samples and detects abnormal activations. Our results show that even lightweight classifiers can effectively prevent malicious actions with considerable accuracy, indicating the potential of this research direction even against sophisticated adversaries.

Elizabeth Bates, Chris Hicks, Vasilios Mavroudis

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in autonomous cyber defence agents trained to defend computer networks using deep reinforcement learning. These agents are typically trained in cyber gym environments using dense, highly engineered reward functions which combine many penalties and incentives for a range of (un)desirable states and costly actions. Dense rewards help alleviate the challenge of exploring complex environments but risk biasing agents towards suboptimal and potentially riskier solutions, a critical issue in complex cyber environments. We thoroughly evaluate the impact of reward function structure on learning and policy behavioural characteristics using a variety of sparse and dense reward functions, two well-established cyber gyms, a range of network sizes, and both policy gradient and value-based RL algorithms. Our evaluation is enabled by a novel ground truth evaluation approach which allows directly comparing between different reward functions, illuminating the nuanced inter-relationships between rewards, action space and the risks of suboptimal policies in cyber environments. Our results show that sparse rewards, provided they are goal aligned and can be encountered frequently, uniquely offer both enhanced training reliability and more effective cyber defence agents with lower-risk policies. Surprisingly, sparse rewards can also yield policies that are better aligned with cyber defender goals and make sparing use of costly defensive actions without explicit reward-based numerical penalties.

Shae McFadden, Myles Foley, Elizabeth Bates et al.

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has achieved remarkable success in domains requiring sequential decision-making, motivating its application to cybersecurity problems. However, transitioning DRL from laboratory simulations to bespoke cyber environments can introduce numerous issues. This is further exacerbated by the often adversarial, non-stationary, and partially-observable nature of most cybersecurity tasks. In this paper, we identify and systematize 11 methodological pitfalls that frequently occur in DRL for cybersecurity (DRL4Sec) literature across the stages of environment modeling, agent training, performance evaluation, and system deployment. By analyzing 66 significant DRL4Sec papers (2018-2025), we quantify the prevalence of each pitfall and find an average of over five pitfalls per paper. We demonstrate the practical impact of these pitfalls using controlled experiments in (i) autonomous cyber defense, (ii) adversarial malware creation, and (iii) web security testing environments. Finally, we provide actionable recommendations for each pitfall to support the development of more rigorous and deployable DRL-based security systems.

Benjamin Kolicic, Alberto Caron, Chris Hicks et al.

In this paper, we address the critical need for interpretable and uncertainty-aware machine learning models in the context of online learning for high-risk industries, particularly cyber-security. While deep learning and other complex models have demonstrated impressive predictive capabilities, their opacity and lack of uncertainty quantification present significant questions about their trustworthiness. We propose a novel pipeline for online supervised learning problems in cyber-security, that harnesses the inherent interpretability and uncertainty awareness of Additive Gaussian Processes (AGPs) models. Our approach aims to balance predictive performance with transparency while improving the scalability of AGPs, which represents their main drawback, potentially enabling security analysts to better validate threat detection, troubleshoot and reduce false positives, and generally make trustworthy, informed decisions. This work contributes to the growing field of interpretable AI by proposing a class of models that can be significantly beneficial for high-stake decision problems such as the ones typical of the cyber-security domain. The source code is available.

Chris Hicks, Vasilios Mavroudis, Myles Foley et al.

Communication networks able to withstand hostile environments are critically important for disaster relief operations. In this paper, we consider a challenging scenario where drones have been compromised in the supply chain, during their manufacture, and harbour malicious software capable of wide-ranging and infectious disruption. We investigate multi-agent deep reinforcement learning as a tool for learning defensive strategies that maximise communications bandwidth despite continual adversarial interference. Using a public challenge for learning network resilience strategies, we propose a state-of-the-art expert technique and study its superiority over deep reinforcement learning agents. Correspondingly, we identify three specific methods for improving the performance of our learning-based agents: (1) ensuring each observation contains the necessary information, (2) using expert agents to provide a curriculum for learning, and (3) paying close attention to reward. We apply our methods and present a new mixed strategy enabling expert and learning-based agents to work together and improve on all prior results.

Isaac Symes Thompson, Alberto Caron, Chris Hicks et al.

A significant challenge for autonomous cyber defence is ensuring a defensive agent's ability to generalise across diverse network topologies and configurations. This capability is necessary for agents to remain effective when deployed in dynamically changing environments, such as an enterprise network where devices may frequently join and leave. Standard approaches to deep reinforcement learning, where policies are parameterised using a fixed-input multi-layer perceptron (MLP) expect fixed-size observation and action spaces. In autonomous cyber defence, this makes it hard to develop agents that generalise to environments with network topologies different from those trained on, as the number of nodes affects the natural size of the observation and action spaces. To overcome this limitation, we reframe the problem of autonomous network defence using entity-based reinforcement learning, where the observation and action space of an agent are decomposed into a collection of discrete entities. This framework enables the use of policy parameterisations specialised in compositional generalisation. We train a Transformer-based policy on the Yawning Titan cyber-security simulation environment and test its generalisation capabilities across various network topologies. We demonstrate that this approach significantly outperforms an MLP-based policy when training across fixed-size networks of varying topologies, and matches performance when training on a single network. We also demonstrate the potential for zero-shot generalisation to networks of a different size to those seen in training. These findings highlight the potential for entity-based reinforcement learning to advance the field of autonomous cyber defence by providing more generalisable policies capable of handling variations in real-world network environments.

Harry Emerson, Liz Bates, Chris Hicks et al.

CybORG++ is an advanced toolkit for reinforcement learning research focused on network defence. Building on the CAGE 2 CybORG environment, it introduces key improvements, including enhanced debugging capabilities, refined agent implementation support, and a streamlined environment that enables faster training and easier customisation. Along with addressing several software bugs from its predecessor, CybORG++ introduces MiniCAGE, a lightweight version of CAGE 2, which improves performance dramatically, up to 1000x faster execution in parallel iterations, without sacrificing accuracy or core functionality. CybORG++ serves as a robust platform for developing and evaluating defensive agents, making it a valuable resource for advancing enterprise network defence research.

Alberto Caron, Chris Hicks, Vasilios Mavroudis

We study the problem of efficiently detecting Out-of-Distribution (OOD) samples at test time in supervised and unsupervised learning contexts. While ML models are typically trained under the assumption that training and test data stem from the same distribution, this is often not the case in realistic settings, thus reliably detecting distribution shifts is crucial at deployment. We re-formulate the OOD problem under the lenses of statistical testing and then discuss conditions that render the OOD problem identifiable in statistical terms. Building on this framework, we study convergence guarantees of an OOD test based on the Wasserstein distance, and provide a simple empirical evaluation.

Alberto Caron, Vasilios Mavroudis, Chris Hicks

Real-world decision-making problems are often marked by complex, uncertain dynamics that can shift or break under changing conditions. Traditional Model-Based Reinforcement Learning (MBRL) approaches learn predictive models of environment dynamics from queried trajectories and then use these models to simulate rollouts for policy optimization. However, such methods do not account for the underlying causal mechanisms that govern the environment, and thus inadvertently capture spurious correlations, making them sensitive to distributional shifts and limiting their ability to generalize. The same naturally holds for model-free approaches. In this work, we introduce Causal Model-Based Policy Optimization (C-MBPO), a novel framework that integrates causal learning into the MBRL pipeline to achieve more robust, explainable, and generalizable policy learning algorithms. Our approach centers on first inferring a Causal Markov Decision Process (C-MDP) by learning a local Structural Causal Model (SCM) of both the state and reward transition dynamics from trajectories gathered online. C-MDPs differ from classic MDPs in that we can decompose causal dependencies in the environment dynamics via specifying an associated Causal Bayesian Network. C-MDPs allow for targeted interventions and counterfactual reasoning, enabling the agent to distinguish between mere statistical correlations and causal relationships. The learned SCM is then used to simulate counterfactual on-policy transitions and rewards under hypothetical actions (or ``interventions"), thereby guiding policy optimization more effectively. The resulting policy learned by C-MBPO can be shown to be robust to a class of distributional shifts that affect spurious, non-causal relationships in the dynamics. We demonstrate this through some simple experiments involving near and far OOD dynamics drifts.