Daniel Woods

Jiuming Jiang, Shidong Pan, Daniel W Woods et al.

Online video games have become major online social spaces where users interact, compete, and create together. These spaces, however, expose users to a wide spectrum of online harms, including harassment, discrimination, inappropriate content, privacy breach, cheating, and more. The shape and severity of such harms vary across game design, mechanics, and community context. To mitigate these harms, game companies issue Codes of Conduct (CoCs) that articulate online safety rules and direct players to safety resources. However, it remains unclear how prevalent CoCs are, what safety, security and privacy violations they govern, and whether they meet growing regulatory and industry expectations. We develop and leverage CONDUCTIFY, a pipeline for identifying and analyzing CoCs at scale. Applied to Steam, the largest PC game marketplace, it located the available CoCs for 350 of the 9,586 multiplayer titles on Steam. We found that CoCs are more available among popular, adult-oriented, and community-driven games, while most multiplayer games operate without CoCs despite regulatory and industry recommendations. Although over 80% of the games with CoCs available consistently address traditional security and safety violations, their governance approaches vary substantially across types of violations. A further asymmetry emerges in specificity. Compared with harms related to gameplay mechanics, the articulations of interpersonal harm and the underage player safety are often less specific, despite their relevance to many game communities. Together, these results inform the improvement of online safety governance and CoC enforcement practices, and building better safety infrastructure for the community of players and developers.

Maximilian Hils, Daniel W. Woods, Rainer Böhme

Privacy preference signals allow users to express preferences over how their personal data is processed. These signals become important in determining privacy outcomes when they reference an enforceable legal basis, as is the case with recent signals such as the Global Privacy Control and the Transparency & Consent Framework. However, the coexistence of multiple privacy preference signals creates ambiguity as users may transmit more than one signal. This paper collects evidence about ambiguity flowing from the aforementioned two signals and the historic Do Not Track signal. We provide the first empirical evidence that ambiguous signals are sent by web users in the wild. We also show that preferences stored in the browser are reliable predictors of privacy preferences expressed in web dialogs. Finally, we provide the first evidence that popular cookie dialogs are blocked by the majority of users who adopted the Do Not Track and Global Privacy Control standards. These empirical results inform forthcoming legal debates about how to interpret privacy preference signals.

Maximilian Hils, Daniel W. Woods, Rainer Böhme

Privacy preference signals are digital representations of how users want their personal data to be processed. Such signals must be adopted by both the sender (users) and intended recipients (data processors). Adoption represents a coordination problem that remains unsolved despite efforts dating back to the 1990s. Browsers implemented standards like the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and Do Not Track (DNT), but vendors profiting from personal data faced few incentives to receive and respect the expressed wishes of data subjects. In the wake of recent privacy laws, a coalition of AdTech firms published the Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF), which defines an opt-in consent signal. This paper integrates post-GDPR developments into the wider history of privacy preference signals. Our main contribution is a high-frequency longitudinal study describing how TCF signal gained dominance as of February 2021. We explore which factors correlate with adoption at the website level. Both the number of third parties on a website and the presence of Google Ads are associated with higher adoption of TCF. Further, we show that vendors acted as early adopters of TCF 2.0 and provide two case-studies describing how Consent Management Providers shifted existing customers to TCF 2.0. We sketch ways forward for a pro-privacy signal.

Mustafa Abdallah, Daniel Woods, Parinaz Naghizadeh et al.

We model the behavioral biases of human decision-making in securing interdependent systems and show that such behavioral decision-making leads to a suboptimal pattern of resource allocation compared to non-behavioral (rational) decision-making. We provide empirical evidence for the existence of such behavioral bias model through a controlled subject study with 145 participants. We then propose three learning techniques for enhancing decision-making in multi-round setups. We illustrate the benefits of our decision-making model through multiple interdependent real-world systems and quantify the level of gain compared to the case in which the defenders are behavioral. We also show the benefit of our learning techniques against different attack models. We identify the effects of different system parameters on the degree of suboptimality of security outcomes due to behavioral decision-making.

Mustafa Abdallah, Daniel Woods, Parinaz Naghizadeh et al.

We study the security of large-scale cyber-physical systems (CPS) consisting of multiple interdependent subsystems, each managed by a different defender. Defenders invest their security budgets with the goal of thwarting the spread of cyber attacks to their critical assets. We model the security investment decisions made by the defenders as a security game. While prior work has used security games to analyze such scenarios, we propose behavioral security games, in which defenders exhibit characteristics of human decision making that have been identified in behavioral economics as representing typical human cognitive biases. This is important as many of the critical security decisions in our target class of systems are made by humans. We provide empirical evidence for our behavioral model through a controlled subject experiment. We then show that behavioral decision making leads to a suboptimal pattern of resource allocation compared to non-behavioral decision making. We illustrate the effects of behavioral decision making using two representative real-world interdependent CPS. In particular, we identify the effects of the defenders' security budget availability and distribution, the degree of interdependency among defenders, and collaborative defense strategies, on the degree of suboptimality of security outcomes due to behavioral decision making. In this context, the adverse effects of behavioral decision making are most severe with moderate defense budgets. Moreover, the impact of behavioral suboptimal decision making is magnified as the degree of the interdependency between subnetworks belonging to different defenders increases. We also observe that selfish defense decisions together with behavioral decisions significantly increase security risk.

Sakshyam Panda, Daniel W Woods, Aron Laszka et al.

We introduce a game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between a cyber insurance policyholder whose premium depends on her self-reported security level and an insurer with the power to audit the security level upon receiving an indemnity claim. Audits can reveal fraudulent (or simply careless) policyholders not following reported security procedures, in which case the insurer can refuse to indemnify the policyholder. However, the insurer has to bear an audit cost even when the policyholders have followed the prescribed security procedures. As audits can be expensive, a key problem insurers face is to devise an auditing strategy to deter policyholders from misrepresenting their security levels to gain a premium discount. This decision-making problem was motivated by conducting interviews with underwriters and reviewing regulatory filings in the U.S.; we discovered that premiums are determined by security posture, yet this is often self-reported and insurers are concerned by whether security procedures are practised as reported by the policyholders. To address this problem, we model this interaction as a Bayesian game of incomplete information and devise optimal auditing strategies for the insurers considering the possibility that the policyholder may misrepresent her security level. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first theoretical consideration of post-incident claims management in cyber security. Our model captures the trade-off between the incentive to exaggerate security posture during the application process and the possibility of punishment for non-compliance with reported security policies. Simulations demonstrate that common sense techniques are not as efficient at providing effective cyber insurance audit decisions as the ones computed using game theory.