Julia Bazinska

LG
h-index9
3papers
18citations
Novelty62%
AI Score41

3 Papers

LGAug 23, 2023
Cached Operator Reordering: A Unified View for Fast GNN Training

Julia Bazinska, Andrei Ivanov, Tal Ben-Nun et al.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are a powerful tool for handling structured graph data and addressing tasks such as node classification, graph classification, and clustering. However, the sparse nature of GNN computation poses new challenges for performance optimization compared to traditional deep neural networks. We address these challenges by providing a unified view of GNN computation, I/O, and memory. By analyzing the computational graphs of the Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) and Graph Attention (GAT) layers -- two widely used GNN layers -- we propose alternative computation strategies. We present adaptive operator reordering with caching, which achieves a speedup of up to 2.43x for GCN compared to the current state-of-the-art. Furthermore, an exploration of different caching schemes for GAT yields a speedup of up to 1.94x. The proposed optimizations save memory, are easily implemented across various hardware platforms, and have the potential to alleviate performance bottlenecks in training large-scale GNN models.

LGNov 27, 2025
A Safety and Security Framework for Real-World Agentic Systems

Shaona Ghosh, Barnaby Simkin, Kyriacos Shiarlis et al.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

CROct 26, 2025
Breaking Agent Backbones: Evaluating the Security of Backbone LLMs in AI Agents

Julia Bazinska, Max Mathys, Francesco Casucci et al.

AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are being deployed at scale, yet we lack a systematic understanding of how the choice of backbone LLM affects agent security. The non-deterministic sequential nature of AI agents complicates security modeling, while the integration of traditional software with AI components entangles novel LLM vulnerabilities with conventional security risks. Existing frameworks only partially address these challenges as they either capture specific vulnerabilities only or require modeling of complete agents. To address these limitations, we introduce threat snapshots: a framework that isolates specific states in an agent's execution flow where LLM vulnerabilities manifest, enabling the systematic identification and categorization of security risks that propagate from the LLM to the agent level. We apply this framework to construct the $\operatorname{b}^3$ benchmark, a security benchmark based on 194331 unique crowdsourced adversarial attacks. We then evaluate 31 popular LLMs with it, revealing, among other insights, that enhanced reasoning capabilities improve security, while model size does not correlate with security. We release our benchmark, dataset, and evaluation code to facilitate widespread adoption by LLM providers and practitioners, offering guidance for agent developers and incentivizing model developers to prioritize backbone security improvements.