A. E. Krzesinski

h-index16
2papers
982citations

2 Papers

14.0CRJan 23, 2018
Block arrivals in the Bitcoin blockchain

R. Bowden, H. P. Keeler, A. E. Krzesinski et al.

Bitcoin is a electronic payment system where payment transactions are verified and stored in a data structure called the blockchain. Bitcoin miners work individually to solve a computationally intensive problem, and with each solution a Bitcoin block is generated, resulting in a new arrival to the blockchain. The difficulty of the computational problem is updated every 2,016 blocks in order to control the rate at which blocks are generated. In the original Bitcoin paper, it was suggested that the blockchain arrivals occur according to a homogeneous Poisson process. Based on blockchain block arrival data and stochastic analysis of the block arrival process, we demonstrate that this is not the case. We present a refined mathematical model for block arrivals, focusing on both the block arrivals during a period of constant difficulty and how the difficulty level evolves over time.

25.9CRMay 20, 2015
Bitcoin Blockchain Dynamics: the Selfish-Mine Strategy in the Presence of Propagation Delay

Johannes Göbel, Paul Keeler, Anthony E. Krzesinski et al.

In the context of the `selfish-mine' strategy proposed by Eyal and Sirer, we study the effect of propagation delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain. First, we use a simplified Markov model that tracks the contrasting states of belief about the blockchain of a small pool of miners and the `rest of the community' to establish that the use of block-hiding strategies, such as selfish-mine, causes the rate of production of orphan blocks to increase. Then we use a spatial Poisson process model to study values of Eyal and Sirer's parameter $γ$, which denotes the proportion of the honest community that mine on a previously-secret block released by the pool in response to the mining of a block by the honest community. Finally, we use discrete-event simulation to study the behaviour of a network of Bitcoin miners, a proportion of which is colluding in using the selfish-mine strategy, under the assumption that there is a propagation delay in the communication of information between miners.