Buyun Liang

LG
h-index2
3papers
11citations
Novelty63%
AI Score45

3 Papers

6.6CLMay 12Code
REALISTA: Realistic Latent Adversarial Attacks that Elicit LLM Hallucinations

Buyun Liang, Jinqi Luo, Liangzu Peng et al.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance across many tasks but remain vulnerable to hallucinations, motivating the need for realistic adversarial prompts that elicit such failures. We formulate hallucination elicitation as a constrained optimization problem, where the goal is to find semantically coherent adversarial prompts that are equivalent to benign user prompts. Existing methods remain limited: discrete prompt-based attacks preserve semantic equivalence and coherence but search only over a limited set of prompt variations, while continuous latent-space attacks explore a richer space but often decode into prompts that are no longer valid rephrasings. To address these limitations, we propose REALISTA, a realistic latent-space attack framework. REALISTA constructs an input-dependent dictionary of valid editing directions, each corresponding to a semantically equivalent and coherent rephrasing, and optimizes continuous combinations of these directions in latent space. This design combines the optimization flexibility of continuous attacks with the semantic realism of discrete rephrasing-based attacks. Experiments demonstrate that REALISTA achieves superior or comparable performance to state-of-the-art realistic attacks on open-source LLMs and, crucially, succeeds in attacking large reasoning models under free-form response settings, where prior realistic attacks fail. Code is available at https://github.com/Buyun-Liang/REALISTA.

10.7LGMar 23, 2023
Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness

Hengyue Liang, Buyun Liang, Le Peng et al.

Empirical robustness evaluation (RE) of deep learning models against adversarial perturbations entails solving nontrivial constrained optimization problems. Existing numerical algorithms that are commonly used to solve them in practice predominantly rely on projected gradient, and mostly handle perturbations modeled by the $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$ and $\ell_\infty$ distances. In this paper, we introduce a novel algorithmic framework that blends a general-purpose constrained-optimization solver PyGRANSO with Constraint Folding (PWCF), which can add more reliability and generality to the state-of-the-art RE packages, e.g., AutoAttack. Regarding reliability, PWCF provides solutions with stationarity measures and feasibility tests to assess the solution quality. For generality, PWCF can handle perturbation models that are typically inaccessible to the existing projected gradient methods; the main requirement is the distance metric to be almost everywhere differentiable. Taking advantage of PWCF and other existing numerical algorithms, we further explore the distinct patterns in the solutions found for solving these optimization problems using various combinations of losses, perturbation models, and optimization algorithms. We then discuss the implications of these patterns on the current robustness evaluation and adversarial training.

4.6LGOct 2, 2022
Optimization for Robustness Evaluation beyond $\ell_p$ Metrics

Hengyue Liang, Buyun Liang, Ying Cui et al.

Empirical evaluation of deep learning models against adversarial attacks entails solving nontrivial constrained optimization problems. Popular algorithms for solving these constrained problems rely on projected gradient descent (PGD) and require careful tuning of multiple hyperparameters. Moreover, PGD can only handle $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$, and $\ell_\infty$ attack models due to the use of analytical projectors. In this paper, we introduce a novel algorithmic framework that blends a general-purpose constrained-optimization solver PyGRANSO, With Constraint-Folding (PWCF), to add reliability and generality to robustness evaluation. PWCF 1) finds good-quality solutions without the need of delicate hyperparameter tuning, and 2) can handle general attack models, e.g., general $\ell_p$ ($p \geq 0$) and perceptual attacks, which are inaccessible to PGD-based algorithms.