Yuchen Wu

Jiayue Yuan, Fangting Xie, Guangwen Ouyang et al.

Multi-person global human mesh recovery (HMR) is crucial for understanding crowd dynamics and interactions. Traditional vision-based HMR methods sometimes face limitations in real-world scenarios due to mutual occlusions, insufficient lighting, and privacy concerns. Human-floor tactile interactions offer an occlusion-free and privacy-friendly alternative for capturing human motion. Existing research indicates that pressure signals acquired from tactile mats can effectively estimate human pose in single-person scenarios. However, when multiple individuals walk randomly on the mat simultaneously, how to distinguish intermingled pressure signals generated by different persons and subsequently acquire individual temporal pressure data remains a pending challenge for extending pressure-based HMR to the multi-person situation. In this paper, we present \textbf{PressTrack-HMR}, a top-down pipeline that recovers multi-person global human meshes solely from pressure signals. This pipeline leverages a tracking-by-detection strategy to first identify and segment each individual's pressure signal from the raw pressure data, and subsequently performs HMR for each extracted individual signal. Furthermore, we build a multi-person interaction pressure dataset \textbf{MIP}, which facilitates further research into pressure-based human motion analysis in multi-person scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that our method excels in multi-person HMR using pressure data, with 89.2 $mm$ MPJPE and 112.6 $mm$ WA-MPJPE$_{100}$, and these showcase the potential of tactile mats for ubiquitous, privacy-preserving multi-person action recognition. Our dataset & code are available at https://github.com/Jiayue-Yuan/PressTrack-HMR.

Yuchen Wu, Kangjie Zhou

We investigate the power iteration algorithm for the tensor PCA model introduced in Richard and Montanari (2014). Previous work studying the properties of tensor power iteration is either limited to a constant number of iterations, or requires a non-trivial data-independent initialization. In this paper, we move beyond these limitations and analyze the dynamics of randomly initialized tensor power iteration up to polynomially many steps. Our contributions are threefold: First, we establish sharp bounds on the number of iterations required for power method to converge to the planted signal, for a broad range of the signal-to-noise ratios. Second, our analysis reveals that the actual algorithmic threshold for power iteration is smaller than the one conjectured in literature by a polylog(n) factor, where n is the ambient dimension. Finally, we propose a simple and effective stopping criterion for power iteration, which provably outputs a solution that is highly correlated with the true signal. Extensive numerical experiments verify our theoretical results.

Yuchen Wu, Xinyi Zhong, Zhuoran Yang

We study an online learning version of the generalized principal-agent model, where a principal interacts repeatedly with a strategic agent possessing private types, private rewards, and taking unobservable actions. The agent is non-myopic, optimizing a discounted sum of future rewards and may strategically misreport types to manipulate the principal's learning. The principal, observing only her own realized rewards and the agent's reported types, aims to learn an optimal coordination mechanism that minimizes strategic regret. We develop the first provably sample-efficient algorithm for this challenging setting. Our approach features a novel pipeline that combines (i) a delaying mechanism to incentivize approximately myopic agent behavior, (ii) an innovative reward angle estimation framework that uses sector tests and a matching procedure to recover type-dependent reward functions, and (iii) a pessimistic-optimistic LinUCB algorithm that enables the principal to explore efficiently while respecting the agent's incentive constraints. We establish a near optimal $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) $ regret bound for learning the principal's optimal policy, where $\tilde{O}(\cdot) $ omits logarithmic factors. Our results open up new avenues for designing robust online learning algorithms for a wide range of game-theoretic settings involving private types and strategic agents.