97.9GTMay 30
Social Learning with Limited Attention: Negative Reviews Persist under Newest FirstJackie Baek, Atanas Dinev, Thodoris Lykouris
We study a model of social learning from reviews where customers are computationally limited and make purchases based on reading only the first few reviews displayed by the platform. Under this limited attention, we establish that the review ordering policy can have a significant impact. In particular, the popular Newest First ordering induces a negative review to persist as the most recent review longer than a positive review. This phenomenon, which we term the Cost of Newest First, can make the long-term revenue unboundedly lower than a counterpart where reviews are exogenously drawn for each customer. We show that the impact of the Cost of Newest First can be mitigated under dynamic pricing, which allows the price to depend on the set of displayed reviews. Under the optimal dynamic pricing policy, the revenue loss is at most a factor of 2. On the way, we identify a structural property for this optimal dynamic pricing: the prices should ensure that the probability of a purchase is always the same, regardless of the state of reviews. We also consider a setting where product quality evolves over time according to a Markov chain; we find that Newest First better tracks current quality but still leads to lower revenue, highlighting a trade-off between customer belief accuracy and revenue. Finally, numerical simulations confirm the robustness of the Cost of Newest First across several modeling variants.
LGMar 21, 2023
Policy Optimization for Personalized Interventions in Behavioral HealthJackie Baek, Justin J. Boutilier, Vivek F. Farias et al.
Behavioral health interventions, delivered through digital platforms, have the potential to significantly improve health outcomes, through education, motivation, reminders, and outreach. We study the problem of optimizing personalized interventions for patients to maximize a long-term outcome, where interventions are costly and capacity-constrained. We assume we have access to a historical dataset collected from an initial pilot study. We present a new approach for this problem that we dub DecompPI, which decomposes the state space for a system of patients to the individual level and then approximates one step of policy iteration. Implementing DecompPI simply consists of a prediction task using the dataset, alleviating the need for online experimentation. DecompPI is a generic model-free algorithm that can be used irrespective of the underlying patient behavior model. We derive theoretical guarantees on a simple, special case of the model that is representative of our problem setting. When the initial policy used to collect the data is randomized, we establish an approximation guarantee for DecompPI with respect to the improvement beyond a null policy that does not allocate interventions. We show that this guarantee is robust to estimation errors. We then conduct a rigorous empirical case study using real-world data from a mobile health platform for improving treatment adherence for tuberculosis. Using a validated simulation model, we demonstrate that DecompPI can provide the same efficacy as the status quo approach with approximately half the capacity of interventions. DecompPI is simple and easy to implement for an organization aiming to improve long-term behavior through targeted interventions, and this paper demonstrates its strong performance both theoretically and empirically, particularly in resource-limited settings.
80.8SIApr 20
Optimal Exploration of New Products under Assortment DecisionsJackie Baek, Atanas Dinev, Thodoris Lykouris
We study online learning for new products on a platform that makes capacity-constrained assortment decisions on which products to offer. For a newly listed product, its quality is initially unknown, and quality information propagates through social learning: when a customer purchases a new product and leaves a review, its quality is revealed to both the platform and future customers. Since reviews require purchases, the platform must feature new products in the assortment ("explore") to generate reviews to learn about new products. Such exploration is costly because customer demand for new products is lower than for incumbent products. We characterize the optimal assortments for exploration to minimize regret, addressing two questions. (1) Should the platform offer a new product alone or alongside incumbent products? The former maximizes the purchase probability of the new product but yields lower short-term revenue. Despite the lower purchase probability, we show it is always optimal to pair the new product with the top incumbent products. (2) With multiple new products, should the platform explore them simultaneously or one at a time? We show that the optimal number of new products to explore simultaneously has a simple threshold structure: it increases with the "potential" of the new products and, surprisingly, does not depend on their individual purchase probabilities. We also show that two canonical bandit algorithms, UCB and Thompson Sampling, both fail in this setting for opposite reasons: UCB over-explores while Thompson Sampling under-explores. Our results provide structural insights on how platforms should learn about new products through assortment decisions.
77.2GTMay 15
Misspecified Explore-then-Exploit Leads to Supra-Competitive PricesJackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias, Farrell Wu
We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms using an explore-then-exploit pipeline: they randomize prices during an initial exploration phase, then estimate demand from their own historical data and set prices myopically thereafter. The estimation step relies on a misspecified, monopoly-style model that omits competitors' prices. We characterize when this pipeline converges to supra-competitive prices above the Nash equilibrium, via a fluid-limit ordinary differential equation analysis. We show that supra-competitive prices arise when firms explore within similar price ranges on the same side of the Nash price. Moreover, prices can be substantially above the Nash price; we show that prices can reach monopoly levels under symmetric exploration. Simulations calibrated to a real multifamily rental market confirm that supra-competitive outcomes arise robustly beyond our theoretical assumptions, including under finite horizons, heterogeneous products, and nonlinear logit demand.
LGFeb 6
Evaluating LLM-persona Generated Distributions for Decision-makingJackie Baek, Yunhan Chen, Ziyu Chi et al.
LLMs can generate a wealth of data, ranging from simulated personas imitating human valuations and preferences, to demand forecasts based on world knowledge. But how well do such LLM-generated distributions support downstream decision-making? For example, when pricing a new product, a firm could prompt an LLM to simulate how much consumers are willing to pay based on a product description, but how useful is the resulting distribution for optimizing the price? We refer to this approach as LLM-SAA, in which an LLM is used to construct an estimated distribution and the decision is then optimized under that distribution. In this paper, we study metrics to evaluate the quality of these LLM-generated distributions, based on the decisions they induce. Taking three canonical decision-making problems (assortment optimization, pricing, and newsvendor) as examples, we find that LLM-generated distributions are practically useful, especially in low-data regimes. We also show that decision-agnostic metrics such as Wasserstein distance can be misleading when evaluating these distributions for decision-making.
AIFeb 13
AI Agents for Inventory Control: Human-LLM-OR ComplementarityJackie Baek, Yaopeng Fu, Will Ma et al.
Inventory control is a fundamental operations problem in which ordering decisions are traditionally guided by theoretically grounded operations research (OR) algorithms. However, such algorithms often rely on rigid modeling assumptions and can perform poorly when demand distributions shift or relevant contextual information is unavailable. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have generated interest in AI agents that can reason flexibly and incorporate rich contextual signals, but it remains unclear how best to incorporate LLM-based methods into traditional decision-making pipelines. We study how OR algorithms, LLMs, and humans can interact and complement each other in a multi-period inventory control setting. We construct InventoryBench, a benchmark of over 1,000 inventory instances spanning both synthetic and real-world demand data, designed to stress-test decision rules under demand shifts, seasonality, and uncertain lead times. Through this benchmark, we find that OR-augmented LLM methods outperform either method in isolation, suggesting that these methods are complementary rather than substitutes. We further investigate the role of humans through a controlled classroom experiment that embeds LLM recommendations into a human-in-the-loop decision pipeline. Contrary to prior findings that human-AI collaboration can degrade performance, we show that, on average, human-AI teams achieve higher profits than either humans or AI agents operating alone. Beyond this population-level finding, we formalize an individual-level complementarity effect and derive a distribution-free lower bound on the fraction of individuals who benefit from AI collaboration; empirically, we find this fraction to be substantial.
LGOct 15, 2023
When Collaborative Filtering is not Collaborative: Unfairness of PCA for RecommendationsDavid Liu, Jackie Baek, Tina Eliassi-Rad
We study the fairness of dimensionality reduction methods for recommendations. We focus on the fundamental method of principal component analysis (PCA), which identifies latent components and produces a low-rank approximation via the leading components while discarding the trailing components. Prior works have defined notions of "fair PCA"; however, these definitions do not answer the following question: why is PCA unfair? We identify two underlying popularity mechanisms that induce item unfairness in PCA. The first negatively impacts less popular items because less popular items rely on trailing latent components to recover their values. The second negatively impacts highly popular items, since the leading PCA components specialize in individual popular items instead of capturing similarities between items. To address these issues, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm, Item-Weighted PCA, that flexibly up-weights less popular items when optimizing for leading principal components. We theoretically show that PCA, in all cases, and Normalized PCA, in cases of block-diagonal matrices, are instances of Item-Weighted PCA. We empirically show that there exist datasets for which Item-Weighted PCA yields the optimal solution while the baselines do not. In contrast to past dimensionality reduction re-weighting techniques, Item-Weighted PCA solves a convex optimization problem and enforces a hard rank constraint. Our evaluations on real-world datasets show that Item-Weighted PCA not only mitigates both unfairness mechanisms, but also produces recommendations that outperform those of PCA baselines.
GTFeb 27, 2025
Hiring under Congestion and Algorithmic Monoculture: Value of Strategic BehaviorJackie Baek, Hamsa Bastani, Shihan Chen
We study the impact of strategic behavior in a setting where firms compete to hire from a shared pool of applicants, and firms use a common algorithm to evaluate them. Each applicant is associated with a scalar score that is observed by all firms, provided by the algorithm. Firms simultaneously make interview decisions, where the number of interviews is capacity-constrained. Job offers are given to those who pass the interview, and an applicant who receives multiple offers accepts one of them uniformly at random. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria under this model. Defining social welfare as the total number of applicants who find a job, we then compare the social welfare at a Nash equilibrium to a naive baseline where all firms interview applicants with the highest scores. We show that the Nash equilibrium greatly improves upon social welfare compared to the naive baseline, especially when the interview capacity is small and the number of firms is large. We also show that the price of anarchy is small, providing further appeal for the equilibrium solution. We then study how the firms may converge to a Nash equilibrium. We show that when firms make interview decisions sequentially and each firm takes the best response action assuming they are the last to act, this process converges to an equilibrium when interview capacities are small. However, we show that the task of computing the best response is difficult if firms have to use its own historical samples to estimate it, while this task becomes trivial if firms have information on the degree of competition for each applicant. Therefore, converging to an equilibrium can be greatly facilitated if firms have information on the level of competition for each applicant.
LGJun 4, 2021
Fair Exploration via Axiomatic BargainingJackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias
Exploration is often necessary in online learning to maximize long-term reward, but it comes at the cost of short-term 'regret'. We study how this cost of exploration is shared across multiple groups. For example, in a clinical trial setting, patients who are assigned a sub-optimal treatment effectively incur the cost of exploration. When patients are associated with natural groups on the basis of, say, race or age, it is natural to ask whether the cost of exploration borne by any single group is 'fair'. So motivated, we introduce the 'grouped' bandit model. We leverage the theory of axiomatic bargaining, and the Nash bargaining solution in particular, to formalize what might constitute a fair division of the cost of exploration across groups. On the one hand, we show that any regret-optimal policy strikingly results in the least fair outcome: such policies will perversely leverage the most 'disadvantaged' groups when they can. More constructively, we derive policies that are optimally fair and simultaneously enjoy a small 'price of fairness'. We illustrate the relative merits of our algorithmic framework with a case study on contextual bandits for warfarin dosing where we are concerned with the cost of exploration across multiple races and age groups.
MEJun 11, 2020
The Limits to Learning a Diffusion ModelJackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias, Andreea Georgescu et al.
This paper provides the first sample complexity lower bounds for the estimation of simple diffusion models, including the Bass model (used in modeling consumer adoption) and the SIR model (used in modeling epidemics). We show that one cannot hope to learn such models until quite late in the diffusion. Specifically, we show that the time required to collect a number of observations that exceeds our sample complexity lower bounds is large. For Bass models with low innovation rates, our results imply that one cannot hope to predict the eventual number of adopting customers until one is at least two-thirds of the way to the time at which the rate of new adopters is at its peak. In a similar vein, our results imply that in the case of an SIR model, one cannot hope to predict the eventual number of infections until one is approximately two-thirds of the way to the time at which the infection rate has peaked. This lower bound in estimation further translates into a lower bound in regret for decision-making in epidemic interventions. Our results formalize the challenge of accurate forecasting and highlight the importance of incorporating additional data sources. To this end, we analyze the benefit of a seroprevalence study in an epidemic, where we characterize the size of the study needed to improve SIR model estimation. Extensive empirical analyses on product adoption and epidemic data support our theoretical findings.
LGJun 11, 2020
TS-UCB: Improving on Thompson Sampling With Little to No Additional ComputationJackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias
Thompson sampling has become a ubiquitous approach to online decision problems with bandit feedback. The key algorithmic task for Thompson sampling is drawing a sample from the posterior of the optimal action. We propose an alternative arm selection rule we dub TS-UCB, that requires negligible additional computational effort but provides significant performance improvements relative to Thompson sampling. At each step, TS-UCB computes a score for each arm using two ingredients: posterior sample(s) and upper confidence bounds. TS-UCB can be used in any setting where these two quantities are available, and it is flexible in the number of posterior samples it takes as input. TS-UCB achieves materially lower regret on a comprehensive suite of synthetic and real-world datasets, including a personalized article recommendation dataset from Yahoo! and a suite of benchmark datasets from a deep bandit suite proposed in Riquelme et al. (2018). Finally, from a theoretical perspective, we establish optimal regret guarantees for TS-UCB for both the K-armed and linear bandit models.