Jie Cui

Depeng Chen, Xiao Liu, Jie Cui et al.

Since machine learning model is often trained on a limited data set, the model is trained multiple times on the same data sample, which causes the model to memorize most of the training set data. Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) exploit this feature to determine whether a data sample is used for training a machine learning model. However, in realistic scenarios, it is difficult for the adversary to obtain enough qualified samples that mark accurate identity information, especially since most samples are non-members in real world applications. To address this limitation, in this paper, we propose a new attack method called CLMIA, which uses unsupervised contrastive learning to train an attack model without using extra membership status information. Meanwhile, in CLMIA, we require only a small amount of data with known membership status to fine-tune the attack model. Experimental results demonstrate that CLMIA performs better than existing attack methods for different datasets and model structures, especially with data with less marked identity information. In addition, we experimentally find that the attack performs differently for different proportions of labeled identity information for member and non-member data. More analysis proves that our attack method performs better with less labeled identity information, which applies to more realistic scenarios.

Zhili Chen, Xuemei Wei, Hong Zhong et al.

Truthful spectrum auction is believed to be an effective method for spectrum redistribution. However, privacy concerns have largely hampered the practical applications of truthful spectrum auctions. In this paper, to make the applications of double spectrum auctions practical, we present a privacy-preserving and socially efficient double spectrum auction design, SDSA. Specifically, by combining three security techniques: homomorphic encryption, secret sharing and garbled circuits, we design a secure two-party protocol computing a socially efficient double spectrum auction, TDSA, without leaking any information about sellers' requests or buyers' bids beyond the auction outcome. We give the formal security definition in our context, and theoretically prove the security that our design achieves. Experimental results show that our design is also efficient in performance, even for large-scale double spectrum auctions.

Zhili Chen, Tianjiao Ni, Hong Zhong et al.

Spectrum auction is an effective approach to improving spectrum utilization, by leasing idle spectrum from primary users to secondary users. Recently, a few differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed, but, as far as we know, none of them addressed the differential privacy in the setting of double spectrum auctions. In this paper, we combine the concept of differential privacy with double spectrum auction design, and present a Differentially private Double spectrum auction mechanism with approximate Social welfare Maximization (DDSM). Specifically, we design the mechanism by employing the exponential mechanism to select clearing prices for the double spectrum auction with probabilities exponentially proportional to the related social welfare values, and then improve the mechanism in several aspects like the designs of the auction algorithm, the utility function and the buyer grouping algorithm. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that DDSM achieves differential privacy, approximate truthfulness, approximate social welfare maximization. Extensive experimental evaluations show that DDSM achieves a good performance in term of social welfare.