Birk Torpmann-Hagen

CR
h-index1
3papers
3citations
Novelty52%
AI Score44

3 Papers

1.4CVMay 30, 2022Code
Segmentation Consistency Training: Out-of-Distribution Generalization for Medical Image Segmentation

Birk Torpmann-Hagen, Vajira Thambawita, Kyrre Glette et al.

Generalizability is seen as one of the major challenges in deep learning, in particular in the domain of medical imaging, where a change of hospital or in imaging routines can lead to a complete failure of a model. To tackle this, we introduce Consistency Training, a training procedure and alternative to data augmentation based on maximizing models' prediction consistency across augmented and unaugmented data in order to facilitate better out-of-distribution generalization. To this end, we develop a novel region-based segmentation loss function called Segmentation Inconsistency Loss (SIL), which considers the differences between pairs of augmented and unaugmented predictions and labels. We demonstrate that Consistency Training outperforms conventional data augmentation on several out-of-distribution datasets on polyp segmentation, a popular medical task.

11.0LGMay 7Code
When No Benchmark Exists: Validating Comparative LLM Safety Scoring Without Ground-Truth Labels

Sushant Gautam, Finn Schwall, Annika Willoch Olstad et al.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component ($η^2 \approx 0.52$), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

3.6CRSep 23, 2025
Defending against Stegomalware in Deep Neural Networks with Permutation Symmetry

Birk Torpmann-Hagen, Michael A. Riegler, Pål Halvorsen et al.

Deep neural networks are being utilized in a growing number of applications, both in production systems and for personal use. Network checkpoints are as a consequence often shared and distributed on various platforms to ease the development process. This work considers the threat of neural network stegomalware, where malware is embedded in neural network checkpoints at a negligible cost to network accuracy. This constitutes a significant security concern, but is nevertheless largely neglected by the deep learning practitioners and security specialists alike. We propose the first effective countermeasure to these attacks. In particular, we show that state-of-the-art neural network stegomalware can be efficiently and effectively neutralized through shuffling the column order of the weight- and bias-matrices, or equivalently the channel-order of convolutional layers. We show that this effectively corrupts payloads that have been embedded by state-of-the-art methods in neural network steganography at no cost to network accuracy, outperforming competing methods by a significant margin. We then discuss possible means by which to bypass this defense, additional defense methods, and advocate for continued research into the security of machine learning systems.