Sadie Zhao

Qian Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Lucy Diao et al.

Coincident Peak (CP) pricing is widely used in U.S. electricity markets to allocate capacity and transmission costs. This paper develops a behavioral game-theoretic framework for CP-driven load shifting that couples a nonlinear cost-allocation model with day-ahead (one-shot) and real-time (sequential-learning) decision processes. We examine two update rules, namely best-response dynamics (BRD) and fictitious-play dynamics (FPD), across continuous and finite action spaces to quantify how flexibility, action resolution, and participation influence peak outcomes. Using ERCOT peak-day data, we find that FPD reliably reduces system peaks, whereas BRD is more variable and can increase peaks under tight-capacity conditions. Finer action resolution improves peak shaving, while the number of participants is largely neutral when aggregate flexibility is fixed. Meanwhile, information-provider signals can induce herding, whereas response-aware or diverse signals improve peak shaving. These results highlight both the potential and limits of CP pricing: smoothing information and enabling granular control are as important as the amount of available flexibility. The framework offers practical guidance for system operators and consumers: For ISOs, broadcasting smoothed CP signals and setting minimum controllable-capacity thresholds enhance coordination. For consumers, greater flexibility and finer control resolution improve both cost savings and peak-shaving performance.

Yuqi Pan, Sadie Zhao, Milind Tambe et al.

We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior, governed by a fixed but unknown parameter. Over repeated interactions, the sender chooses persuasive signaling schemes, observes only the receiver's realized actions, and seeks to minimize regret relative to a full-information oracle that knows the receiver's biased updating rule. We propose a safe exploration algorithm for learning the receiver's bias while maintaining high persuasion value. The algorithm exploits the asymmetric cost of probing: conservative probes incur only local loss, whereas overly aggressive probes may lose the persuasive opportunity entirely. For general finite state and action spaces and arbitrary bounded utilities, our method achieves $O(\log\log T)$ regret. A matching $Ω(\log\log T)$ lower bound shows that this rate is optimal. We further discuss the influence on receiver welfare, as well as extensions to jointly unknown prior and bias, and contextual settings with time-varying priors and utilities.

Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang et al. · harvard, tsinghua

Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds promise as a technology that can be used to improve government and economic policy-making. This paper proposes a new research agenda towards this end by introducing Social Environment Design, a general framework for the use of AI for automated policy-making that connects with the Reinforcement Learning, EconCS, and Computational Social Choice communities. The framework seeks to capture general economic environments, includes voting on policy objectives, and gives a direction for the systematic analysis of government and economic policy through AI simulation. We highlight key open problems for future research in AI-based policy-making. By solving these challenges, we hope to achieve various social welfare objectives, thereby promoting more ethical and responsible decision making.

Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald, Sadie Zhao et al.

In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these problems as generative-adversarial (i.e., min-max) optimization problems, for which we develop polynomial-time algorithms to solve, the former of which relies on an exact first-order oracle, and the latter, a stochastic one. We extend our approach to solve inverse multiagent simulacral learning in polynomial time and number of samples. In these problems, we seek a simulacrum, meaning parameters and an associated equilibrium that replicate the given observations in expectation. We find that our approach outperforms the widely-used ARIMA method in predicting prices in Spanish electricity markets based on time-series data.