Julián García

Qiankun Zhong, Thomas F. Eisenmann, Julian Garcia et al.

Reliance on generative AI can reduce cultural variance and diversity, especially in creative work. This reduction in variance has already led to problems in model performance, including model collapse and hallucination. In this paper, we examine the long-term consequences of AI use for human cultural evolution and the conditions under which widespread AI use may lead to "cultural collapse", a process in which reliance on AI-generated content reduces human variation and innovation and slows cumulative cultural evolution. Using an agent-based model and evolutionary game theory, we compare two types of AI use: complement and substitute. AI-complement users seek suggestions and guidance while remaining the main producers of the final output, whereas AI-substitute users provide minimal input, and rely on AI to produce most of the output. We then study how these use strategies compete and spread under evolutionary dynamics. We find that AI-substitute users prevail under individual-level selection despite the stronger reduction in cultural variance. By contrast, AI-complement users can benefit their groups by maintaining the variance needed for exploration, and can therefore be favored under cultural group selection when group boundaries are strong. Overall, our findings shed light on the long-term, population-level effects of AI adoption and inform policy and organizational strategies to mitigate these risks.

Francisco Zanartu, John Cook, Markus Wagner et al.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Nicolas Anastassacos, Julian García, Stephen Hailes et al.

Creating incentives for cooperation is a challenge in natural and artificial systems. One potential answer is reputation, whereby agents trade the immediate cost of cooperation for the future benefits of having a good reputation. Game theoretical models have shown that specific social norms can make cooperation stable, but how agents can independently learn to establish effective reputation mechanisms on their own is less understood. We use a simple model of reinforcement learning to show that reputation mechanisms generate two coordination problems: agents need to learn how to coordinate on the meaning of existing reputations and collectively agree on a social norm to assign reputations to others based on their behavior. These coordination problems exhibit multiple equilibria, some of which effectively establish cooperation. When we train agents with a standard Q-learning algorithm in an environment with the presence of reputation mechanisms, convergence to undesirable equilibria is widespread. We propose two mechanisms to alleviate this: (i) seeding a proportion of the system with fixed agents that steer others towards good equilibria; and (ii), intrinsic rewards based on the idea of introspection, i.e., augmenting agents' rewards by an amount proportionate to the performance of their own strategy against themselves. A combination of these simple mechanisms is successful in stabilizing cooperation, even in a fully decentralized version of the problem where agents learn to use and assign reputations simultaneously. We show how our results relate to the literature in Evolutionary Game Theory, and discuss implications for artificial, human and hybrid systems, where reputations can be used as a way to establish trust and cooperation.