CLJul 3, 2024
On Evaluating Explanation Utility for Human-AI Decision Making in NLPFateme Hashemi Chaleshtori, Atreya Ghosal, Alexander Gill et al.
Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations help people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To aid with this, we first review existing metrics suitable for application-grounded evaluation. We then establish criteria to select appropriate datasets, and using them, we find that only 4 out of over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP meet them. We then demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams: teaming people with models for certain tasks might only now start to make sense, and for others, it remains unsound. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract. Our results show that providing AI predictions, with or without explanations, does not cause decision makers to speed up their work without compromising performance. We argue for revisiting the setup of human-AI teams and improving automatic deferral of instances to AI, where explanations could play a useful role.
CLDec 24, 2025
Teaching People LLM's Errors and Getting it RightNathan Stringham, Fateme Hashemi Chaleshtori, Xinyuan Yan et al.
People use large language models (LLMs) when they should not. This is partly because they see LLMs compose poems and answer intricate questions, so they understandably, but incorrectly, assume LLMs won't stumble on basic tasks like simple arithmetic. Prior work has tried to address this by clustering instance embeddings into regions where an LLM is likely to fail and automatically describing patterns in these regions. The found failure patterns are taught to users to mitigate their overreliance. Yet, this approach has not fully succeeded. In this analysis paper, we aim to understand why. We first examine whether the negative result stems from the absence of failure patterns. We group instances in two datasets by their meta-labels and evaluate an LLM's predictions on these groups. We then define criteria to flag groups that are sizable and where the LLM is error-prone, and find meta-label groups that meet these criteria. Their meta-labels are the LLM's failure patterns that could be taught to users, so they do exist. We next test whether prompting and embedding-based approaches can surface these known failures. Without this, users cannot be taught about them to reduce their overreliance. We find mixed results across methods, which could explain the negative result. Finally, we revisit the final metric that measures teaching effectiveness. We propose to assess a user's ability to effectively use the given failure patterns to anticipate when an LLM is error-prone. A user study shows a positive effect from teaching with this metric, unlike the human-AI team accuracy. Our findings show that teaching failure patterns could be a viable approach to mitigating overreliance, but success depends on better automated failure-discovery methods and using metrics like ours.
CLFeb 20, 2025
Measuring Chain of Thought Faithfulness by Unlearning Reasoning StepsMartin Tutek, Fateme Hashemi Chaleshtori, Ana Marasović et al.
When prompted to think step-by-step, language models (LMs) produce a chain of thought (CoT), a sequence of reasoning steps that the model supposedly used to produce its prediction. Despite much work on CoT prompting, it is unclear if reasoning verbalized in a CoT is faithful to the models' parametric beliefs. We introduce a framework for measuring parametric faithfulness of generated reasoning, and propose Faithfulness by Unlearning Reasoning steps (FUR), an instance of this framework. FUR erases information contained in reasoning steps from model parameters, and measures faithfulness as the resulting effect on the model's prediction. Our experiments with four LMs and five multi-hop multi-choice question answering (MCQA) datasets show that FUR is frequently able to precisely change the underlying models' prediction for a given instance by unlearning key steps, indicating when a CoT is parametrically faithful. Further analysis shows that CoTs generated by models post-unlearning support different answers, hinting at a deeper effect of unlearning.