Florence E. Enock

Yi-Ling Chung, Gavin Abercrombie, Florence Enock et al.

Counterspeech offers direct rebuttals to hateful speech by challenging perpetrators of hate and showing support to targets of abuse. It provides a promising alternative to more contentious measures, such as content moderation and deplatforming, by contributing a greater amount of positive online speech rather than attempting to mitigate harmful content through removal. Advances in the development of large language models mean that the process of producing counterspeech could be made more efficient by automating its generation, which would enable large-scale online campaigns. However, we currently lack a systematic understanding of several important factors relating to the efficacy of counterspeech for hate mitigation, such as which types of counterspeech are most effective, what are the optimal conditions for implementation, and which specific effects of hate it can best ameliorate. This paper aims to fill this gap by systematically reviewing counterspeech research in the social sciences and comparing methodologies and findings with computer science efforts in automatic counterspeech generation. By taking this multi-disciplinary view, we identify promising future directions in both fields.

Angus R. Williams, Liam Burke-Moore, Ryan Sze-Yin Chan et al.

Advances in large language models have raised concerns about their potential use in generating compelling election disinformation at scale. This study presents a two-part investigation into the capabilities of LLMs to automate stages of an election disinformation operation. First, we introduce DisElect, a novel evaluation dataset designed to measure LLM compliance with instructions to generate content for an election disinformation operation in localised UK context, containing 2,200 malicious prompts and 50 benign prompts. Using DisElect, we test 13 LLMs and find that most models broadly comply with these requests; we also find that the few models which refuse malicious prompts also refuse benign election-related prompts, and are more likely to refuse to generate content from a right-wing perspective. Secondly, we conduct a series of experiments (N=2,340) to assess the "humanness" of LLMs: the extent to which disinformation operation content generated by an LLM is able to pass as human-written. Our experiments suggest that almost all LLMs tested released since 2022 produce election disinformation operation content indiscernible by human evaluators over 50% of the time. Notably, we observe that multiple models achieve above-human levels of humanness. Taken together, these findings suggest that current LLMs can be used to generate high-quality content for election disinformation operations, even in hyperlocalised scenarios, at far lower costs than traditional methods, and offer researchers and policymakers an empirical benchmark for the measurement and evaluation of these capabilities in current and future models.