Yitong Shen

Haopeng Zhang, Yili Ren, Haohan Yuan et al.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks. However, their potential to integrate physical model knowledge for real-world signal interpretation remains largely unexplored. In this work, we introduce Wi-Chat, the first LLM-powered Wi-Fi-based human activity recognition system. We demonstrate that LLMs can process raw Wi-Fi signals and infer human activities by incorporating Wi-Fi sensing principles into prompts. Our approach leverages physical model insights to guide LLMs in interpreting Channel State Information (CSI) data without traditional signal processing techniques. Through experiments on real-world Wi-Fi datasets, we show that LLMs exhibit strong reasoning capabilities, achieving zero-shot activity recognition. These findings highlight a new paradigm for Wi-Fi sensing, expanding LLM applications beyond conventional language tasks and enhancing the accessibility of wireless sensing for real-world deployments.

Jingzhe Zhang, Yitong Shen, Ning Wang et al.

With the rapid evolution of wireless technologies, Wi-Fi has expanded beyond its original role in data transmission to support various emerging applications, particularly in physical-layer security, including device authentication, user authentication, and secret key generation. Despite extensive research on Wi-Fi Channel State Information (CSI)-based physical-layer security, its vulnerabilities remain largely unexplored. In this work, we propose BFIAttack, a novel attack that exploits Beamforming Feedback Information (BFI) to reconstruct the CSI of a legitimate user or device, thereby compromising Wi-Fi-based physical-layer security. We realize the attack by leveraging a closed-form CSI reconstruction method for the single-antenna station scenario and a maximum likelihood estimation-based CSI reconstruction for the multi-antenna station scenario. Moreover, we exploit spatial similarities among antenna pairs to refine the reconstructed CSI and enhance attack effectiveness. Experimental results show that BFIAttack achieves an average attack success rate of $73\%$ in multi-antenna station scenarios with no more than five attack attempts, and over $93\%$ in single-antenna station scenarios with only a single attempt. BFIAttack reveals critical vulnerabilities in existing Wi-Fi-based physical-layer security.