Teng Gu

Simin Chen, Yiming Chen, Zexin Li et al.

Data contamination has received increasing attention in the era of large language models (LLMs) due to their reliance on vast Internet-derived training corpora. To mitigate the risk of potential data contamination, LLM benchmarking has undergone a transformation from static to dynamic benchmarking. In this work, we conduct an in-depth analysis of existing static to dynamic benchmarking methods aimed at reducing data contamination risks. We first examine methods that enhance static benchmarks and identify their inherent limitations. We then highlight a critical gap-the lack of standardized criteria for evaluating dynamic benchmarks. Based on this observation, we propose a series of optimal design principles for dynamic benchmarking and analyze the limitations of existing dynamic benchmarks. This survey provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of recent advancements in data contamination research, offering valuable insights and a clear guide for future research efforts. We maintain a GitHub repository to continuously collect both static and dynamic benchmarking methods for LLMs. The repository can be found at this link.

Yixu Wang, Tianle Gu, Yan Teng et al.

Model extraction attacks are one type of inference-time attacks that approximate the functionality and performance of a black-box victim model by launching a certain number of queries to the model and then leveraging the model's predictions to train a substitute model. These attacks pose severe security threats to production models and MLaaS platforms and could cause significant monetary losses to the model owners. A body of work has proposed to defend machine learning models against model extraction attacks, including both active defense methods that modify the model's outputs or increase the query overhead to avoid extraction and passive defense methods that detect malicious queries or leverage watermarks to perform post-verification. In this work, we introduce a new defense paradigm called attack as defense which modifies the model's output to be poisonous such that any malicious users that attempt to use the output to train a substitute model will be poisoned. To this end, we propose a novel lightweight backdoor attack method dubbed HoneypotNet that replaces the classification layer of the victim model with a honeypot layer and then fine-tunes the honeypot layer with a shadow model (to simulate model extraction) via bi-level optimization to modify its output to be poisonous while remaining the original performance. We empirically demonstrate on four commonly used benchmark datasets that HoneypotNet can inject backdoors into substitute models with a high success rate. The injected backdoor not only facilitates ownership verification but also disrupts the functionality of substitute models, serving as a significant deterrent to model extraction attacks.