Nikolay Ivanov

Hanqing Guo, Qiben Yan, Nikolay Ivanov et al.

Voice-activated systems are integrated into a variety of desktop, mobile, and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. However, voice spoofing attacks, such as impersonation and replay attacks, in which malicious attackers synthesize the voice of a victim or simply replay it, have brought growing security concerns. Existing speaker verification techniques distinguish individual speakers via the spectrographic features extracted from an audible frequency range of voice commands. However, they often have high error rates and/or long delays. In this paper, we explore a new direction of human voice research by scrutinizing the unique characteristics of human speech at the ultrasound frequency band. Our research indicates that the high-frequency ultrasound components (e.g. speech fricatives) from 20 to 48 kHz can significantly enhance the security and accuracy of speaker verification. We propose a speaker verification system, SUPERVOICE that uses a two-stream DNN architecture with a feature fusion mechanism to generate distinctive speaker models. To test the system, we create a speech dataset with 12 hours of audio (8,950 voice samples) from 127 participants. In addition, we create a second spoofed voice dataset to evaluate its security. In order to balance between controlled recordings and real-world applications, the audio recordings are collected from two quiet rooms by 8 different recording devices, including 7 smartphones and an ultrasound microphone. Our evaluation shows that SUPERVOICE achieves 0.58% equal error rate in the speaker verification task, it only takes 120 ms for testing an incoming utterance, outperforming all existing speaker verification systems. Moreover, within 91 ms processing time, SUPERVOICE achieves 0% equal error rate in detecting replay attacks launched by 5 different loudspeakers.

Sushanth Ambati, Kainat Adeel, Jack Myers et al.

Self-Sovereign Digital Identity (SSDI) enables individuals to control their own identity assertions and data, rather than relying on centralized or federated systems prone to large-scale data breaches. By eliminating centralized databases maintained by service providers and identity brokers, SSDIs offer enhanced security and privacy. However, adoption remains slow, and research in this area lacks systematization and uniformity. To address these gaps, we present a comprehensive systematization of knowledge on self-sovereign digital identities, with a primary focus on identifying the challenges that impede real-world adoption. We survey 80 academic and non-academic sources and identify six major challenges: (i) binding a single identity to one individual or organization, (ii) the absence of mature cryptographic and communication protocols, (iii) significant usability barriers, (iv) regulatory and oversight gaps, (v) bootstrapping to critical-mass adoption, and (vi) dependence on a permissionless, decentralized, yet singular infrastructure that may expose unforeseen vulnerabilities over time. We then analyze 47 scientific publications and find that the vast majority focus on blockchain-based solutions rather than generalized SSDI architectures. Additionally, we catalog 12 real-world, production-grade SSDI applications. Our evaluation of these solutions reveals that self-sovereignty is, in practice, a spectrum rather than a binary property. Finally, we explore the frontiers of SSDI by identifying major trends, open problems, and opportunities for future research. We hope this systematization will help advance the shift from centralized to self-sovereign digital identities in a disciplined and impactful way.

Nikolay Ivanov, Jianzhi Lou, Ting Chen et al.

Ethereum holds multiple billions of U.S. dollars in the form of Ether cryptocurrency and ERC-20 tokens, with millions of deployed smart contracts algorithmically operating these funds. Unsurprisingly, the security of Ethereum smart contracts has been under rigorous scrutiny. In recent years, numerous defense tools have been developed to detect different types of smart contract code vulnerabilities. When opportunities for exploiting code vulnerabilities diminish, the attackers start resorting to social engineering attacks, which aim to influence humans -- often the weakest link in the system. The only known class of social engineering attacks in Ethereum are honeypots, which plant hidden traps for attackers attempting to exploit existing vulnerabilities, thereby targeting only a small population of potential victims. In this work, we explore the possibility and existence of new social engineering attacks beyond smart contract honeypots. We present two novel classes of Ethereum social engineering attacks - Address Manipulation and Homograph - and develop six zero-day social engineering attacks. To show how the attacks can be used in popular programming patterns, we conduct a case study of five popular smart contracts with combined market capitalization exceeding $29 billion, and integrate our attack patterns in their source codes without altering their existing functionality. Moreover, we show that these attacks remain dormant during the test phase but activate their malicious logic only at the final production deployment. We further analyze 85,656 open-source smart contracts, and discover that 1,027 of them can be used for the proposed social engineering attacks. We conduct a professional opinion survey with experts from seven smart contract auditing firms, corroborating that the exposed social engineering attacks bring a major threat to the smart contract systems.

Sky Pelletier Waterpeace, Nikolay Ivanov

Transaction processing systems underpin modern commerce, finance, and critical infrastructure, yet their security has never been studied across the full evolutionary arc of these systems. Over five decades, transaction processing has progressed through four distinct generations, from centralized databases, to distributed databases, to blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), finally to multi-context systems that span cyber-physical components under real-time constraints. Each generation has introduced new transaction types and new classes of vulnerabilities, yet security research remains fragmented by domain, and the foundational ACID transaction model has not been revisited to reflect the demands of contemporary systems. We classify 163 papers on transaction security by evolutionary generation, security focus, and relevant Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entries, and distill a curated set of 41 high-impact or seminal papers spanning all four generations. We make three principal contributions. First, we develop a four-generation evolutionary taxonomy that contextualizes each work within the broader trajectory of transaction processing. Second, we map each paper's security focus to CWE identifiers, providing a systems-oriented vocabulary for analyzing transaction-specific threats across otherwise siloed domains. Third, we demonstrate that the classical ACID properties are insufficient for modern transactional systems and introduce RANCID, extending ACID with Real-timeness (R) and N-many Contexts (N), as a property set for reasoning about the security and correctness of systems that must coordinate across heterogeneous contexts under timing constraints. Our systematization exposes a pronounced bias toward DLT security research at the expense of broader transactional security and identifies concrete open problems for the next generation of transaction processing systems.

Nikolay Ivanov, Qiben Yan

Hardware wallets are designed to withstand malware attacks by isolating their private keys from the cyberspace, but they are vulnerable to the attacks that fake an address stored in a clipboard. To prevent such attacks, a hardware wallet asks the user to verify the recipient address shown on the wallet display. Since crypto addresses are long sequences of random symbols, their manual verification becomes a difficult task. Consequently, many users of hardware wallets elect to verify only a few symbols in the address, and this can be exploited by an attacker. In this work, we introduce EthClipper, an attack that targets owners of hardware wallets on the Ethereum platform. EthClipper malware queries a distributed database of pre-mined accounts in order to select the address with maximum visual similarity to the original one. We design and implement a EthClipper malware, which we test on Trezor, Ledger, and KeepKey wallets. To deliver computation and storage resources for the attack, we implement a distributed service, ClipperCloud, and test it on different deployment environments. Our evaluation shows that with off-the-shelf PCs and NAS storage, an attacker would be able to mine a database capable of matching 25% of the digits in an address to achieve a 50% chance of finding a fitting fake address. For responsible disclosure, we have contacted the manufactures of the hardware wallets used in the attack evaluation, and they all confirm the danger of EthClipper.

Nikolay Ivanov, Qiben Yan

Most self-service payment terminals require network connectivity for processing electronic payments. The necessity to maintain network connectivity increases costs, introduces cybersecurity risks, and significantly limits the number of places where the terminals can be installed. Leading payment service providers have proposed offline payment solutions that rely on algorithmically generated payment tokens. Existing payment token solutions, however, require complex mechanisms for authentication, transaction management, and most importantly, security risk management. In this paper, we present VolgaPay, a blockchain-based system that allows merchants to deploy secure offline payment terminal infrastructure that does not require collection and storage of any sensitive data. We design a novel payment protocol which mitigates security threats for all the participants of VolgaPay, such that the maximum loss from gaining full access to any component by an adversary incurs only a limited scope of harm. We achieve significant enhancements in security, operation efficiency, and cost reduction via a combination of polynomial multi-hash chain micropayment channels and blockchain grafting for off-chain channel state transition. We implement the VolgaPay payment system, and with thorough evaluation and security analysis, we demonstrate that VolgaPay is capable of delivering a fast, secure, and cost-efficient solution for offline payment terminals.

Nikolay Ivanov, Hanqing Guo, Qiben Yan

The developers of Ethereum smart contracts often implement administrating patterns, such as censoring certain users, creating or destroying balances on demand, destroying smart contracts, or injecting arbitrary code. These routines turn an ERC20 token into an administrated token - the type of Ethereum smart contract that we scrutinize in this research. We discover that many smart contracts are administrated, and the owners of these tokens carry lesser social and legal responsibilities compared to the traditional centralized actors that those tokens intend to disrupt. This entails two major problems: a) the owners of the tokens have the ability to quickly steal all the funds and disappear from the market; and b) if the private key of the owner's account is stolen, all the assets might immediately turn into the property of the attacker. We develop a pattern recognition framework based on 9 syntactic features characterizing administrated ERC20 tokens, which we use to analyze existing smart contracts deployed on Ethereum Mainnet. Our analysis of 84,062 unique Ethereum smart contracts reveals that nearly 58% of them are administrated ERC20 tokens, which accounts for almost 90% of all ERC20 tokens deployed on Ethereum. To protect users from the frivolousness of unregulated token owners without depriving the ability of these owners to properly manage their tokens, we introduce SafelyAdministrated - a library that enforces a responsible ownership and management of ERC20 tokens. The library introduces three mechanisms: deferred maintenance, board of trustees and safe pause. We implement and test SafelyAdministrated in the form of Solidity abstract contract, which is ready to be used by the next generation of safely administrated ERC20 tokens.

Nikolay Ivanov, Qiben Yan

The Foreign Exchange (Forex) is a large decentralized market, on which trading analysis and algorithmic trading are popular. Research efforts have been focusing on proof of efficiency of certain technical indicators. We demonstrate, however, that the values of indicator functions are not reproducible and often reduce the number of trade opportunities, compared to price-action trading. In this work, we develop two dataset-agnostic Forex trading heuristic templates with high rate of trading signals. In order to determine most optimal parameters for the given heuristic prototypes, we perform a machine learning simulation of 10 years of Forex price data over three low-margin instruments and 6 different OHLC granularities. As a result, we develop a specific and reproducible list of most optimal trade parameters found for each instrument-granularity pair, with 118 pips of average daily profit for the optimized configuration.