Sven Seuken

Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems et al. · berkeley

We study the combinatorial assignment domain, which includes combinatorial auctions and course allocation. The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from agents. However, the main shortcoming of this prior work is that it does not model a mechanism's uncertainty over values for not yet elicited bundles. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by presenting a Bayesian optimization-based combinatorial assignment (BOCA) mechanism. Our key technical contribution is to integrate a method for capturing model uncertainty into an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism. Concretely, we design a new method for estimating an upper uncertainty bound that can be used to define an acquisition function to determine the next query to the agents. This enables the mechanism to properly explore (and not just exploit) the bundle space during its preference elicitation phase. We run computational experiments in several spectrum auction domains to evaluate BOCA's performance. Our results show that BOCA achieves higher allocative efficiency than state-of-the-art approaches.

Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss et al. · berkeley

We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning (ML)-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from bidders. However, from a practical point of view, the main shortcoming of this prior work is that those designs elicit bidders' preferences via value queries (i.e., ``What is your value for the bundle $\{A,B\}$?''). In most real-world ICA domains, value queries are considered impractical, since they impose an unrealistically high cognitive burden on bidders, which is why they are not used in practice. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by designing an ML-powered combinatorial clock auction that elicits information from the bidders only via demand queries (i.e., ``At prices $p$, what is your most preferred bundle of items?''). We make two key technical contributions: First, we present a novel method for training an ML model on demand queries. Second, based on those trained ML models, we introduce an efficient method for determining the demand query with the highest clearing potential, for which we also provide a theoretical foundation. We experimentally evaluate our ML-based demand query mechanism in several spectrum auction domains and compare it against the most established real-world ICA: the combinatorial clock auction (CCA). Our mechanism significantly outperforms the CCA in terms of efficiency in all domains, it achieves higher efficiency in a significantly reduced number of rounds, and, using linear prices, it exhibits vastly higher clearing potential. Thus, with this paper we bridge the gap between research and practice and propose the first practical ML-powered ICA.

Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner et al.

We study the course allocation problem, where universities assign course schedules to students. The current state-of-the-art mechanism, Course Match, has one major shortcoming: students make significant mistakes when reporting their preferences, which negatively affects welfare and fairness. To address this issue, we introduce a new mechanism, Machine Learning-powered Course Match (MLCM). At the core of MLCM is a machine learning-powered preference elicitation module that iteratively asks personalized pairwise comparison queries to alleviate students' reporting mistakes. Extensive computational experiments, grounded in real-world data, demonstrate that MLCM, with only ten comparison queries, significantly increases both average and minimum student utility by 7%-11% and 17%-29%, respectively. Finally, we highlight MLCM's robustness to changes in the environment and show how our design minimizes the risk of upgrading to MLCM while making the upgrade process simple for universities and seamless for their students.

Ludwig Dierks, Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken et al.

To find families for the more than 70,000 children in need of adoptive placements, most United States child welfare agencies have employed a family-driven search approach in which prospective families respond to announcements made by the agency. However, some agencies have switched to a caseworker-driven search approach in which the caseworker directly contacts families recommended for a child. We introduce a novel search-and-matching model that captures the key features of the adoption process and compare family-driven with caseworker-driven search in a game-theoretical framework. Under either approach, the equilibria are generated by threshold strategies and form a lattice structure. Our main theoretical finding then shows that no family-driven equilibrium can Pareto dominate any caseworker-driven outcome, whereas it is possible that each caseworker-driven equilibrium Pareto dominates every equilibrium attainable under family-driven search. We also find that, within our model, when families are sufficiently impatient, caseworker-driven search is better for all children. We numerically illustrate that most agents are better off under caseworker-driven search across a wide range of parameter values. Finally, we present an empirical study of an agency that switched to caseworker-driven search, finding a three-year adoption probability that outperformed a statewide benchmark by 44.9%, along with a statistically significant 54% higher adoption hazard rate.

Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael Curry et al. · cmu

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) involves determining paths for multiple agents to travel simultaneously and collision-free through a shared area toward given goal locations. This problem is computationally complex, especially when dealing with large numbers of agents, as is common in realistic applications like autonomous vehicle coordination. Finding an optimal solution is often computationally infeasible, making the use of approximate, suboptimal algorithms essential. Adding to the complexity, agents might act in a self-interested and strategic way, possibly misrepresenting their goals to the MAPF algorithm if it benefits them. Although the field of mechanism design offers tools to align incentives, using these tools without careful consideration can fail when only having access to approximately optimal outcomes. In this work, we introduce the problem of scalable mechanism design for MAPF and propose three strategyproof mechanisms, two of which even use approximate MAPF algorithms. We test our mechanisms on realistic MAPF domains with problem sizes ranging from dozens to hundreds of agents. We find that they improve welfare beyond a simple baseline.

Ermis Soumalias, Yanchen Jiang, Kehang Zhu et al.

We study the potential of large language models (LLMs) as proxies for humans to simplify preference elicitation (PE) in combinatorial assignment. While traditional PE methods rely on iterative queries to capture preferences, LLMs offer a one-shot alternative with reduced human effort. We propose a framework for LLM proxies that can work in tandem with SOTA ML-powered preference elicitation schemes. Our framework handles the novel challenges introduced by LLMs, such as response variability and increased computational costs. We experimentally evaluate the efficiency of LLM proxies against human queries in the well-studied course allocation domain, and we investigate the model capabilities required for success. We find that our approach improves allocative efficiency by up to 20%, and these results are robust across different LLMs and to differences in quality and accuracy of reporting.

Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner et al. · berkeley

We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, recent work has proposed machine learning (ML)-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most critical information from bidders to maximize efficiency. However, while the SOTA ML-based algorithms elicit bidders' preferences via value queries, ICAs that are used in practice elicit information via demand queries. In this paper, we introduce a novel ML algorithm that provably makes use of the full information from both value and demand queries, and we show via experiments that combining both query types results in significantly better learning performance in practice. Building on these insights, we present MLHCA, a new ML-powered auction that uses value and demand queries. MLHCA substantially outperforms the previous SOTA, reducing efficiency loss by up to a factor 10, with up to 58% fewer queries. Thus, MLHCA achieves large efficiency improvements while also reducing bidders' cognitive load, establishing a new benchmark for both practicability and efficiency.

Ermis Soumalias, Michael J. Curry, Sven Seuken

The next frontier of online advertising is revenue generation from LLM-generated content. We consider a setting where advertisers aim to influence the responses of an LLM to align with their interests, while platforms seek to maximize advertiser value and ensure user satisfaction. The challenge is that advertisers' preferences generally conflict with those of the user, and advertisers may misreport their preferences. To address this, we introduce MOSAIC, an auction mechanism that ensures that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for advertisers and that aligns the utility of each advertiser with their contribution to social welfare. Importantly, the mechanism operates without LLM fine-tuning or access to model weights and provably converges to the output of the optimally fine-tuned LLM as computational resources increase. Additionally, it can incorporate contextual information about advertisers, which significantly improves social welfare. Through experiments with a publicly available LLM, we show that MOSAIC leads to high advertiser value and platform revenue with low computational overhead. While our motivating application is online advertising, our mechanism can be applied in any setting with monetary transfers, making it a general-purpose solution for truthfully aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents over LLM-generated replies.

Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna Wutte et al.

We study methods for estimating model uncertainty for neural networks (NNs) in regression. To isolate the effect of model uncertainty, we focus on a noiseless setting with scarce training data. We introduce five important desiderata regarding model uncertainty that any method should satisfy. However, we find that established benchmarks often fail to reliably capture some of these desiderata, even those that are required by Bayesian theory. To address this, we introduce a new approach for capturing model uncertainty for NNs, which we call Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty (NOMU). The main idea of NOMU is to design a network architecture consisting of two connected sub-NNs, one for model prediction and one for model uncertainty, and to train it using a carefully-designed loss function. Importantly, our design enforces that NOMU satisfies our five desiderata. Due to its modular architecture, NOMU can provide model uncertainty for any given (previously trained) NN if given access to its training data. We evaluate NOMU in various regressions tasks and noiseless Bayesian optimization (BO) with costly evaluations. In regression, NOMU performs at least as well as state-of-the-art methods. In BO, NOMU even outperforms all considered benchmarks.

Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein

Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming (MBDP) has proved extremely effective in solving decentralized POMDPs with large horizons. We generalize the algorithm and improve its scalability by reducing the complexity with respect to the number of observations from exponential to polynomial. We derive error bounds on solution quality with respect to this new approximation and analyze the convergence behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness of the improvements, we introduce a new, larger benchmark problem. Experimental results show that despite the high complexity of decentralized POMDPs, scalable solution techniques such as MBDP perform surprisingly well.