Jack Clark

Esin Durmus, Karina Nguyen, Thomas I. Liao et al. · openai, stanford

Large language models (LLMs) may not equitably represent diverse global perspectives on societal issues. In this paper, we develop a quantitative framework to evaluate whose opinions model-generated responses are more similar to. We first build a dataset, GlobalOpinionQA, comprised of questions and answers from cross-national surveys designed to capture diverse opinions on global issues across different countries. Next, we define a metric that quantifies the similarity between LLM-generated survey responses and human responses, conditioned on country. With our framework, we run three experiments on an LLM trained to be helpful, honest, and harmless with Constitutional AI. By default, LLM responses tend to be more similar to the opinions of certain populations, such as those from the USA, and some European and South American countries, highlighting the potential for biases. When we prompt the model to consider a particular country's perspective, responses shift to be more similar to the opinions of the prompted populations, but can reflect harmful cultural stereotypes. When we translate GlobalOpinionQA questions to a target language, the model's responses do not necessarily become the most similar to the opinions of speakers of those languages. We release our dataset for others to use and build on. Our data is at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Anthropic/llm_global_opinions. We also provide an interactive visualization at https://llmglobalvalues.anthropic.com.

Yuntao Bai, Andy Jones, Kamal Ndousse et al. · berkeley, openai

We apply preference modeling and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to finetune language models to act as helpful and harmless assistants. We find this alignment training improves performance on almost all NLP evaluations, and is fully compatible with training for specialized skills such as python coding and summarization. We explore an iterated online mode of training, where preference models and RL policies are updated on a weekly cadence with fresh human feedback data, efficiently improving our datasets and models. Finally, we investigate the robustness of RLHF training, and identify a roughly linear relation between the RL reward and the square root of the KL divergence between the policy and its initialization. Alongside our main results, we perform peripheral analyses on calibration, competing objectives, and the use of OOD detection, compare our models with human writers, and provide samples from our models using prompts appearing in recent related work.

Nestor Maslej, Loredana Fattorini, Erik Brynjolfsson et al. · salesforce, stanford

Welcome to the sixth edition of the AI Index Report. This year, the report introduces more original data than any previous edition, including a new chapter on AI public opinion, a more thorough technical performance chapter, original analysis about large language and multimodal models, detailed trends in global AI legislation records, a study of the environmental impact of AI systems, and more. The AI Index Report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence. Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI. The report aims to be the world's most credible and authoritative source for data and insights about AI.

Saurav Kadavath, Tom Conerly, Amanda Askell et al. · berkeley, openai

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Catherine Olsson, Nelson Elhage, Neel Nanda et al. · openai

"Induction heads" are attention heads that implement a simple algorithm to complete token sequences like [A][B] ... [A] -> [B]. In this work, we present preliminary and indirect evidence for a hypothesis that induction heads might constitute the mechanism for the majority of all "in-context learning" in large transformer models (i.e. decreasing loss at increasing token indices). We find that induction heads develop at precisely the same point as a sudden sharp increase in in-context learning ability, visible as a bump in the training loss. We present six complementary lines of evidence, arguing that induction heads may be the mechanistic source of general in-context learning in transformer models of any size. For small attention-only models, we present strong, causal evidence; for larger models with MLPs, we present correlational evidence.

Daniel Zhang, Nestor Maslej, Erik Brynjolfsson et al. · salesforce, stanford

Welcome to the fifth edition of the AI Index Report! The latest edition includes data from a broad set of academic, private, and nonprofit organizations as well as more self-collected data and original analysis than any previous editions, including an expanded technical performance chapter, a new survey of robotics researchers around the world, data on global AI legislation records in 25 countries, and a new chapter with an in-depth analysis of technical AI ethics metrics. The AI Index Report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence. Its mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, and globally sourced data for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI. The report aims to be the world's most credible and authoritative source for data and insights about AI.

Deep Ganguli, Liane Lovitt, Jackson Kernion et al. · berkeley, openai

We describe our early efforts to red team language models in order to simultaneously discover, measure, and attempt to reduce their potentially harmful outputs. We make three main contributions. First, we investigate scaling behaviors for red teaming across 3 model sizes (2.7B, 13B, and 52B parameters) and 4 model types: a plain language model (LM); an LM prompted to be helpful, honest, and harmless; an LM with rejection sampling; and a model trained to be helpful and harmless using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We find that the RLHF models are increasingly difficult to red team as they scale, and we find a flat trend with scale for the other model types. Second, we release our dataset of 38,961 red team attacks for others to analyze and learn from. We provide our own analysis of the data and find a variety of harmful outputs, which range from offensive language to more subtly harmful non-violent unethical outputs. Third, we exhaustively describe our instructions, processes, statistical methodologies, and uncertainty about red teaming. We hope that this transparency accelerates our ability to work together as a community in order to develop shared norms, practices, and technical standards for how to red team language models.

Ethan Perez, Sam Ringer, Kamilė Lukošiūtė et al. · anthropic, berkeley

As language models (LMs) scale, they develop many novel behaviors, good and bad, exacerbating the need to evaluate how they behave. Prior work creates evaluations with crowdwork (which is time-consuming and expensive) or existing data sources (which are not always available). Here, we automatically generate evaluations with LMs. We explore approaches with varying amounts of human effort, from instructing LMs to write yes/no questions to making complex Winogender schemas with multiple stages of LM-based generation and filtering. Crowdworkers rate the examples as highly relevant and agree with 90-100% of labels, sometimes more so than corresponding human-written datasets. We generate 154 datasets and discover new cases of inverse scaling where LMs get worse with size. Larger LMs repeat back a dialog user's preferred answer ("sycophancy") and express greater desire to pursue concerning goals like resource acquisition and goal preservation. We also find some of the first examples of inverse scaling in RL from Human Feedback (RLHF), where more RLHF makes LMs worse. For example, RLHF makes LMs express stronger political views (on gun rights and immigration) and a greater desire to avoid shut down. Overall, LM-written evaluations are high-quality and let us quickly discover many novel LM behaviors.

Deep Ganguli, Amanda Askell, Nicholas Schiefer et al. · berkeley, openai

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

Gillian K. Hadfield, Jack Clark

Appropriately regulating artificial intelligence is an increasingly urgent and widespread policy challenge. We identify two primary, competing problem. First is a technical deficit: Legislatures and regulatory face significant challenges in rapidly translating conventional command-and-control legal requirements into technical requirements. Second is a democratic deficit: Over-reliance on industry to provide technical standards fails to ensure that the many values-based decisions that must be made to shape AI development and deployment are made by democratically accountable public, not private, actors. We propose a solution: regulatory markets, in which governments require the targets of regulation to purchase regulatory services from a government-licensed private regulator. This approach to AI regulation could overcome the limitations of both command-and-control regulation and excessive delegation to industry. Regulatory markets could enable governments to establish policy priorities for the regulation of AI while relying on market forces and industry R&D efforts to pioneer the technical methods of regulation that best achieve policymakers' stated objectives.

Evan Hubinger, Carson Denison, Jesse Mu et al.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoor behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoor behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

Alec Radford, Jong Wook Kim, Chris Hallacy et al.

State-of-the-art computer vision systems are trained to predict a fixed set of predetermined object categories. This restricted form of supervision limits their generality and usability since additional labeled data is needed to specify any other visual concept. Learning directly from raw text about images is a promising alternative which leverages a much broader source of supervision. We demonstrate that the simple pre-training task of predicting which caption goes with which image is an efficient and scalable way to learn SOTA image representations from scratch on a dataset of 400 million (image, text) pairs collected from the internet. After pre-training, natural language is used to reference learned visual concepts (or describe new ones) enabling zero-shot transfer of the model to downstream tasks. We study the performance of this approach by benchmarking on over 30 different existing computer vision datasets, spanning tasks such as OCR, action recognition in videos, geo-localization, and many types of fine-grained object classification. The model transfers non-trivially to most tasks and is often competitive with a fully supervised baseline without the need for any dataset specific training. For instance, we match the accuracy of the original ResNet-50 on ImageNet zero-shot without needing to use any of the 1.28 million training examples it was trained on. We release our code and pre-trained model weights at https://github.com/OpenAI/CLIP.

Kunal Handa, Alex Tamkin, Miles McCain et al. · stanford

Despite widespread speculation about artificial intelligence's impact on the future of work, we lack systematic empirical evidence about how these systems are actually being used for different tasks. Here, we present a novel framework for measuring AI usage patterns across the economy. We leverage a recent privacy-preserving system to analyze over four million Claude.ai conversations through the lens of tasks and occupations in the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET Database. Our analysis reveals that AI usage primarily concentrates in software development and writing tasks, which together account for nearly half of all total usage. However, usage of AI extends more broadly across the economy, with approximately 36% of occupations using AI for at least a quarter of their associated tasks. We also analyze how AI is being used for tasks, finding 57% of usage suggests augmentation of human capabilities (e.g., learning or iterating on an output) while 43% suggests automation (e.g., fulfilling a request with minimal human involvement). While our data and methods face important limitations and only paint a picture of AI usage on a single platform, they provide an automated, granular approach for tracking AI's evolving role in the economy and identifying leading indicators of future impact as these technologies continue to advance.

Alex Tamkin, Miles McCain, Kunal Handa et al. · stanford

How are AI assistants being used in the real world? While model providers in theory have a window into this impact via their users' data, both privacy concerns and practical challenges have made analyzing this data difficult. To address these issues, we present Clio (Claude insights and observations), a privacy-preserving platform that uses AI assistants themselves to analyze and surface aggregated usage patterns across millions of conversations, without the need for human reviewers to read raw conversations. We validate this can be done with a high degree of accuracy and privacy by conducting extensive evaluations. We demonstrate Clio's usefulness in two broad ways. First, we share insights about how models are being used in the real world from one million Claude.ai Free and Pro conversations, ranging from providing advice on hairstyles to providing guidance on Git operations and concepts. We also identify the most common high-level use cases on Claude.ai (coding, writing, and research tasks) as well as patterns that differ across languages (e.g., conversations in Japanese discuss elder care and aging populations at higher-than-typical rates). Second, we use Clio to make our systems safer by identifying coordinated attempts to abuse our systems, monitoring for unknown unknowns during critical periods like launches of new capabilities or major world events, and improving our existing monitoring systems. We also discuss the limitations of our approach, as well as risks and ethical concerns. By enabling analysis of real-world AI usage, Clio provides a scalable platform for empirically grounded AI safety and governance.

Toby Shevlane, Sebastian Farquhar, Ben Garfinkel et al.

Current approaches to building general-purpose AI systems tend to produce systems with both beneficial and harmful capabilities. Further progress in AI development could lead to capabilities that pose extreme risks, such as offensive cyber capabilities or strong manipulation skills. We explain why model evaluation is critical for addressing extreme risks. Developers must be able to identify dangerous capabilities (through "dangerous capability evaluations") and the propensity of models to apply their capabilities for harm (through "alignment evaluations"). These evaluations will become critical for keeping policymakers and other stakeholders informed, and for making responsible decisions about model training, deployment, and security.

Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, Anna Chen et al.

Given the broad capabilities of large language models, it should be possible to work towards a general-purpose, text-based assistant that is aligned with human values, meaning that it is helpful, honest, and harmless. As an initial foray in this direction we study simple baseline techniques and evaluations, such as prompting. We find that the benefits from modest interventions increase with model size, generalize to a variety of alignment evaluations, and do not compromise the performance of large models. Next we investigate scaling trends for several training objectives relevant to alignment, comparing imitation learning, binary discrimination, and ranked preference modeling. We find that ranked preference modeling performs much better than imitation learning, and often scales more favorably with model size. In contrast, binary discrimination typically performs and scales very similarly to imitation learning. Finally we study a `preference model pre-training' stage of training, with the goal of improving sample efficiency when finetuning on human preferences.

Jess Whittlestone, Jack Clark

In this paper we outline a proposal for improving the governance of artificial intelligence (AI) by investing in government capacity to systematically measure and monitor the capabilities and impacts of AI systems. If adopted, this would give governments greater information about the AI ecosystem, equipping them to more effectively direct AI development and deployment in the most societally and economically beneficial directions. It would also create infrastructure that could rapidly identify potential threats or harms that could occur as a consequence of changes in the AI ecosystem, such as the emergence of strategically transformative capabilities, or the deployment of harmful systems. We begin by outlining the problem which motivates this proposal: in brief, traditional governance approaches struggle to keep pace with the speed of progress in AI. We then present our proposal for addressing this problem: governments must invest in measurement and monitoring infrastructure. We discuss this proposal in detail, outlining what specific things governments could focus on measuring and monitoring, and the kinds of benefits this would generate for policymaking. Finally, we outline some potential pilot projects and some considerations for implementing this in practice.

Sandhini Agarwal, Gretchen Krueger, Jack Clark et al.

Recently, there have been breakthroughs in computer vision ("CV") models that are more generalizable with the advent of models such as CLIP and ALIGN. In this paper, we analyze CLIP and highlight some of the challenges such models pose. CLIP reduces the need for task specific training data, potentially opening up many niche tasks to automation. CLIP also allows its users to flexibly specify image classification classes in natural language, which we find can shift how biases manifest. Additionally, through some preliminary probes we find that CLIP can inherit biases found in prior computer vision systems. Given the wide and unpredictable domain of uses for such models, this raises questions regarding what sufficiently safe behaviour for such systems may look like. These results add evidence to the growing body of work calling for a change in the notion of a 'better' model--to move beyond simply looking at higher accuracy at task-oriented capability evaluations, and towards a broader 'better' that takes into account deployment-critical features such as different use contexts, and people who interact with the model when thinking about model deployment.

Daniel Zhang, Saurabh Mishra, Erik Brynjolfsson et al.

Welcome to the fourth edition of the AI Index Report. This year we significantly expanded the amount of data available in the report, worked with a broader set of external organizations to calibrate our data, and deepened our connections with the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI). The AI Index Report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence. Its mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, and globally sourced data for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop intuitions about the complex field of AI. The report aims to be the most credible and authoritative source for data and insights about AI in the world.

Alex Tamkin, Miles Brundage, Jack Clark et al.

On October 14th, 2020, researchers from OpenAI, the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, and other universities convened to discuss open research questions surrounding GPT-3, the largest publicly-disclosed dense language model at the time. The meeting took place under Chatham House Rules. Discussants came from a variety of research backgrounds including computer science, linguistics, philosophy, political science, communications, cyber policy, and more. Broadly, the discussion centered around two main questions: 1) What are the technical capabilities and limitations of large language models? 2) What are the societal effects of widespread use of large language models? Here, we provide a detailed summary of the discussion organized by the two themes above.

Tom B. Brown, Benjamin Mann, Nick Ryder et al.

Recent work has demonstrated substantial gains on many NLP tasks and benchmarks by pre-training on a large corpus of text followed by fine-tuning on a specific task. While typically task-agnostic in architecture, this method still requires task-specific fine-tuning datasets of thousands or tens of thousands of examples. By contrast, humans can generally perform a new language task from only a few examples or from simple instructions - something which current NLP systems still largely struggle to do. Here we show that scaling up language models greatly improves task-agnostic, few-shot performance, sometimes even reaching competitiveness with prior state-of-the-art fine-tuning approaches. Specifically, we train GPT-3, an autoregressive language model with 175 billion parameters, 10x more than any previous non-sparse language model, and test its performance in the few-shot setting. For all tasks, GPT-3 is applied without any gradient updates or fine-tuning, with tasks and few-shot demonstrations specified purely via text interaction with the model. GPT-3 achieves strong performance on many NLP datasets, including translation, question-answering, and cloze tasks, as well as several tasks that require on-the-fly reasoning or domain adaptation, such as unscrambling words, using a novel word in a sentence, or performing 3-digit arithmetic. At the same time, we also identify some datasets where GPT-3's few-shot learning still struggles, as well as some datasets where GPT-3 faces methodological issues related to training on large web corpora. Finally, we find that GPT-3 can generate samples of news articles which human evaluators have difficulty distinguishing from articles written by humans. We discuss broader societal impacts of this finding and of GPT-3 in general.

Irene Solaiman, Miles Brundage, Jack Clark et al.

Large language models have a range of beneficial uses: they can assist in prose, poetry, and programming; analyze dataset biases; and more. However, their flexibility and generative capabilities also raise misuse concerns. This report discusses OpenAI's work related to the release of its GPT-2 language model. It discusses staged release, which allows time between model releases to conduct risk and benefit analyses as model sizes increased. It also discusses ongoing partnership-based research and provides recommendations for better coordination and responsible publication in AI.

Miles Brundage, Shahar Avin, Jack Clark et al.

This report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of AI, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. After analyzing the ways in which AI may influence the threat landscape in the digital, physical, and political domains, we make four high-level recommendations for AI researchers and other stakeholders. We also suggest several promising areas for further research that could expand the portfolio of defenses, or make attacks less effective or harder to execute. Finally, we discuss, but do not conclusively resolve, the long-term equilibrium of attackers and defenders.