Max Siegel

Ilker Yildirim, Max H. Siegel, Amir A. Soltani et al. · mit

Many surface cues support three-dimensional shape perception, but people can sometimes still see shape when these features are missing -- in extreme cases, even when an object is completely occluded, as when covered with a draped cloth. We propose a framework for 3D shape perception that explains perception in both typical and atypical cases as analysis-by-synthesis, or inference in a generative model of image formation: the model integrates intuitive physics to explain how shape can be inferred from deformations it causes to other objects, as in cloth-draping. Behavioral and computational studies comparing this account with several alternatives show that it best matches human observers in both accuracy and response times, and is the only model that correlates significantly with human performance on difficult discriminations. Our results suggest that bottom-up deep neural network models are not fully adequate accounts of human shape perception, and point to how machine vision systems might achieve more human-like robustness.

Lance Ying, Daniel Xu, Alicia Zhang et al.

People regularly make inferences about objects in the world that they cannot see by flexibly integrating information from multiple sources: auditory and visual cues, language, and our prior beliefs and knowledge about the scene. How are we able to so flexibly integrate many sources of information to make sense of the world around us, even if we have no direct knowledge? In this work, we propose a neurosymbolic model that uses neural networks to parse open-ended multimodal inputs and then applies a Bayesian model to integrate different sources of information to evaluate different hypotheses. We evaluate our model with a novel object guessing game called ``What's in the Box?'' where humans and models watch a video clip of an experimenter shaking boxes and then try to guess the objects inside the boxes. Through a human experiment, we show that our model correlates strongly with human judgments, whereas unimodal ablated models and large multimodal neural model baselines show poor correlation.

Yuka Machino, Matthias Hofer, Max Siegel et al.

Misunderstandings in cross-cultural communication often arise from subtle differences in interpretation, but it is unclear whether these differences arise from the literal meanings assigned to words or from more general pragmatic factors such as norms around politeness and brevity. In this paper, we report three experiments examining how speakers of British and American English interpret intensifiers like "quite" and "very." To better understand these cross-cultural differences, we developed a computational cognitive model where listeners recursively reason about speakers who balance informativity, politeness, and utterance cost. Our model comparisons suggested that cross-cultural differences in intensifier interpretation stem from a combination of (1) different literal meanings, (2) different weights on utterance cost. These findings challenge accounts based purely on semantic variation or politeness norms, demonstrating that cross-cultural differences in interpretation emerge from an intricate interplay between the two.