Jiayi Geng

Alexis Chevalier, Jiayi Geng, Alexander Wettig et al. · princeton

NLP has recently made exciting progress toward training language models (LMs) with strong scientific problem-solving skills. However, model development has not focused on real-life use-cases of LMs for science, including applications in education that require processing long scientific documents. To address this, we introduce TutorEval and TutorChat. TutorEval is a diverse question-answering benchmark consisting of questions about long chapters from STEM textbooks, written by experts. TutorEval helps measure real-life usability of LMs as scientific assistants, and it is the first benchmark combining long contexts, free-form generation, and multi-disciplinary scientific knowledge. Moreover, we show that fine-tuning base models with existing dialogue datasets leads to poor performance on TutorEval. Therefore, we create TutorChat, a dataset of 80,000 long synthetic dialogues about textbooks. We use TutorChat to fine-tune Llemma models with 7B and 34B parameters. These LM tutors specialized in math have a 32K-token context window, and they excel at TutorEval while performing strongly on GSM8K and MATH. Our datasets build on open-source materials, and we release our models, data, and evaluations.

Ryan Liu, Jiayi Geng, Addison J. Wu et al.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for improving large language and multimodal model performance. However, it is still an open question under which settings CoT systematically reduces performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, focusing on six representative tasks from the psychological literature where deliberation hurts performance in humans. In three of these tasks, state-of-the-art models exhibit significant performance drop-offs with CoT (up to 36.3\% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o), while in others, CoT effects are mixed, with positive, neutral, and negative changes. While models and humans do not exhibit perfectly parallel cognitive processes, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for humans helps identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human verbal thinking and deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a perspective for understanding the impact of inference-time reasoning.

Howard Chen, Jiayi Geng, Adithya Bhaskar et al. · princeton

As new knowledge rapidly accumulates, language models (LMs) with pretrained knowledge quickly become obsolete. A common approach to updating LMs is fine-tuning them directly on new knowledge. However, recent studies have shown that fine-tuning for memorization may be ineffective in storing knowledge or may exacerbate hallucinations. In this work, we introduce a setting we call continual memorization, where a model must memorize and retain a set of factoids through multiple stages of fine-tuning on subsequent datasets. We characterized the forgetting patterns through extensive experiments and show that LMs widely suffer from forgetting, especially when needing to memorize factoids in the second stage. We posit that forgetting can be alleviated by modifying training dynamics: (1) protecting the memorization process when learning factoids or (2) reducing interference from subsequent training stages. Intriguingly, we find that mixing randomly generated word sequences or generic data sampled from pretraining corpora at different training stages effectively mitigates forgetting REMIX: Random and Generic Data Mixing). REMIX can recover performance from severe forgetting, outperforming replay methods and other continual learning baselines. We analyze how REMIX influences the learning process and find that robust memorization follows a distinct pattern: the model stores factoids in earlier layers than usual and diversifies the layers that retain them, which results in easier recall and manipulate of the learned factoids.

Ryan Liu, Jiayi Geng, Joshua C. Peterson et al.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.