Bowei Tian

Guoheng Sun, Ziyao Wang, Bowei Tian et al.

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

Shwai He, Tao Ge, Guoheng Sun et al.

Traditional transformer models often allocate a fixed amount of computational resources to every input token, leading to inefficient and unnecessary computation. To address this, the Mixture of Depths (MoD) was introduced to dynamically adjust the computational depth by skipping less important layers. Despite its promise, current MoD approaches remain under-explored and face two main challenges: (1) high training costs due to the need to train the entire model along with the routers that determine which layers to skip, and (2) the risk of performance degradation when important layers are bypassed. In response to the first issue, we propose Router-Tuning, a method that fine-tunes only the router on a small dataset, drastically reducing the computational overhead associated with full model training. For the second challenge, we propose MindSkip, which deploys Attention with Dynamic Depths. This method preserves the model's performance while significantly enhancing computational and memory efficiency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach delivers competitive results while dramatically improving the computation efficiency, e.g., 21\% speedup and only a 0.2\% performance drop. The code is released at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/Router-Tuning.

Guoheng Sun, Ziyao Wang, Xuandong Zhao et al. · berkeley

Modern large language model (LLM) services increasingly rely on complex, often abstract operations, such as multi-step reasoning and multi-agent collaboration, to generate high-quality outputs. While users are billed based on token consumption and API usage, these internal steps are typically not visible. We refer to such systems as Commercial Opaque LLM Services (COLS). This position paper highlights emerging accountability challenges in COLS: users are billed for operations they cannot observe, verify, or contest. We formalize two key risks: \textit{quantity inflation}, where token and call counts may be artificially inflated, and \textit{quality downgrade}, where providers might quietly substitute lower-cost models or tools. Addressing these risks requires a diverse set of auditing strategies, including commitment-based, predictive, behavioral, and signature-based methods. We further explore the potential of complementary mechanisms such as watermarking and trusted execution environments to enhance verifiability without compromising provider confidentiality. We also propose a modular three-layer auditing framework for COLS and users that enables trustworthy verification across execution, secure logging, and user-facing auditability without exposing proprietary internals. Our aim is to encourage further research and policy development toward transparency, auditability, and accountability in commercial LLM services.

Xueluan Gong, Bowei Tian, Meng Xue et al.

Vision transformers have achieved impressive performance in various vision-related tasks, but their vulnerability to backdoor attacks is under-explored. A handful of existing works focus on dirty-label attacks with wrongly-labeled poisoned training samples, which may fail if a benign model trainer corrects the labels. In this paper, we propose Megatron, an evasive clean-label backdoor attack against vision transformers, where the attacker injects the backdoor without manipulating the data-labeling process. To generate an effective trigger, we customize two loss terms based on the attention mechanism used in transformer networks, i.e., latent loss and attention diffusion loss. The latent loss aligns the last attention layer between triggered samples and clean samples of the target label. The attention diffusion loss emphasizes the attention diffusion area that encompasses the trigger. A theoretical analysis is provided to underpin the rationale behind the attention diffusion loss. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet demonstrate the effectiveness of Megatron. Megatron can achieve attack success rates of over 90% even when the position of the trigger is slightly shifted during testing. Furthermore, Megatron achieves better evasiveness than baselines regarding both human visual inspection and defense strategies (i.e., DBAVT, BAVT, Beatrix, TeCo, and SAGE).

Xueluan Gong, Bowei Tian, Meng Xue et al.

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of Deep Neural Network (DNN) models to backdoor attacks. However, existing backdoor attacks arbitrarily set the trigger mask or use a randomly selected trigger, which restricts the effectiveness and robustness of the generated backdoor triggers. In this paper, we propose a novel attention-based mask generation methodology that searches for the optimal trigger shape and location. We also introduce a Quality-of-Experience (QoE) term into the loss function and carefully adjust the transparency value of the trigger in order to make the backdoored samples to be more natural. To further improve the prediction accuracy of the victim model, we propose an alternating retraining algorithm in the backdoor injection process. The victim model is retrained with mixed poisoned datasets in even iterations and with only benign samples in odd iterations. Besides, we launch the backdoor attack under a co-optimized attack framework that alternately optimizes the backdoor trigger and backdoored model to further improve the attack performance. Apart from DNN models, we also extend our proposed attack method against vision transformers. We evaluate our proposed method with extensive experiments on VGG-Flower, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, CIFAR-100, and ImageNette datasets. It is shown that we can increase the attack success rate by as much as 82\% over baselines when the poison ratio is low and achieve a high QoE of the backdoored samples. Our proposed backdoor attack framework also showcases robustness against state-of-the-art backdoor defenses.