Eric Mazumdar

Pan Xu, Hongkai Zheng, Eric Mazumdar et al.

We study the efficiency of Thompson sampling for contextual bandits. Existing Thompson sampling-based algorithms need to construct a Laplace approximation (i.e., a Gaussian distribution) of the posterior distribution, which is inefficient to sample in high dimensional applications for general covariance matrices. Moreover, the Gaussian approximation may not be a good surrogate for the posterior distribution for general reward generating functions. We propose an efficient posterior sampling algorithm, viz., Langevin Monte Carlo Thompson Sampling (LMC-TS), that uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to directly sample from the posterior distribution in contextual bandits. Our method is computationally efficient since it only needs to perform noisy gradient descent updates without constructing the Laplace approximation of the posterior distribution. We prove that the proposed algorithm achieves the same sublinear regret bound as the best Thompson sampling algorithms for a special case of contextual bandits, viz., linear contextual bandits. We conduct experiments on both synthetic data and real-world datasets on different contextual bandit models, which demonstrates that directly sampling from the posterior is both computationally efficient and competitive in performance.

Moritz Hardt, Eric Mazumdar, Celestine Mendler-Dünner et al.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar et al.

We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into temporal-difference (TD)-learning and minimax value iteration. The resulting dynamics are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric among players. Our main results provide finite-sample guarantees. In particular, we prove the first-known $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/ε^2)$ sample complexity bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics, up to a smoothing bias. In the special case where the stochastic game has only one state (i.e., matrix games), we provide a sharper $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/ε)$ sample complexity. Our analysis uses a novel coupled Lyapunov drift approach to capture the evolution of multiple sets of coupled and stochastic iterates, which might be of independent interest.

Lillian J. Ratliff, Chase Dowling, Eric Mazumdar et al.

We model parking in urban centers as a set of parallel queues and overlay a game theoretic structure that allows us to compare the user-selected (Nash) equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium. We model arriving drivers as utility maximizers and consider the game in which observing the queue length is free as well as the game in which drivers must pay to observe the queue length. In both games, drivers must decide between balking and joining. We compare the Nash induced welfare to the socially optimal welfare. We find that gains to welfare do not require full information penetration---meaning, for social welfare to increase, not everyone needs to pay to observe. Through simulation, we explore a more complex scenario where drivers decide based the queueing game whether or not to enter a collection of queues over a network. We examine the occupancy-congestion relationship, an important relationship for determining the impact of parking resources on overall traffic congestion. Our simulated models use parameters informed by real-world data collected by the Seattle Department of Transportation.

Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar et al.

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix games are based on the smoothed best-response dynamics, while the learning dynamics for stochastic games build upon those for matrix games, with additional incorporation of the minimax value iteration. To our knowledge, our theoretical results present the first finite-sample analysis of such learning dynamics with last-iterate guarantees. In the matrix game setting, the results imply a sample complexity of $O(ε^{-1})$ to find the Nash distribution and a sample complexity of $O(ε^{-8})$ to find a Nash equilibrium. In the stochastic game setting, the results also imply a sample complexity of $O(ε^{-8})$ to find a Nash equilibrium. To establish these results, the main challenge is to handle stochastic approximation algorithms with multiple sets of coupled and stochastic iterates that evolve on (possibly) different time scales. To overcome this challenge, we developed a coupled Lyapunov-based approach, which may be of independent interest to the broader community studying the convergence behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.

Roy Dong, Eric Mazumdar, S. Shankar Sastry

The widespread applicability of analytics in cyber-physical systems has motivated research into causal inference methods. Predictive estimators are not sufficient when analytics are used for decision making; rather, the flow of causal effects must be determined. Generally speaking, these methods focus on estimation of a causal structure from experimental data. In this paper, we consider the dual problem: we fix the causal structure and optimize over causal imputations to achieve desirable system behaviors for a minimal imputation cost. First, we present the optimal causal imputation problem, and then we analyze the problem in two special cases: 1) when the causal imputations can only impute to a fixed value, 2) when the causal structure has linear dynamics with additive Gaussian noise. This optimal causal imputation framework serves to bridge the gap between causal structures and control.

Lauren Conger, Franca Hoffmann, Eric Mazumdar et al.

We propose a novel framework for analyzing the dynamics of distribution shift in real-world systems that captures the feedback loop between learning algorithms and the distributions on which they are deployed. Prior work largely models feedback-induced distribution shift as adversarial or via an overly simplistic distribution-shift structure. In contrast, we propose a coupled partial differential equation model that captures fine-grained changes in the distribution over time by accounting for complex dynamics that arise due to strategic responses to algorithmic decision-making, non-local endogenous population interactions, and other exogenous sources of distribution shift. We consider two common settings in machine learning: cooperative settings with information asymmetries, and competitive settings where a learner faces strategic users. For both of these settings, when the algorithm retrains via gradient descent, we prove asymptotic convergence of the retraining procedure to a steady-state, both in finite and in infinite dimensions, obtaining explicit rates in terms of the model parameters. To do so we derive new results on the convergence of coupled PDEs that extends what is known on multi-species systems. Empirically, we show that our approach captures well-documented forms of distribution shifts like polarization and disparate impacts that simpler models cannot capture.

Chinmay Maheshwari, Eric Mazumdar, Shankar Sastry

We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through repeated interaction while competing with other agents for successful matches. We propose a class of decentralized, communication- and coordination-free algorithms that agents can use to reach to their stable match in structured matching markets. In contrast to prior works, the proposed algorithms make decisions based solely on an agent's own history of play and requires no foreknowledge of the firms' preferences. Our algorithms are constructed by splitting up the statistical problem of learning one's preferences, from noisy observations, from the problem of competing for firms. We show that under realistic structural assumptions on the underlying preferences of the agents and firms, the proposed algorithms incur a regret which grows at most logarithmically in the time horizon. Our results show that, in the case of matching markets, competition need not drastically affect the performance of decentralized, communication and coordination free online learning algorithms.

Chinmay Maheshwari, James Cheng, S. Shankar Sasty et al.

In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the followers' utility functions or strategy space. Our algorithm introduces a unique gradient estimator, leveraging specially designed strategies to probe followers. In a departure from traditional assumptions of optimal play, we model followers' responses using a convergent adaptation rule, allowing for realistic and dynamic interactions. The leader constructs the gradient estimator solely based on observations of followers' actions. We provide both non-asymptotic convergence rates to stationary points of the leader's objective and demonstrate asymptotic convergence to a \emph{local Stackelberg equilibrium}. To validate the effectiveness of our algorithm, we use this algorithm to solve the problem of incentive design on a large-scale transportation network, showcasing its robustness even when the leader lacks access to followers' demand.

Tijana Zrnic, Eric Mazumdar

We construct a zeroth-order gradient estimator for a smooth function defined on the probability simplex. The proposed estimator queries the simplex only. We prove that projected gradient descent and the exponential weights algorithm, when run with this estimator instead of exact gradients, converge at a $\mathcal O(T^{-1/4})$ rate.

Laixi Shi, Jingchu Gai, Eric Mazumdar et al.

Standard multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms are vulnerable to sim-to-real gaps. To address this, distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs) have been proposed to enhance robustness in MARL by optimizing the worst-case performance when game dynamics shift within a prescribed uncertainty set. RMGs remains under-explored, from reasonable problem formulation to the development of sample-efficient algorithms. Two notorious and open challenges are the formulation of the uncertainty set and whether the corresponding RMGs can overcome the curse of multiagency, where the sample complexity scales exponentially with the number of agents. In this work, we propose a natural class of RMGs inspired by behavioral economics, where each agent's uncertainty set is shaped by both the environment and the integrated behavior of other agents. We first establish the well-posedness of this class of RMGs by proving the existence of game-theoretic solutions such as robust Nash equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE). Assuming access to a generative model, we then introduce a sample-efficient algorithm for learning the CCE whose sample complexity scales polynomially with all relevant parameters. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to break the curse of multiagency for RMGs, regardless of the uncertainty set formulation.

Shangding Gu, Laixi Shi, Muning Wen et al.

Driven by inherent uncertainty and the sim-to-real gap, robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to improve resilience against the complexity and variability in agent-environment sequential interactions. Despite the existence of a large number of RL benchmarks, there is a lack of standardized benchmarks for robust RL. Current robust RL policies often focus on a specific type of uncertainty and are evaluated in distinct, one-off environments. In this work, we introduce Robust-Gymnasium, a unified modular benchmark designed for robust RL that supports a wide variety of disruptions across all key RL components-agents' observed state and reward, agents' actions, and the environment. Offering over sixty diverse task environments spanning control and robotics, safe RL, and multi-agent RL, it provides an open-source and user-friendly tool for the community to assess current methods and foster the development of robust RL algorithms. In addition, we benchmark existing standard and robust RL algorithms within this framework, uncovering significant deficiencies in each and offering new insights.

Laixi Shi, Eric Mazumdar, Yuejie Chi et al.

To overcome the sim-to-real gap in reinforcement learning (RL), learned policies must maintain robustness against environmental uncertainties. While robust RL has been widely studied in single-agent regimes, in multi-agent environments, the problem remains understudied -- despite the fact that the problems posed by environmental uncertainties are often exacerbated by strategic interactions. This work focuses on learning in distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs), a robust variant of standard Markov games, wherein each agent aims to learn a policy that maximizes its own worst-case performance when the deployed environment deviates within its own prescribed uncertainty set. This results in a set of robust equilibrium strategies for all agents that align with classic notions of game-theoretic equilibria. Assuming a non-adaptive sampling mechanism from a generative model, we propose a sample-efficient model-based algorithm (DRNVI) with finite-sample complexity guarantees for learning robust variants of various notions of game-theoretic equilibria. We also establish an information-theoretic lower bound for solving RMGs, which confirms the near-optimal sample complexity of DRNVI with respect to problem-dependent factors such as the size of the state space, the target accuracy, and the horizon length.

Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar et al.

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games and propose a two-timescale $Q$-learning algorithm with function approximation that is payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. In two-timescale $Q$-learning, the fast-timescale iterates are updated in spirit to the stochastic gradient descent and the slow-timescale iterates (which we use to compute the policies) are updated by taking a convex combination between its previous iterate and the latest fast-timescale iterate. Introducing the slow timescale as well as its update equation marks as our main algorithmic novelty. In the special case of linear function approximation, we establish, to the best of our knowledge, the first last-iterate finite-sample bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics of these types. The result implies a polynomial sample complexity to find a Nash equilibrium in such stochastic games. To establish the results, we model our proposed algorithm as a two-timescale stochastic approximation and derive the finite-sample bound through a Lyapunov-based approach. The key novelty lies in constructing a valid Lyapunov function to capture the evolution of the slow-timescale iterates. Specifically, through a change of variable, we show that the update equation of the slow-timescale iterates resembles the classical smoothed best-response dynamics, where the regularized Nash gap serves as a valid Lyapunov function. This insight enables us to construct a valid Lyapunov function via a generalized variant of the Moreau envelope of the regularized Nash gap. The construction of our Lyapunov function might be of broad independent interest in studying the behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.

Kishan Panaganti, Adam Wierman, Eric Mazumdar

The robust $φ$-regularized Markov Decision Process (RRMDP) framework focuses on designing control policies that are robust against parameter uncertainties due to mismatches between the simulator (nominal) model and real-world settings. This work makes two important contributions. First, we propose a model-free algorithm called Robust $φ$-regularized fitted Q-iteration (RPQ) for learning an $ε$-optimal robust policy that uses only the historical data collected by rolling out a behavior policy (with robust exploratory requirement) on the nominal model. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first unified analysis for a class of $φ$-divergences achieving robust optimal policies in high-dimensional systems with general function approximation. Second, we introduce the hybrid robust $φ$-regularized reinforcement learning framework to learn an optimal robust policy using both historical data and online sampling. Towards this framework, we propose a model-free algorithm called Hybrid robust Total-variation-regularized Q-iteration (HyTQ: pronounced height-Q). To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first improved out-of-data-distribution assumption in large-scale problems with general function approximation under the hybrid robust $φ$-regularized reinforcement learning framework. Finally, we provide theoretical guarantees on the performance of the learned policies of our algorithms on systems with arbitrary large state space.

Eric Mazumdar, Kishan Panaganti, Laixi Shi

A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. To overcome this obstacle, we take inspiration from behavioral economics and show that -- by imbuing agents with important features of human decision-making like risk aversion and bounded rationality -- a class of risk-averse quantal response equilibria (RQE) become tractable to compute in all $n$-player matrix and finite-horizon Markov games. In particular, we show that they emerge as the endpoint of no-regret learning in suitably adjusted versions of the games. Crucially, the class of computationally tractable RQE is independent of the underlying game structure and only depends on agents' degree of risk-aversion and bounded rationality. To validate the richness of this class of solution concepts we show that it captures peoples' patterns of play in a number of 2-player matrix games previously studied in experimental economics. Furthermore, we give a first analysis of the sample complexity of computing these equilibria in finite-horizon Markov games when one has access to a generative model and validate our findings on a simple multi-agent reinforcement learning benchmark.

Tijana Zrnic, Eric Mazumdar, S. Shankar Sastry et al.

As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the game by deploying a model, and the strategic agents "follow" by playing their best response to the deployed model. Importantly, in this framing, the burden of learning is placed solely on the decision-maker, while the agents' best responses are implicitly treated as instantaneous. In this work, we argue that the order of play in strategic classification is fundamentally determined by the relative frequencies at which the decision-maker and the agents adapt to each other's actions. In particular, by generalizing the standard model to allow both players to learn over time, we show that a decision-maker that makes updates faster than the agents can reverse the order of play, meaning that the agents lead and the decision-maker follows. We observe in standard learning settings that such a role reversal can be desirable for both the decision-maker and the strategic agents. Finally, we show that a decision-maker with the freedom to choose their update frequency can induce learning dynamics that converge to Stackelberg equilibria with either order of play.

Chinmay Maheshwari, Chih-Yuan Chiu, Eric Mazumdar et al.

Min-max optimization is emerging as a key framework for analyzing problems of robustness to strategically and adversarially generated data. We propose a random reshuffling-based gradient free Optimistic Gradient Descent-Ascent algorithm for solving convex-concave min-max problems with finite sum structure. We prove that the algorithm enjoys the same convergence rate as that of zeroth-order algorithms for convex minimization problems. We further specialize the algorithm to solve distributionally robust, decision-dependent learning problems, where gradient information is not readily available. Through illustrative simulations, we observe that our proposed approach learns models that are simultaneously robust against adversarial distribution shifts and strategic decisions from the data sources, and outperforms existing methods from the strategic classification literature.

Yaodong Yu, Tianyi Lin, Eric Mazumdar et al.

Distributionally robust supervised learning (DRSL) is emerging as a key paradigm for building reliable machine learning systems for real-world applications -- reflecting the need for classifiers and predictive models that are robust to the distribution shifts that arise from phenomena such as selection bias or nonstationarity. Existing algorithms for solving Wasserstein DRSL -- one of the most popular DRSL frameworks based around robustness to perturbations in the Wasserstein distance -- have serious limitations that limit their use in large-scale problems -- in particular they involve solving complex subproblems and they fail to make use of stochastic gradients. We revisit Wasserstein DRSL through the lens of min-max optimization and derive scalable and efficiently implementable stochastic extra-gradient algorithms which provably achieve faster convergence rates than existing approaches. We demonstrate their effectiveness on synthetic and real data when compared to existing DRSL approaches. Key to our results is the use of variance reduction and random reshuffling to accelerate stochastic min-max optimization, the analysis of which may be of independent interest.

Vicenc Rubies-Royo, Eric Mazumdar, Roy Dong et al.

In this work we present a multi-armed bandit framework for online expert selection in Markov decision processes and demonstrate its use in high-dimensional settings. Our method takes a set of candidate expert policies and switches between them to rapidly identify the best performing expert using a variant of the classical upper confidence bound algorithm, thus ensuring low regret in the overall performance of the system. This is useful in applications where several expert policies may be available, and one needs to be selected at run-time for the underlying environment.

Tyler Westenbroek, Eric Mazumdar, David Fridovich-Keil et al.

This paper proposes a framework for adaptively learning a feedback linearization-based tracking controller for an unknown system using discrete-time model-free policy-gradient parameter update rules. The primary advantage of the scheme over standard model-reference adaptive control techniques is that it does not require the learned inverse model to be invertible at all instances of time. This enables the use of general function approximators to approximate the linearizing controller for the system without having to worry about singularities. However, the discrete-time and stochastic nature of these algorithms precludes the direct application of standard machinery from the adaptive control literature to provide deterministic stability proofs for the system. Nevertheless, we leverage these techniques alongside tools from the stochastic approximation literature to demonstrate that with high probability the tracking and parameter errors concentrate near zero when a certain persistence of excitation condition is satisfied. A simulated example of a double pendulum demonstrates the utility of the proposed theory. 1

Eric Mazumdar, Aldo Pacchiano, Yi-an Ma et al.

Thompson sampling for multi-armed bandit problems is known to enjoy favorable performance in both theory and practice. However, it suffers from a significant limitation computationally, arising from the need for samples from posterior distributions at every iteration. We propose two Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods tailored to Thompson sampling to address this issue. We construct quickly converging Langevin algorithms to generate approximate samples that have accuracy guarantees, and we leverage novel posterior concentration rates to analyze the regret of the resulting approximate Thompson sampling algorithm. Further, we specify the necessary hyperparameters for the MCMC procedure to guarantee optimal instance-dependent frequentist regret while having low computational complexity. In particular, our algorithms take advantage of both posterior concentration and a sample reuse mechanism to ensure that only a constant number of iterations and a constant amount of data is needed in each round. The resulting approximate Thompson sampling algorithm has logarithmic regret and its computational complexity does not scale with the time horizon of the algorithm.

Tyler Westenbroek, David Fridovich-Keil, Eric Mazumdar et al.

We present a novel approach to control design for nonlinear systems which leverages model-free policy optimization techniques to learn a linearizing controller for a physical plant with unknown dynamics. Feedback linearization is a technique from nonlinear control which renders the input-output dynamics of a nonlinear plant \emph{linear} under application of an appropriate feedback controller. Once a linearizing controller has been constructed, desired output trajectories for the nonlinear plant can be tracked using a variety of linear control techniques. However, the calculation of a linearizing controller requires a precise dynamics model for the system. As a result, model-based approaches for learning exact linearizing controllers generally require a simple, highly structured model of the system with easily identifiable parameters. In contrast, the model-free approach presented in this paper is able to approximate the linearizing controller for the plant using general function approximation architectures. Specifically, we formulate a continuous-time optimization problem over the parameters of a learned linearizing controller whose optima are the set of parameters which best linearize the plant. We derive conditions under which the learning problem is (strongly) convex and provide guarantees which ensure the true linearizing controller for the plant is recovered. We then discuss how model-free policy optimization algorithms can be used to solve a discrete-time approximation to the problem using data collected from the real-world plant. The utility of the framework is demonstrated in simulation and on a real-world robotic platform.

Eric Mazumdar, Lillian J. Ratliff, Michael I. Jordan et al.

We show by counterexample that policy-gradient algorithms have no guarantees of even local convergence to Nash equilibria in continuous action and state space multi-agent settings. To do so, we analyze gradient-play in N-player general-sum linear quadratic games, a classic game setting which is recently emerging as a benchmark in the field of multi-agent learning. In such games the state and action spaces are continuous and global Nash equilibria can be found be solving coupled Ricatti equations. Further, gradient-play in LQ games is equivalent to multi agent policy-gradient. We first show that these games are surprisingly not convex games. Despite this, we are still able to show that the only critical points of the gradient dynamics are global Nash equilibria. We then give sufficient conditions under which policy-gradient will avoid the Nash equilibria, and generate a large number of general-sum linear quadratic games that satisfy these conditions. In such games we empirically observe the players converging to limit cycles for which the time average does not coincide with a Nash equilibrium. The existence of such games indicates that one of the most popular approaches to solving reinforcement learning problems in the classic reinforcement learning setting has no local guarantee of convergence in multi-agent settings. Further, the ease with which we can generate these counterexamples suggests that such situations are not mere edge cases and are in fact quite common.

Benjamin Chasnov, Lillian J. Ratliff, Eric Mazumdar et al.

Considering a class of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms in non-cooperative settings, we provide local convergence guarantees to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium. In particular, we consider continuous games where agents learn in (i) deterministic settings with oracle access to their gradient and (ii) stochastic settings with an unbiased estimator of their gradient. Utilizing the minimum and maximum singular values of the game Jacobian, we provide finite-time convergence guarantees in the deterministic case. On the other hand, in the stochastic case, we provide concentration bounds guaranteeing that with high probability agents will converge to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium in finite time. Different than other works in this vein, we also study the effects of non-uniform learning rates on the learning dynamics and convergence rates. We find that much like preconditioning in optimization, non-uniform learning rates cause a distortion in the vector field which can, in turn, change the rate of convergence and the shape of the region of attraction. The analysis is supported by numerical examples that illustrate different aspects of the theory. We conclude with discussion of the results and open questions.

Eric V. Mazumdar, Michael I. Jordan, S. Shankar Sastry

We propose local symplectic surgery, a two-timescale procedure for finding local Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We first show that previous gradient-based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to local Nash equilibria due to the existence of non-Nash stationary points. By taking advantage of the differential structure of the game, we construct an algorithm for which the local Nash equilibria are the only attracting fixed points. We also show that the algorithm exhibits no oscillatory behaviors in neighborhoods of equilibria and show that it has the same per-iteration complexity as other recently proposed algorithms. We conclude by validating the algorithm on two numerical examples: a toy example with multiple Nash equilibria and a non-Nash equilibrium, and the training of a small generative adversarial network (GAN).

Eric Mazumdar, Roy Dong, Vicenç Rúbies Royo et al.

We formulate a multi-armed bandit (MAB) approach to choosing expert policies online in Markov decision processes (MDPs). Given a set of expert policies trained on a state and action space, the goal is to maximize the cumulative reward of our agent. The hope is to quickly find the best expert in our set. The MAB formulation allows us to quantify the performance of an algorithm in terms of the regret incurred from not choosing the best expert from the beginning. We first develop the theoretical framework for MABs in MDPs, and then present a basic regret decomposition identity. We then adapt the classical Upper Confidence Bounds algorithm to the problem of choosing experts in MDPs and prove that the expected regret grows at worst at a logarithmic rate. Lastly, we validate the theory on a small MDP.

Lillian J. Ratliff, Eric Mazumdar

We address the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in Markov decision processes where the agent is risk-sensitive. In particular, we model risk-sensitivity in a reinforcement learning framework by making use of models of human decision-making having their origins in behavioral psychology, behavioral economics, and neuroscience. We propose a gradient-based inverse reinforcement learning algorithm that minimizes a loss function defined on the observed behavior. We demonstrate the performance of the proposed technique on two examples, the first of which is the canonical Grid World example and the second of which is a Markov decision process modeling passengers' decisions regarding ride-sharing. In the latter, we use pricing and travel time data from a ride-sharing company to construct the transition probabilities and rewards of the Markov decision process.