Alexander Benvenuti

Alexander Benvenuti, Huaiyuan Rao, Matthew Hale

Privacy techniques have been developed for data-driven systems, but systems with non-numeric data cannot use typical noise-adding techniques. Therefore, we develop a new mechanism for privatizing state trajectories of symbolic systems that may be represented as words over a finite alphabet. Such systems include Markov chains, Markov decision processes, and finite-state automata, and we protect their symbolic trajectories with differential privacy. The mechanism we develop randomly selects a private approximation to be released in place of the original sensitive word, with a bias towards low-error private words. This work is based on the permute-and-flip mechanism for differential privacy, which can be applied to non-numeric data. However, a na\"ıve implementation would have to enumerate an exponentially large list of words to generate a private word. As a result, we develop a new mechanism that generates private words without ever needing to enumerate such a list. We prove that the accuracy of our mechanism is never worse than the prior state of the art, and we empirically show on a real traffic dataset that it introduces up to $55\%$ less error than the prior state of the art under a conventional privacy implementation.

Yerin Kim, Alexander Benvenuti, Bo Chen et al.

Autonomous systems are increasingly expected to operate in the presence of adversaries, though adversaries may infer sensitive information simply by observing a system. Therefore, present a deceptive sequential decision-making framework that not only conceals sensitive information, but actively misleads adversaries about it. We model autonomous systems as Markov decision processes, with adversaries using inverse reinforcement learning to recover reward functions. To counter them, we present three regularization strategies for policy synthesis problems that actively deceive an adversary about a system's reward. ``Diversionary deception'' leads an adversary to draw any false conclusion about the system's reward function. ``Targeted deception'' leads an adversary to draw a specific false conclusion about the system's reward function. ``Equivocal deception'' leads an adversary to infer that the real reward and a false reward both explain the system's behavior. We show how each form of deception can be implemented in policy optimization problems and analytically bound the loss in total accumulated reward induced by deception. Next, we evaluate these developments in a multi-agent setting. We show that diversionary, targeted, and equivocal deception all steer the adversary to false beliefs while still attaining a total accumulated reward that is at least 97% of its optimal, non-deceptive value.