Oğuzhan Ersoy

Gorka Abad, Oguzhan Ersoy, Stjepan Picek et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across various tasks, including image and speech recognition. However, maximizing the effectiveness of DNNs requires meticulous optimization of numerous hyperparameters and network parameters through training. Moreover, high-performance DNNs entail many parameters, which consume significant energy during training. In order to overcome these challenges, researchers have turned to spiking neural networks (SNNs), which offer enhanced energy efficiency and biologically plausible data processing capabilities, rendering them highly suitable for sensory data tasks, particularly in neuromorphic data. Despite their advantages, SNNs, like DNNs, are susceptible to various threats, including adversarial examples and backdoor attacks. Yet, the field of SNNs still needs to be explored in terms of understanding and countering these attacks. This paper delves into backdoor attacks in SNNs using neuromorphic datasets and diverse triggers. Specifically, we explore backdoor triggers within neuromorphic data that can manipulate their position and color, providing a broader scope of possibilities than conventional triggers in domains like images. We present various attack strategies, achieving an attack success rate of up to 100% while maintaining a negligible impact on clean accuracy. Furthermore, we assess these attacks' stealthiness, revealing that our most potent attacks possess significant stealth capabilities. Lastly, we adapt several state-of-the-art defenses from the image domain, evaluating their efficacy on neuromorphic data and uncovering instances where they fall short, leading to compromised performance.

Ali Reza Ghavamipour, Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao, Oguzhan Ersoy et al.

Decentralized machine learning (DL) has been receiving an increasing interest recently due to the elimination of a single point of failure, present in Federated learning setting. Yet, it is threatened by the looming threat of Byzantine clients who intentionally disrupt the learning process by broadcasting arbitrary model updates to other clients, seeking to degrade the performance of the global model. In response, robust aggregation schemes have emerged as promising solutions to defend against such Byzantine clients, thereby enhancing the robustness of Decentralized Learning. Defenses against Byzantine adversaries, however, typically require access to the updates of other clients, a counterproductive privacy trade-off that in turn increases the risk of inference attacks on those same model updates. In this paper, we introduce SecureDL, a novel DL protocol designed to enhance the security and privacy of DL against Byzantine threats. SecureDL~facilitates a collaborative defense, while protecting the privacy of clients' model updates through secure multiparty computation. The protocol employs efficient computation of cosine similarity and normalization of updates to robustly detect and exclude model updates detrimental to model convergence. By using MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10 datasets, we evaluated SecureDL against various Byzantine attacks and compared its effectiveness with four existing defense mechanisms. Our experiments show that SecureDL is effective even in the case of attacks by the malicious majority (e.g., 80% Byzantine clients) while preserving high training accuracy.

Oguzhan Ersoy, Stefanie Roos, Zekeriya Erkin

Payment channel networks like Bitcoin's Lightning network are an auspicious approach for realizing high transaction throughput and almost-instant confirmations in blockchain networks. However, the ability to successfully make payments in such networks relies on the willingness of participants to lock collateral in the network. In Lightning, the key financial incentive is to lock collateral are small fees for routing payments for other participants. While users can choose these fees, currently, they mainly stick to the default fees. By providing insights on beneficial choices for fees, we aim to incentivize users to lock more collateral and improve the effectiveness of the network. In this paper, we consider a node $\mathbf{A}$ that given the network topology and the channel details selects where to establish channels and how much fee to charge such that its financial gain is maximized. We formalize the optimization problem and show that it is NP-hard. We design a greedy algorithm to approximate the optimal solution. In each step, our greedy algorithm selects a node which maximizes the total reward concerning the number of shortest paths passing through $\mathbf{A}$ and channel fees. Our simulation study leverages real-world data set to quantify the impact of our gain optimization and indicates that our strategy is at least a factor two better than other strategies.

Oguzhan Ersoy, Zhijie Ren, Zekeriya Erkin et al.

Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will not be sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with rational nodes. In this work, we formally define the problem of incentivizing nodes for transaction propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the propagation of a transaction receives a share of the transaction fee. We also show that our proposal is Sybil-proof. Furthermore, we combine the incentive mechanism with smart routing to reduce the communication and storage costs at the same time. The proposed routing mechanism reduces the redundant transaction propagation from the size of the network to a factor of average shortest path length. The routing mechanism is built upon a specific type of consensus protocol where the round leader who creates the transaction block is known in advance. Note that our routing mechanism is a generic one and can be adopted independently from the incentive mechanism.