Yan Lin

ByteDance Seed, Jiaze Chen, Tiantian Fan et al. · bytedance

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

Jun Li, Zhichao Xing, Weibin Zhang et al.

Vehicle tracking has become one of the key applications of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in the fields of rescue, surveillance, traffic monitoring, etc. However, the increased tracking accuracy requires more energy consumption. In this letter, a decentralized vehicle tracking strategy is conceived for improving both tracking accuracy and energy saving, which is based on adjusting the intersection area between the fixed sensing area and the dynamic activation area. Then, two deep reinforcement learning (DRL) aided solutions are proposed relying on the dynamic selection of the activation area radius. Finally, simulation results show the superiority of our DRL aided design.

Lin Yan, Yao Guo, Xiangqun Chen et al.

Power side channel is a very important category of side channels, which can be exploited to steal confidential information from a computing system by analyzing its power consumption. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of various power side channels on popular mobile devices such as smartphones. Based on unprivileged power consumption traces, we present a list of real-world attacks that can be initiated to identify running apps, infer sensitive UIs, guess password lengths, and estimate geo-locations. These attack examples demonstrate that power consumption traces can be used as a practical side channel to gain various confidential information of mobile apps running on smartphones. Based on these power side channels, we discuss possible exploitations and present a general approach to exploit a power side channel on an Android smartphone, which demonstrates that power side channels pose imminent threats to the security and privacy of mobile users. We also discuss possible countermeasures to mitigate the threats of power side channels.