Pangpang Liu

Pangpang Liu, Zhuoran Yang, Zhaoran Wang et al.

Personalized pricing, which involves tailoring prices based on individual characteristics, is commonly used by firms to implement a consumer-specific pricing policy. In this process, buyers can also strategically manipulate their feature data to obtain a lower price, incurring certain manipulation costs. Such strategic behavior can hinder firms from maximizing their profits. In this paper, we study the contextual dynamic pricing problem with strategic buyers. The seller does not observe the buyer's true feature, but a manipulated feature according to buyers' strategic behavior. In addition, the seller does not observe the buyers' valuation of the product, but only a binary response indicating whether a sale happens or not. Recognizing these challenges, we propose a strategic dynamic pricing policy that incorporates the buyers' strategic behavior into the online learning to maximize the seller's cumulative revenue. We first prove that existing non-strategic pricing policies that neglect the buyers' strategic behavior result in a linear $Ω(T)$ regret with $T$ the total time horizon, indicating that these policies are not better than a random pricing policy. We then establish that our proposed policy achieves a sublinear regret upper bound of $O(\sqrt{T})$. Importantly, our policy is not a mere amalgamation of existing dynamic pricing policies and strategic behavior handling algorithms. Our policy can also accommodate the scenario when the marginal cost of manipulation is unknown in advance. To account for it, we simultaneously estimate the valuation parameter and the cost parameter in the online pricing policy, which is shown to also achieve an $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound. Extensive experiments support our theoretical developments and demonstrate the superior performance of our policy compared to other pricing policies that are unaware of the strategic behaviors.

Shuai Wang, Xinyuan Tian, Pangpang Liu et al.

This paper argues that workflow closure is not scientific closure in auto-research systems. Current systems can increasingly complete research-like loops internally, moving from idea generation to experiment execution, writing, and self-evaluation. That achievement is real, but it does not by itself give the resulting outputs scientific standing. We argue that trustworthy auto-research should not aim for autonomous self-sufficiency, but should aim for autonomous execution under non-autonomous epistemic control. Based on a survey of more than 100 recent papers and repositories in this rapidly emerging area, together with a structured audit of 21 representative systems, we diagnose a recurring and structurally connected failure pattern: objective collapse, in which single-proxy targets replace multi-objective scientific aims; validation collapse, in which internal self-evaluation replaces independent validation; and acceptance collapse, in which benchmark scores or publication-shaped artifacts replace mechanisms for domain-level critique, reuse, and integration. These collapses are not inherent limits of autonomy but correctable design choices. Accordingly, we outline potential remedies across objective signal, validation, and output pathway to spark community discussion.

Pangpang Liu, Chengchun Shi, Will Wei Sun

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a central framework for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Despite its practical success, RLHF raises fundamental statistical questions because it relies on noisy, subjective, and often heterogeneous feedback to learn reward models and optimize policies. This survey provides a statistical perspective on RLHF, focusing primarily on the LLM alignment setting. We introduce the main components of RLHF, including supervised fine-tuning, reward modeling, and policy optimization, and relate them to familiar statistical ideas such as Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model, latent utility estimation, active learning, experimental design, and uncertainty quantification. We review methods for learning reward functions from pairwise preference data and for optimizing policies through both two-stage RLHF pipelines and emerging one-stage approaches such as direct preference optimization. We further discuss recent extensions including reinforcement learning from AI feedback, inference-time algorithms, and reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, as well as benchmark datasets, evaluation protocols, and open-source frameworks that support RLHF research. We conclude by highlighting open challenges in RLHF. An accompanying GitHub demo https://github.com/Pangpang-Liu/RLHF_demo illustrates key components of the RLHF pipeline.

Pangpang Liu, Junwei Lu, Will Wei Sun

We study estimation and statistical inference for reward models used in aligning large language models (LLMs). A key component of LLM alignment is reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), where humans compare pairs of model-generated answers and their preferences are used to train a reward model. However, human feedback is inherently heterogeneous, creating significant challenges for reliable reward learning. To address this, we adopt a heterogeneous preference framework that jointly models the latent reward of answers and human rationality. This leads to a challenging biconvex optimization problem, which we solve via an alternating gradient descent algorithm. We establish theoretical guarantees for the resulting estimator, including its convergence and asymptotic distribution. These results enable the construction of confidence intervals for reward estimates. Leveraging these uncertainty quantification results, we conduct valid statistical comparisons between rewards and incorporate uncertainty into the best-of-$N$ (BoN) policy framework. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, and applications to real LLM data highlight the practical value of accounting for uncertainty in reward modeling for LLM alignment.

Pangpang Liu, Will Wei Sun

Contextual pricing strategies are prevalent in online retailing, where the seller adjusts prices based on products' attributes and buyers' characteristics. Although such strategies can enhance seller's profits, they raise concerns about fairness when significant price disparities emerge among specific groups, such as gender or race. These disparities can lead to adverse perceptions of fairness among buyers and may even violate the law and regulation. In contrast, price differences can incentivize disadvantaged buyers to strategically manipulate their group identity to obtain a lower price. In this paper, we investigate contextual dynamic pricing with fairness constraints, taking into account buyers' strategic behaviors when their group status is private and unobservable from the seller. We propose a dynamic pricing policy that simultaneously achieves price fairness and discourages strategic behaviors. Our policy achieves an upper bound of $O(\sqrt{T}+H(T))$ regret over $T$ time horizons, where the term $H(T)$ arises from buyers' assessment of the fairness of the pricing policy based on their learned price difference. When buyers are able to learn the fairness of the price policy, this upper bound reduces to $O(\sqrt{T})$. We also prove an $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ regret lower bound of any pricing policy under our problem setting. We support our findings with extensive experimental evidence, showcasing our policy's effectiveness. In our real data analysis, we observe the existence of price discrimination against race in the loan application even after accounting for other contextual information. Our proposed pricing policy demonstrates a significant improvement, achieving 35.06% reduction in regret compared to the benchmark policy.